Rethinking journalism for supporting social cohesion and democracy: case study of media performance in Fiji by Singh, Shailendra Bahadur
Rethinking journalism for supporting social cohesion and democracy: 
Case study of media performance in Fiji  
Shailendra Bahadur Singh
Masters in Business Administration 
Graduate Certificate Tertiary Teaching  
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
The University of Queensland in 2014
School of Journalism and Communication
	   i	  
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines conflict reporting in Fiji, an ethnically and politically divided Pacific island 
country debilitated by four socially and economically devastating coups between 1987 and 2006.  
Like media in some other developing countries, the Fiji media stand accused of exacerbating 
societal tensions through ill-informed, inflammatory journalism. This has had major repercussions 
for freedom of speech and good governance, with governments often citing media’s alleged role in 
aggravating conflict as justification for the introduction of punitive Media Industry Development 
Decree in 2010.  Pacific media lacks in-depth scholarly investigation, and consequently this Fiji-
focussed research has four core objectives: to empirically test the claims being made constantly 
about conflict reporting; to assess journalists’ professionalism and diversity; to analyse media 
legislation to determine whether it is having its purported effects; and finally, to examine the 
national media ownership structure and its impact on journalism. These cross-cutting issues are 
examined through the political economy and normative media theoretical frameworks in 
combination with contemporary conflict reporting concepts such as peace journalism.  
 
The literature review involved an assessment of the media coverage of the major post-Cold War 
conflicts, including some in the Pacific. In the main, existing literature focuses on Western news 
organisations. Non-Western, domestic media are largely neglected, with little exploration of the 
links between media content and the national media structure (ownership, legislation, journalist 
diversity and journalist capacity). The thesis approaches conflict reporting in Fiji in a holistic manner 
by linking media content to the national media landscape. This method enables not only an empirical 
assessment of the long-standing claims made against the Fiji media, but also a determination of 
whether conflict resolution can, and should be, one of the recognised roles of the national media in a 
tense, multi-ethnic country such as Fiji.   
 
The methodology includes the following: a content analysis of the print media’s coverage of the 
2006 general elections; a survey of the national journalist corps; a document review to evaluate the 
legislative environment and the national media ownership structure; and in-depth interviews for 
deeper insights into the key issues emanating from the literature. The content analysis returned a 
peace journalism reading, but the lack of context and the heavy reliance on elite sources diminished 
the value of the positive tone of the overall findings. Indeed, a new line of enquiry indicated that 
media were under-reporting important socio-economic issues, usually at the heart of societal 
conflict.  
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The questionnaire survey revealed a relatively young, inexperienced and under-qualified journalist 
corps, which betrayed signs of a fairly high rate of journalist attrition. This thesis tries to determine 
to what extent this problem can be attributed to low salaries, and to some other potential causes, 
such as Fiji’s coup culture and punitive media legislation. Document review shows the legal 
environment has become quite restrictive since the 2006 coup, and that the media ownership regime 
has become increasingly corporatised since Fiji’s independence in 1970. Following the 
implementation of the 2010 Media Decree, the government has become the most powerful influence 
in the media sector, both as a major proprietor and a high-volume advertiser. Moreover, government 
is the legislator of not only media policies, but also trade, business and economic policies that could 
impact on the profitability of media company owners, which include local conglomerates with 
major interests in other sectors of the economy.  
 
These findings are indicative of a media sector mired in serious political, economic, and structural 
challenges. The results show that inflammatory reporting may have been a problem at one time, and 
is not to be underestimated in a multi-ethnic country like Fiji. But the one-sided focus of the policy 
on inflammatory reporting could be diverting attention from the more serious, deep-rooted 
problems that seem to have taken hold in the media sector over the decades, such as the lack of in-
depth coverage, apparently due to insufficient newsroom capacity. This morass leads to the 
conclusion that authoritarian oversight, over-regulation and punitive media laws – introduced in the 
name of social stability and national development – are insufficient on their own to address the root 
causes of the problems. A better strategy would be to direct greater efforts towards training and 
development, and improving working conditions to build and retain a strong journalist corps over 
the long term.  
 
This study spans theory, practice and policy. With conflict reporting rarely researched in a 
systematic manner in the Pacific, the thesis aims to put the subject firmly on the agenda. It seeks to 
make a distinct contribution to knowledge with originality through approaching the whole area via 
theoretical frameworks involving political economy and peace journalism. Policy-wise, conflict 
containment is going to be an on-going, generational effort in Fiji, and a study looking into the 
problem from a media perspective is long overdue. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
“Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding.” 
– Albert Einstein. 
 
1.1 Overall research paradigm and significance 
 
Certain observers consider that Fiji’s news media, not unlike media elsewhere, are implicated in 
exacerbating social and political conflict. Yet media per se are also thought to have potential for 
peace building and promoting understanding (Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Robie, 2001). This research 
seeks to investigate such seemingly anomalous claims in the Fiji context. Discussion in this first 
chapter opens with the overall research paradigm and significance before explaining the origins of 
the thesis. It then outlines the problem statement, research objectives and the research questions, 
before proceeding to a preliminary discussion of the key concepts and methodological framework 
shaping the thesis. The chapter rounds off with an overview of the thesis chapters followed by a 
summary of this chapter. 
 
This particular investigation is a response to a global trend in research and practice in conflict 
prevention in reaction to security threats arising in the post–Cold War era, particularly ethnically-
driven, internal conflicts (AusAid, 2006; Centre on International Cooperation, 2010). Various 
studies assert that such conflicts, which made up 80 per cent of all major conflicts in the 1990s, are 
a security problem of “global proportions” (Bloomfield & Reilly, 1998; Wimmer, 2004). This 
research was inspired by a growing recognition among policymakers that the news media should be 
a part of any comprehensive peace-building strategy (United States Institute of Peace, 2008). Some 
Pacific analysts believe that an empowered media could play an important role in the region, 
especially in politically fragile island societies (Papoutsaki & Harris, 2008; Robie, 2011, 2014). 
One of the aims of this research is to determine whether the Fiji media needs to be empowered, and 
if so, in what manner. 
 
Towards this end, this research seeks to fill a major gap: Peace studies have become an important 
contemporary field in many parts of the world (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2011); 
however, the subject remains largely unexplored in Fiji and the Pacific, particularly from news 
media and conflict reporting perspectives. Paradoxically, this coy silence persists amid a global era 
marked by unprecedented intra-State conflict, in which media are allegedly used to exacerbate 
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tensions (see Lynch & Galtung, 2010). Elsewhere, some analysts have been researching and 
propagating concepts such as peace journalism and conflict sensitive reporting, which propose an 
alternative approach to conflict reporting (Lynch & Galtung, 2010). These frameworks have been 
partially applied in troubled spots like the Philippines, with mixed results. But the allegedly Western-
influenced Pacific media are said to have largely emphasised conflict as a predominant news value by 
focussing on its visible, often violent manifestations, with little in-depth reporting or debate about 
alternative paradigms (Robie, 2011, 2014).  
 
In the western context, journalism attaches great value to the public interest agenda. Aggressive, 
confrontational and adversarial watchdog journalism is not only tolerated, it is also seen as a 
legitimate way to seek out and expose the truth. The Pacific cultural context is somewhat more 
complicated, as in Fiji, where there is an emphasis on respect for elders and chiefs, shying away 
from open criticism, not questioning leaders’ actions and avoiding conflict (Madraiwiwi, 2014; 
Williams, 1999). Some see this as an unequal distribution of power within Pacific societies, but it is 
generally accepted as part of the tradition (see Saffu, 2003). Some scholars argue that for journalism 
to be effective in the Pacific, there is a need for a more inclusive media framework that appreciates 
and incorporates the strong role of culture and its influence in island societies (see Latu, 2010). 
Commentators like J. Bhagwan (2010) believe that concepts such as peace journalism may be more 
suited for Fiji’s cultural, social and political conditions. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005, p. 5) state 
that peace journalism: 
 
uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of  
balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting. Peace journalism provides a new route map 
tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover, and the 
consequences of their intervention. 
 
A thoughtful, thorough and considered approach to conflict reporting could benefit an ethnically-
tense country like Fiji. Moreover, it would seem to be more compatible with indigenous communal 
values compared to the traditional reporting format, which can be quite direct and even 
confrontational. But there are long-standing issues about societal elites using so-called culturally-
sensitive journalistic frameworks to curtail the media and cover up abuses (see Robie, 2014; Smiles, 
2001). Such concerns aside, an investigation into the role of media in conflict is overdue, given the 
post-Cold War trend in conflicts in the region. This includes the four coups (arguably five) in Fiji 
between 1987 and 2006; the decade-long Bougainville insurgency, 1988–1997; anti-French nuclear 
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protests in Papeete, French Polynesia, in the mid-1990s; armed forces rebellion in Vanuatu in 1996; 
ethnic conflict between the people of Malaita and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, 1998–2003; 
army mutinies in Papua New Guinea in 1997 and 2001; and the political riots in Tonga in 2006 
(Henderson & Bellamy, 2002; Robie, 2011, 2014; U. Harris, 2004). 
 
Citing human rights agency reports and other sources, Robie (2014, p. 311) estimates that 120,000 
Pacific Islanders have been killed in various disputes over the past quarter-century, plus another 
200,000 when Timor-Leste is included. In Fiji, political and ethnic tensions between the two major 
groups, indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, contributed to the four coups – ostensibly only in one 
or two cases. Several empirical studies have attempted to show that inflammatory reporting by 
sections of the national media emboldened rebels involved in the 2000 takeover of government 
(Robie, 2001; T. R. Singh, 2011). This thesis investigates such claims theoretically and 
methodologically. 
 
Fiji has not, thus far, degenerated into wide-scale violence. However, it has experienced fairly long-
term ethno-political tensions, which degenerated into rioting and looting during the 1987 and 2000 
nationalistic coups, with major property damage, some loss of lives and further harm to race 
relations (T. R. Singh, 2011). The December 2006 coup was a perplexing turnaround, with the 
indigenous Fijian-dominated military taking power in the name of multiracialism (T. R. Singh, 
2011). Fiji has its share of demagogues. In 2002, an indigenous Fijian cabinet minister, Asenaca 
Caucau, described Indo-Fijians, descendants of indentured labourers brought to Fiji by the British 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as “weeds taking up space” (Bisram, 2002). 
Such forms of hate speech are viewed with grave seriousness within the media sector and academic 
circles, especially after the Rwanda experience, when Hutu agitators used radio to demonise Tutsis 
as “cockroaches and snakes to be stamped out” prior to and during the genocide (McCullum, 1997).  
  
For Fiji, the lack of growth resulting from the political instability could be seen as a major problem 
and a potential trigger for further conflict. Paul Collier’s words in his acclaimed book, Guns, Wars 
and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, ring true for Fiji: “wars and coups are not tea parties: 
they are development in reverse” (2009, p. 9). Fiji’s four coups can be linked to a trend of serious 
and sustained decline that permeates virtually all levels of society. This includes investment falling 
from 25 per cent of the GDP in the 1970s to around 12 per cent in more recent decades. This is 
reflected in the meagre annual average growth of 1.6 per cent since 1996, which is in turn linked to 
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high unemployment, increasing social problems and declining services and infrastructure (see B. 
Prasad & R. Singh, 2008; Naidu, 2005, 2008, 2013).  
 
In addition, research shows that the country has a 20-year infrastructure deficit of FJD3.4 billion 
partly due to persistent instability (B. Prasad & P. Narayan, 2008). Fiji economist and political 
commentator Wadan Narsey (2013a) estimates that by 2011, Fiji had lost FJD1,700 million because 
of the 2006 coup. This included FJD400 million in government revenue, which could have been 
allocated to education, health, infrastructure, public debt repayments and so forth. Cumulatively, 
these indicators reveal that Fiji’s precarious position has progressively worsened over the past 25 
years. The situation betrays signs of an ominous trend: long-term ethnic and political tensions 
coupled with low growth rates and under development are usually the formula for violent conflict in 
fragile states (see Collier, 2009; Henderson & Watson, 2005).  
 
From a conflict reporting perspective, the moot point is whether journalism in Fiji is informed and 
influenced by this historical context of persistent, low-level conflict that periodically boils over into 
coups. Given the ongoing social, political and economic consequences of conflict in Fiji, and a 
national aspiration to contain the problem, this research seeks to understand conflict in the country 
and the local media’s role in it, especially since successive Fiji governments’ accusations of press 
incitement of racial discord are used to justify censorship (Robie, 2009a, 2009b).  
 
1.2 Foundation of this thesis 
 
The seeds for this thesis were planted in this researcher’s mind subconsciously during his conduct 
of a news interview with a deposed government minister in the aftermath of Fiji’s third coup on 
May 19, 2000. Civilian and military ethno-nationalist elements proclaiming indigenous Fijian 
supremacy took the country’s first legitimately elected Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, Mahendra 
Chaudhry, and his People’s Coalition Government, hostage (T. R. Singh, 2011). The fall of this 
government in its first year in office was preceded by what many analysts saw as the media 
demonisation of Chaudhry, which allegedly fed into latent indigenous concerns about their rights 
under an Indo-Fijian prime minister (Obini, 2000; T. R, Singh, 2011; Robie, 2001). But an 
unrepentant media blamed the Chaudhry Government for its own demise. However, while 
government had made some poor decisions, it was seen to be performing well on the crucial 
economic front (see Robie, 2000, 2001). 
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Notwithstanding government’s supposed tactical blunders, including getting off-side with the 
media, were indigenous interests really threatened by an Indo-Fijian prime minister as claimed by 
the insurgents? This researcher put the question to a senior Chaudhry Government MP, Krishna 
Datt, who had escaped arrest by the rebels. In a compelling discussion, Datt insisted that the issue 
had more to do with leadership style, assumptions about a fully-fledged democracy, the roles played 
by the media and certain individuals in shaping public opinion, rather than outright indigenous 
Fijian rejection of the government (Living on borrowed time, 2000). Datt, the education minister in 
the deposed cabinet, added: 
 
Journalists abroad have a certain style in questioning issues and adopt a particular 
slant, which is fine in fully-fledged democracies that can take it. But here we had a 
fledgling democracy, which hadn’t got its roots dug in. That kind of journalism did a 
lot of damage. We could score all this and see where the problem is – whether there was a 
reaction to the media image about government or if it was the reality. Unless we delve 
deeply into these and other issues, it would not be fair to jump to conclusions.   
(Living on borrowed time, 2000, p. 18)   
 
The Datt interview was a profound experience for this researcher, who trained as a cadet reporter in 
the late 1980s with the Rupert Murdoch–owned the Fiji Times, developing a rather strong faith in 
the media’s fourth estate role in a democracy, forged largely in the newsroom. In hindsight, the 
grounding laid in the newsroom lacked critical analysis. It was limiting in the Fiji context, 
particularly in terms of a deeper understanding about the fragility of Fiji’s democracy due to its 
history and its mixed society.   
 
Twelve years after the Datt interview, this researcher conducted interviews with Fiji journalists for 
his PhD study. It was déjà vu when a print media journalist commented that “we are stuck in here 
and just go through the mill (with) no time to reflect. The newsroom environment is not conducive 
for reflective thinking” (Print Newsroom Manager, in an in-depth interview with the author, 25 
September 2012). Typically, journalists and analysts conceptualise the role of Fiji’s media from the 
fourth estate perspective. This idea of an unfettered and independent press holding governments to 
account was conceived and developed by liberal theorists in Western democracies with largely 
homogeneous populations (Cornog, 2006; Mohd, 2005). However, Fiji is neither a liberal 
democracy in the sense that Australia and New Zealand might be, nor is it an ethnically 
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homogeneous entity. Fiji represents a “hybrid” political order, which combines Western and 
indigenous models of governance.  
 
To further complicate things for journalists, the country has two major ethnic groups, with cultural and 
religious differences magnified under a racially-based electoral system. This means that in Fiji, liberal 
media values can become caught in the cross-fire of cultural respect on the one hand, and the ethno-
political divide on the other. The government of Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama (which took power 
in the 2006 coup) claims to be addressing ethno-nationalism through the 2013 Constitution. This 
Constitution has eliminated race-based electoral rolls and seat quotas in favour of a single constituency 
(see Boege et al., 2008, p. x; Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji Islands 2013, 2013; Naidu, 1996, 
2005, 2013).  
 
Since independence in 1970, the Fiji media have attempted to apply a libertarian press model to Fiji’s 
national framework. The libertarian dogma holds that in the pursuit of truth, the press should be free to 
publish what they choose, regardless of the consequences (Christians et al., 2009; Mohd, 2005). The 
libertarian attitude took a stronger hold in Fiji in the 1990s, particularly after deregulation, as this thesis 
will argue. In 1999, the Chaudhry Government bore the brunt of the aggressive coverage, largely at 
the hands of Fiji TV and the Rupert Murdoch–owned the Fiji Times, the latter with its distinct 
Australian influence and flavour (see Gaunder, 2008; Obini, 2000; Robie, 2000, 2001; T. R. Singh, 
2011). In fact, in an address at a Fiji Media Council launching on 26 October 2000, Chaudhry 
singled out the paper for criticism, saying in a remarkable broadside: 
 
The media in Fiji needs to take stock of how it is behaving and whether it is facing a crisis 
of ethics. Since taking office, my Government has had occasion to be extremely disgusted 
by the antics of some elements in the media who have used the medium of the newspaper 
and television to further their own personal agendas to discredit the Government. Is the Fiji 
Times carrying the torch for people engaged in seditious activities? Is it not fanning the fires 
of sedition and communalism by giving undue prominence to stories that are really non-
stories? (M. Chaudhry, 2000) 
 
The media dismissed the allegations, although various researchers and analysts concluded that at 
least some of Chaudhry’s concerns were valid (Field, 2002, 2007, 2010; Obini, 2000; Robie, 2001; 
T. R. Singh, 2011). This researcher was in Fiji in 2000, employed as a journalist, and in Australia 
from 2011 to 2014 as a PhD research student. He could not help but notice parallels between the 
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coverage that preceded Chaudhry’s fall and that of his Australian Labor Party counterpart, Julia 
Gillard, by the different branches of the Murdoch media. The air of inevitability and the palpable 
sense of a government under siege and living on borrowed time have been well captured by various 
authors and scholars in the respective countries (see K. Walsh, 2013; Muller, 2013; Obini, 2000; 
Robie, 2001, 2014). 
 
Australian Labor Party senator Doug Cameron’s comments about the Murdoch media’s coverage of 
the Gillard Government were strikingly similar to Chaudhry’s (2000) speech at the Fiji Media 
Council launch more than a decade earlier. Cameron described the Murdoch media as an “absolute 
disgrace”, a “threat to democracy”, engaging in “fabrication”, “putting false headlines, day in and 
day out”, “misrepresenting” and trying to “destabilise” government. Cameron’s remark about a 
“culture that permeates the Murdoch press internationally” had a certain ring to it (J. Thompson, 
2011). 
 
However, there was a major difference in the two countries in terms of outcomes. Australia 
experienced an orderly transition of power, with Kevin Rudd reclaiming the prime ministership in a 
palace coup in June 2013. Fiji faced a violent overthrow of government that caused massive social 
and political disorder, economic ruin, a mutiny at the military barracks, and six years down the line, 
the country’s fourth military coup (see T. R. Singh, 2011). Fiji’s experience belies Labour MP 
Datt’s remarks about the different impacts of media messages in mature democracies on the one 
hand, and fragile ones on the other. It somewhat vindicates claims that unfettered, libertarian media 
approaches may not be suited in every context or setting. As Goonasekera and Ito (1999) state, in 
multicultural, multiparty democracies, such media tactics can heighten societal tensions and 
mobilise sectional constituencies by flooding the marketplace with racially divisive information. 
This could set countries on a course of racial strife and even civil war (Mohd, 2005).  
 
This study argues that the 2000 coup was a defining moment for the Fiji media sector. While the 
upheaval provided journalists with a lot of copy, it also gave rise to an unprecedented level of 
public and academic scrutiny into the inner workings of the media (see Cass, 2002; Field, 2002; 
Gounder, 2006; Kiran, 2005; Mason, 2007; Robie, 2001, 2002, 2004). Apparently spooked by the 
Chaudhry Government’s fall, the new government of Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase increased 
attacks on the media and boosted efforts to restrict media criticism by attempting to impose tougher 
controls (Reporters Without Borders, 2004). These developments underline the need for a study into 
conflict reporting in Fiji. 
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1.3 Problem Statement  
 
Concerns about the negative impact of an unencumbered, Western-inspired news reporting culture 
in Fiji and the Pacific are not new. More than three decades ago at the University of Hawaii, the late 
Fiji journalist Robert Keith-Reid had this to say at a Pacific media roundtable: 
 
In coming years, Pacific Island journalists, native and expatriate, without being subservient, 
will have to develop a style of operation that sees all the news, good and bad, get into print, 
yet making some allowances for Pacific Island sensibilities. They will have to learn how to 
get local leaders to accept criticism coolly and with the realisation that a free press must 
often be cruel to be kind.  (cited in Brislin, 1979, p. 85) 
 
Keith-Reid was addressing a panel reviewing “adversary” and “cooperative” (developmental) press 
systems in the Pacific. The panel noted that the libertarian press systems imported from Great 
Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States prevailed in the Pacific (Brislin, 1979). The 
wellness of this system was predicated on the availability of a “multitude of possible voices” in the 
public forum. However, contemporary economics had “undercut” the multitude of voices’ 
foundation, compromising media’s search for the truth. The panel suggested that somewhere 
between the extremes of the purely adversarial and the purely developmental might lie a press 
system more suited for the Pacific (Brislin, 1979), although they did not outline or advocate any 
specific model.  
 
Since that 1979 meeting, there has been little follow-up discussion about contemporary Pacific 
press models to deal with contemporary issues. Instead, the libertarian system has become 
entrenched even as concerns about the impact of “contemporary economics” on media’s watchdog 
role has intensified with globalisation (see Brislin, 2004, 2007). In Fiji, journalists are still confined 
to 1970s-style conflict-focused reporting inherited from the British free press model. Media have 
attempted to maintain this system even under military rule since December 2006. Ultimately, this 
has resulted in State-imposed restrictions through a punitive media law (see Dutt, 2010).  
 
The Fiji media are paradoxically described as both a national security threat and champion of 
democracy (see Robie, 2014). This is not surprising, given the country’s complex socio-political 
history. Credited with exposing corruption and challenging the military government, journalists are 
also commonly alleged to lack cultural sensitivity, professionalism, educational standards, 
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knowledge of political and social institutions, and having a questionable grasp of ethics (Robie, 
2004). Unlike previous works (Field, 2002; Gounder, 2006; Kiran, 2005; Parkinson, 2002), this study 
does not stop at identifying media’s mistakes. It goes further in trying to understand the alleged mistakes 
in the context of the other variables within the media landscape. This is explained in the next section. 
 
1.4  Research Objectives 
 
Given the apparent paucity of rigorous research on the media context in the Pacific, this research goes 
‘back to the starting line’ to establish some factual groundwork. It is guided by the following 
intentions: 
  
• to verify claims about the nature of conflict reporting by studying local print media through 
a content analysis framework inspired by peace journalism  
• to assess the professional capacity and diversity of Fiji’s media corps and discern any links 
with conflict reporting 
• to find out who owns what media in Fiji and determine any link between the ownership  
structure and the nature of the news coverage 
• to analyse the nature of Fiji’s legislation relating to the media and to evaluate its 
conduciveness for responsible conflict reporting  
• to determine whether conflict resolution can, and should, be one of the recognised roles or 
core values of the media in a multiethnic country such as Fiji  
• on the basis of the findings, to make recommendations for a national framework to facilitate 
responsible conflict reporting in Fiji. 
 
At this juncture, it should be clarified that responsible conflict reporting is not to be confused with 
the Bainimarama Government’s concept of “journalism of hope,” which some critics interpret as 
media not criticising the government (Media in Fiji told to adopt ‘journalism of hope’, 2009). This 
thesis argues that a reasonably free media environment and open dialogue is more conducive for 
responsible conflict reporting than an overly restricted one. Any media abuse or shortcomings are 
best addressed through regular debate, discussion, training and education rather than excessively 
punitive legislation. 
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1.5 Research Questions 
 
The research objectives will be explored through the following four research questions in relation to 
conflict reporting:  
        
1. Are the Fiji print media inflammatory, as is often alleged?  
2. What is the level of journalist professional capacity and diversity in Fiji?  
3. What are the genesis and nature of Fiji’s media laws?  
4. What are the genesis and nature of media ownership in Fiji and the link with 
     political and economic power?  
 
1.6 Key concepts and methodological framework 
 
The study is supported by conflict theory and contemporary conflict reporting frameworks, such as 
peace journalism, use and abuse of media in fragile societies and conflict-sensitive reporting 
(Frohardt & Temin, 2003; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; R. Howard, 2003, 2009). The study also applies 
political economy and normative media theory to conflict reporting (Christians et al., 2009; Herman 
& Chomsky, 1988, 2008). Methodologically, the research triangulates four techniques: a content 
analysis of Fiji’s 2006 general elections to evaluate the nature of conflict reporting; a survey 
questionnaire to assess the professional capacity and diversity of the national journalist corps; and 
document review to analyse the legislative environment and trends in media ownership. These three 
methods are underpinned by the fourth, in-depth interviews with journalists and academics. To the 
best of this researcher’s knowledge, this approach is unique for a region with little empirical research 
into conflict reporting or the media landscape. 
 
1.7 Organisation of chapters  
 
The thesis comprises seven chapters, including this introductory one.  
 
Chapter Two reviews the study’s literature and theoretical frameworks – conflict theory, normative 
media theories, political economy and contemporary conflict reporting frames. The idea is to 
understand conflict both as a social phenomenon and a news product. The literature on Fiji suggests 
that the Fiji media privilege the ethnic angle in conflict reporting. This ignores the multitude of 
conflict causes and triggers rooted in colonialism, ethnically-based electoral systems and 
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competition for scarce resources. The chapter notes that, despite some apparent merits, peace 
journalism and other developmental journalism concepts are surrounded by scepticism due to a 
government tendency to use them to justify undue censorship (Media in Fiji . . ., 2009). The chapter 
conceptualises the Fiji media’s post-2006 coup predicament through the four roles of the media 
theory (Christians et al., 2009) in attempts to show that the country’s slide into authoritarianism was 
matched by the media’s gradual capitulation into a collaborative role with the State.  
 
Chapter Three turns its attention to the research context. In line with the literature review, the 
analysis adopts the instrumentalist (elite manipulation/political economy) and constructivist 
(structural/historical) philosophies for conflict analysis. Primordialism (ethnic hatred) is de-
emphasised, not ruled out. With regard to conflict, the chapter considers the impact of British 
imperialism, the country’s pluralistic make-up, its legacy of an unusual, ethnically-based political 
system and its distinctive cultures and traditions. This expansive approach seeks to give deeper 
insights into some seemingly intractable conflicts that have dominated the local news agenda for 
decades. The chapter argues that what has been described as Fiji’s “coup culture” (Lane, 2012) is in 
reality an ongoing, if unsteady, and inconsistent, process of militarisation. This trend is comparable, 
in some respects, to a guarded democracy, whereby elected civilian authorities form government  
and the universal rule of law applies, but the military remains in control, and is the ultimate 
authority (see Buchanan, 2013). The media overlooked this trend due to a generally positive 
disposition toward the armed forces. In the same way, sections of the media might have been 
initially seduced by 2006 coup leader Bainimarama’s promise of a “clean up” campaign against 
corruption (see Media failed to grill coup leader, 2009).  
 
Chapter Four details the methodological framework, integrating four techniques – content analysis, 
survey questionnaire, document review and in-depth interviews. These methods not only identify 
patterns in conflict reporting, but link them to the media landscape, which includes journalist 
professional capacity and diversity, the legal environment and the structure of media ownership.  
 
Chapter Five deals with the research findings. Surprisingly, the content analysis returned a 
dominant peace journalism frame whereas the questionnaire survey found a comparatively young, 
inexperienced and under-qualified journalist cohort. Document review shows that although, after 
independence in 1970, the country adopted British free press traditions, successive governments 
tried to tighten the laws in the name of social stability and economic development. Document 
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review also indicates that since independence, media ownership has become increasingly 
corporatised.  
 
Chapter Six analyses the results. In terms of the content analysis, the peace journalism frame was 
deemed somewhat irrelevant in the face of a new line of enquiry showing a dearth of stories dealing 
with core developmental issues. This implies that the lack of analytical vigour is a bigger problem 
than inflammatory journalism, at least insofar as print media coverage of the 2006 election is 
concerned. Evidence of a young, inexperienced and underqualified journalist corps in the 
questionnaire survey indicates a high rate of journalist attrition. Lack of journalist capacity could be 
behind, or at least implicated in, the lack of in-depth reporting discovered in the content analysis. 
 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis, makes recommendations, outlines the research contributions 
and implications, identifies weaknesses in the study and suggests areas for future research. The 
chapter surmises that journalist attrition rates make insignificant any gains recorded in journalist 
qualification standards. Moreover, the lack of analytical reporting is not wholly due to weaknesses 
in journalists and their craft. Media owners who prioritise low-cost news sources, deadlines, and 
high selling sports and entertainment news products limit the space for serious news coverage and 
journalistic endeavour.  The thesis argues that one of the major contributors to the apparent decline 
in journalism in Fiji is the country’s coup culture. 
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presented an overview of the overall research paradigm in the national, regional and 
global senses, as well as the underlying research goal of identifying strengths, weaknesses and 
opportunities in conflict reporting in coup-prone Fiji. The chapter outlines the devastating social 
and economic costs of ongoing conflicts in the nation to rationalise an exploration into long-
standing concerns about the alleged links between the national media and conflict. It summarises 
the research objectives and the research questions, explaining the central concepts and methods, and 
gives a brief overview of the chapters. 
 
 
 
	   13	  
CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter articulated the thesis’ rationale and scope. This chapter reviews the literature 
and theoretical frameworks as they relate to conflict reporting in Fiji. It includes an analysis of the 
media coverage of major post–Cold War conflicts, both inter-State and intra-State, in the South 
Pacific and beyond. The idea is to locate Fiji within contemporary conflict reporting research in 
both the regional and global senses. Consequently, the following frameworks and concepts are 
used: 
 
• conflict theory  
• contemporary conflict reporting frames 
• normative media theories 
• the political economy-media nexus. 
 
The first two sections discuss the inevitability of conflict (and conflict resolution) as well as the 
conflict–media dynamic. The next two sections analyse media coverage of the major post–Cold 
War conflicts – both inter-State and intra-State – and media’s alleged disproportionate focus on the 
ethnic aspects of social conflicts. A discussion on the frames of conflict-reduction journalism and 
the perspectives of Fiji and Pacific Islands media theorists follows. Next, the chapter looks at 
normative press theories and theory grounded in the political economy of the media, before 
identifying the apparent gaps in the literature, setting out the resultant research questions and 
summarising the chapter. 
 
2.2 The inevitability of conflict and conflict resolution 
 
Anyone trying to analyse conflict reporting needs first to understand that conflict is part of 
humanity. As Cees Hamelink (2008, p. 77) points out, “human history is filled with the horror of 
lethal conflict”. Indeed, in some instances, the literature reveals a worsening trend in spite of (or 
perhaps due to) the so-called civilisational progress in technology, democracy, and human rights. 
The 20th century saw 250 armed conflicts, with up to180 million dead, making it humankind’s 
bloodiest era (Manoff, 1997). British novelist Margaret Drabble describes it as “a beastly century” 
(2001, p. 160). 
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The post–Cold War era gave rise to a new trend – a decline in inter-State conflicts but an increase in 
intra-State conflicts (Van Leeuwen, 2009), notwithstanding the two Iraq Wars. Theories to explain 
warfare and social conflict are vast, complex and contentious, drawing from multiple disciplines 
including but not limited to anthropology, economics, history, human geography, mass 
communication sociology and so forth (Berberlogu, 2005). Although a full review of the literature 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, a brief discussion is possible and appropriate.  
 
Conflict theory is a potential minefield of contradictions and controversies. At the very basic level, the 
theory holds that the human species is both psychologically and biologically primed for war. This is 
due to “selfish genes” that motivate groups of people – usually governments but also a country’s 
general population, or tribe or ethnic group – to increase their power and wealth (Taylor, 2014). War 
is also attributed to the large amount of testosterone produced in males, in that it is linked to 
aggression and competition. But these accounts do not sufficiently explain the apparent lack of 
conflict in early human history or pre-history, and why many communities have a record of living 
peacefully (Taylor, 2014).  
 
While it is true that conflicts are inevitable, there are peaceful and creative ways of dealing with 
them. Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe (2000) has conceived the notion of “agonistic 
pluralism”. Here, the aim of democratic politics is to construct the ‘them’ in such a way that it is no 
longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but an “adversary” whose ideas are opposed, and 
whose right to hold and defend those ideas are recognised, even respected (pp.14-15). Mouffe’s 
idea of agonistic confrontation can be imagined as a healthy escape valve to let off excessive steam. 
This could avoid pent up tensions and aggressions resulting in violent outcomes. Innovative and 
evolving conflict prevention measures such as those espoused by Mouffe are vital: the deadly trend 
of intra-State conflicts since the 1990s have only added to the existing perplexities surrounding 
group conflicts. Characterised by territorial disputes, competition for natural resources, and ethnic 
disagreements, such conflicts count for more deaths, destruction, and displacement than any other 
type of conflict in the world today (Chirot & Seligman, 2001; O’Sullivan, 2001). 
 
Three dominant typologies are generally proposed to explain ethnic conflict: primordialism,  
instrumentalism, and constructivism. Primordialism argues that ethnic conflict is primal. It stems 
from ancient hatreds between ethnic groups based on religious, racial and/or regional differences. 
These traits are so deeply ingrained in human history and experience as to be ostensibly immutable 
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(Weir, 2012; Wolff, 2006). But primordialism is seen to be theoretically and empirically fraught in 
some respects. As Varshney (2002) points out, primordialism on its own fails to sufficiently explain 
why serious conflicts can occur within the same ethnic groups, or why different ethnic groups are 
able to cooperate and co-exist harmoniously. Instrumentalism is the antithesis of primordialism. It 
holds that conflict is driven by power and wealth seeking elites actively manipulating ethnic 
identities (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). But instrumentalism too suffers from theoretical contradictions. 
While its central argument rests on leaders stirring conflict for political or economic gain, 
instrumentalism fails to explain why people would mobilise behind leaders if they (the people) were 
not going to gain tangibly from it (Varshney, 2002).  
 
Constructivism seeks to bridge the primordialist–instrumentalist divide. It holds that ethnicity is a 
socially constructed identity and as such, dynamic, amenable and changeable (Yang, 2000). 
Constructivists operate on the ontological assumption that actors are shaped by the socio-cultural 
milieu in which they live (Conteh-Morgan, 2005). According to this theory, conflict is better 
understood in relation to other meaningful events. That meaning can be found in structures, hence 
the constructivist focus on various social structures to establish how individual and group interests, 
self-understandings, and behaviour relate to demobilisation, identity politics, or post-war 
reconciliation activities (Conteh-Morgan, 2005). 
 
While it is the most popular of the three concepts, constructivism is criticised for downplaying the 
role of political and economic motives in the construction of ethnicity and conflict (Yang, 2000). A 
logical conclusion from these explanations is that conflicts are either ‘manufactured’ 
(instrumentalist view); an inevitable ‘outcome’ or ‘product’ of history and social 
structures/processes (constructivist view); or an ‘inborn’ and ‘inherited’ human trait (primordialist 
view); if not a product of all these three variables. Given the multi-layered, complex phenomenon 
that conflict is, it would be imprudent to confine it to any one source or cause, or to emphasis one 
variable over the other potential, underlying variabless. Indeed, while specific conflicts in specific 
counties can be explained in ad hoc ways, few patterns can be seen to overarch all examples. For 
instance, it is theoretically difficult to explain why some conflicts “turn genocidal” while others are 
seen as “moderate and move towards resolution” (Chirot, 2001).  
 
In his book, The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined, Steven Pinker (2011) 
argues, somewhat controversially, that the spread of democracy, literacy, trade, and prosperity has 
seen a dramatic decline in organised conflicts over the long term. While Pinker is adamant that the 
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present era is far more peaceful than any others in human history, and presents fairly convincing 
data to back his claims, he concedes that there is no guarantee that this trend will continue. Indeed, 
in reviewing Pinker’s book, Singer (2011) reminds us of what some refer to as the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ with Islam, and the risk of nuclear terrorism by war with Iran. Singer also highlights 
the potential risks of conflicts resulting from climate change, especially in light of a Columbia 
University study purporting to show, through data from the past half-century, that in tropical 
regions, the risk of a new civil conflict doubles during the hotter El Niño years (see the study by 
Hsiang, Meng, & Cane, 2011). A possible implication of the reported climate-conflict nexus is that 
a warmer world could lead to greater conflicts (Singer, 2011).  
 
While Pinker’s central thesis is about an overall decline in conflicts, his research is also an unerring 
reminder of the unpredictable nature of conflicts and their destructive force. If anything, Pinker’s 
theory underscores the need for ongoing conflict reduction efforts, regardless of the supposed 
decline in violent conflicts. One could justifiably argue that the claimed decline in conflicts is, at 
least in part, due to the increased focus on conflict reduction over the years (see Centre for Peace 
and Conflict Studies, 2011). Regarding post–Cold War trends in intra-State conflicts, two theories 
are common. One holds that the breakdown of the Cold War structures released ancient ethnic 
ambitions and hatreds, resulting in a world far more complex and dangerous than the familiar 
bipolar East and West construction. This is the primordialist view. The other theory surmises that 
conflicts are instigated by influential local figures who exploit ancient differences to retain power, 
gain access to resources and further their nationalist visions (Chirot & Seligman, 2001; O’Sullivan, 
2001). This is an example of instrumentalism.  
 
Moreover, conflict can be violent and nonviolent. The different outcomes can be conceptualised 
through Galtung’s (1964; 1969) notion of negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace 
denotes the absence of violence, often enforced by the state apparatus. Positive peace denotes 
constructive conflict resolution characterised by the respect for universal human rights and the 
creation of social systems to benefit the whole population (Galtung, 1964; 1969). From this, we see 
that positive peace is harmonious and deeply-rooted, where as negative peace is superficial, 
acrimonious and fragile. The “Galtung Triangle”, comprising direct violence, indirect violence and 
cultural violence, gives further insights into the different forms and manifestations of conflict. 
Direct violence, which is visible, verbal and/or physical, harms body, mind and spirit, leaves behind 
trauma, and involves an immediate relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. Examples 
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include armed conflicts or human rights abuses by state security forces or other armed groups 
(Galtung, 1969).  
 
Structural violence is invisible. It is characterised by politically repressive or economically 
exploitative systems embedded within the local, national and international structures. There is no 
direct perpetrator-victim contact. Harm results from structures of inequality, such as huge 
disparities of income or wealth, or highly unequal patterns of land ownership (Galtung, 1969). 
Cultural violence is invisible and it divides by content such as religion, law, ideology, language, art, 
empirical/formal science, cosmology (deep culture); and by carriers, which include schools, 
universities, and media (Galtung, 1990). Galtung’s models lead us to some preliminary observations 
about Fiji. Direct violence has been experienced in short bursts during the coups. Verbal violence is 
more prevalent, especially when Parliament is sitting, and during the general elections, when debate 
can degenerate into hate speech, including racial slurs (See Kant, 2012). Verbal violence is 
transmitted through the media.  
 
Structural violence seems to be the major, ever-present form of violence in Fiji and the key cause of 
conflict between the two major races. Both Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians feel victimised by 
the system – the former claim they are the targets of legalised State discrimination while the latter 
assert that they suffer economic marginalisation (see Boege, et al., 2013; Naidu, 2005; 2008; 2013). 
Furthermore, for a country like Fiji, where the two major races see each other as oppressors, 
Galtung’s focus on structurally-orientated (indirect) violence instead of actor-orientated (direct) 
violence is significant. If the Fiji media understand and portray violence as structurally-orientated, it 
is possible that instead of seeing the ‘other’ as the oppressor or enemy, people may come to realise 
that to a certain level, they are perhaps the victims of a flawed system. As Grewal, (2003) puts it, 
violence exists because of the structure. The actors merely carry out that violence. This point is 
quite pertinent to Fiji given that direct or physical violence is rare whereas structural violence has 
been prevalent. The consequence of unaddressed structural violence is physical violence, which 
tells us where conflict-reducing efforts should be directed. 
 
While conflict is generally portrayed as a negative development, it can potentially be beneficial and 
achieve some positive outcomes and transformations. For instance, Fiji’s first coup in 1987 caused 
widespread economic and social devastation but it might have averted a bloodier racial 
confrontation caused by a change in the political order, controversial as this line of reasoning is (see 
Ewins, 1998). Supporters of Bainimarama hailed his coup as a revolution that brought in “genuine 
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democracy” for the first time in Fijian history, on basis of a non-racial electoral system (Davis, 
2013), although opinions on this matter are divided (for a rebuttal, see Narsey, 2012a, 2013a).   
 
Tonga’s Black September political uprising instigated unprecedented violence and exacerbated pre-
existing social tensions in the country, but it may have precipitated the political reforms deemed 
necessary for greater democracy and long-term stability (see Latu, 2010; Moala, 2004, 2008, 2009). 
Naidu (2005, p. 370) sums it up well by pointing out that without conflict, constructive structural 
transformations in societal relationships and culture would not have been possible. 
 
2.3 The conflict–media dynamic  
 
Where there is war and conflict, there is usually media to be found. Owens-Ibie (2002) describes it 
as a natural attraction, clearly because war is a major story. As American journalist and novelist 
Nora Ephron states, for the correspondent “war is not hell. It is fun” (in J. Harris, 2006). If 
excitement, fame and ambition drive journalists, then ratings and profitability apparently motivate 
media owners. R. Collins (1991) states that “media images pitch war for profit” and “corporate 
opportunism [frequently] hides behind the veil of patriotism”. Butler (1935) has declared that: “War 
is a racket; possibly the oldest, easily the most profitable racket that benefits only a small group of 
insiders”. He had noted that World War I produced 21,000 new millionaires and billionaires in the 
United States. Similarly, Akin (2005) writes that in the era of modern communications, conflict 
attracts viewers, listeners, and readers to the media – the greater the conflict, the larger the 
audience, the better the financial returns.  
 
While there are some apparent truths in these postulations, perhaps they are too sweeping in terms 
of ascribing blame on the media. Journalists such as BBC war correspondent David Loyn tend to 
reject such allegations. In a 2003 essay, Loyn ridicules the notion that war correspondents are 
“somehow unhealthily addicted” to violence. In his view, media actually “under-report conflict”, 
often failing to expose it in the early days. But herein lies a core criticism about conflict reporting – 
that they are mostly interested in the visible, often violent manifestations, (Lynch & Galtung, 2010). 
There is some justification in the literature for such criticism. Take, for instance, coverage of the 
first Gulf War by sections of the American and international media. Gottschalk’s (1992) research 
found that the influential Newsweek “talked breathlessly” about “six weeks of the most precise 
bombing in the history of modern warfare” and “obsessively explored the question of whether the 
fighting ended too soon”. Overall coverage was “jingoistic, misleading and an abysmal failure” (pp. 
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450-479). Gottschalk’s work supports Dixit’s (2010, p. 55) portrayal of conflict as the “adrenaline 
of a macho media” (for a statistical analysis of coverage first Gulf War, see Kempf, 1996). 
 
This alleged slant in war reporting is what Lynch and Galtung (2010) describe as war journalism. It 
is often linked to a dominant journalistic paradigm that regards conflict as a premium news value 
with “drama” and “abundance of visuals” (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 68). There is an emphasis in the use 
of emotive or demonising language, which promotes hatred and fear, and often results in violence 
(Lynch & Galtung, 2010). This journalistic orientation is said to put both people and nations on a 
war footing, be it intra-State or inter-State conflicts. For example, a PhD dissertation by Zenebe 
(2012) used comparative case studies and process tracing to show that media contributed to both the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda and the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya.  
 
Intra-State conflicts, as in Rwanda, are often fought with strong references to ethnic, cultural and 
religious identities (primordialism) but they are also said to be financially motivated, with roots in 
resource disputes and political power (instrumentalism) (Chirot & Seligman, 2001; Henderson & 
Watson, 2005; Kriesberg, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2001). Media are allegedly used to mobilise population 
groups behind leaders seeking to gain personally from the upheavals (Bonde, 2007; Frohardt & 
Temin, 2003; R. Howard, 2003). In the former Yugoslavia, political powerbrokers are said to have 
hijacked the media, particularly television, to stir ethnic tensions in the build-up to civil war 
(Frohardt & Temin, 2003). Pejic claims that the Yugoslavian media lied in the name of patriotism. 
He warns that “where there is too much patriotism there is no professionalism” (1998, p. 10).  
 
However, it appears that the literature on conflict reporting is somewhat one-sided. If media 
coverage has started wars, it has also helped end wars, as in Vietnam, but this aspect has not 
received as much research attention (Bonde, 2007; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; O’Sullivan, 2001). 
Some analysts state that it is wrong to assume that there is a direct cause-effect relationship between 
media coverage and the chances for either preventing, preempting, or limiting a conflict, simply 
because of insufficient evidence (see Gowing, 1994). Such assertions are, in essence, a call for 
further research to fill a major gap in the literature. This particular study is attempting to address the 
issue through the application of contemporary conflict reporting theoretical concepts like peace 
journalism to gather and analyse empirical data in Fiji. Concepts like peace journalism are seeking 
opportunities to harness media’s power for the purpose of mitigating, resolving and ending conflicts 
based on a broader, more forward-looking, and conscientious (as opposed to a detached) approach 
to the problem.  
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2.4 Post–Cold War conflicts in Fiji and the Pacific  
 
The South Pacific did not escape Cold War geopolitics, and experienced its fair share of violent and 
non-violent conflicts (Henderson & Watson, 2005; Robie, 1989). Tensions suppressed during 
colonial rule surfaced gradually after independence in the 1970s and 1980s, with recent decades 
marked by a rash of uprisings, both civilian and military. In Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Papua 
New Guinea, recurring problems have given rise to tags such as the “arc of instability” and “failed 
states”, contentious as these labels might be (Dibb, 2007; Dobell, 2003).  
 
While not as deadly or as prolonged as the upheavals in other parts of the world, these conflicts 
have taken a comparatively heavy and lasting toll. The Bougainville rebellion against the Papua 
New Guinea Government was the region’s deadliest conflict, with an estimated death toll of 15,000 
in a population of 200,000 (UNIFEM, 2007; Wallis, 2012). The Solomon Islands ethnic conflict, 
based on land and resource disputes, claimed several hundred lives, displaced around 40,000 
people, and caused a GDP loss equivalent to 20 years (Hegarty & Regan, 2006). Iroga described 
this conflict as the “most destructive” and “darkest moment” since the Solomon Islands gained 
Independence in 1978 (2008, p. 152).  
 
Fiji’s four coups are often described as bloodless. But this account fails to cover the social and 
economic trauma of the coups. Partly because of a prolonged period of uncertainty and instability, Fiji 
has achieved a paltry annual average growth rate of 1.6 per cent since 1996, well below the five per 
cent needed for sustainable development (Firth, 2001; Naidu, 2005, 2008; Robie, 2011; B. Prasad & 
R. Singh, 2008). According to a major paper from a seminar in Brussels in 2003, conflicts in the 
Pacific Islands are generally powered by: unequal distribution of benefits from natural resources; 
change of traditional social structures caused by modernisation; detachment of the State from 
society; and perceptions of injustice among citizens (Pacific Issues Paper No. 7, 2003, p. 4). These 
denote both instrumentalist and constructivist causes of conflict, although it is the primordial 
manifestations that seem to receive the most media attention, as in Fiji and Solomon Islands (see 
Kabutaulaka, 2000; Robie, 2014). 
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2.5 Alleged media ‘ethnicisation’ of conflicts  
 
The alleged tendency of the media to ‘ethnicise’ conflicts, often at the expense of other causes and 
triggers, is a global concern (Bonde, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2001). Kabutaulaka (2000) has written about this 
issue in relation to Solomon Islands. He states that media resorted to the “easiest explanation” in 
describing the conflict as a product of ethnic differences between the peoples of Guadalcanal and 
Malaita. He added: 
 
while ethnicity should not be completely disregarded, there is a need to situate the crisis  
within the context of broader socio-economic and political developments rather than  
as merely a result of “hatred” between the peoples of two islands. There is a need to 
explore the poor policies of successive governments, weak and ineffective structures and 
systems of government, poorly planned large-scale resource developments, the inequitable 
distribution of development benefits and the need for institutional and constitutional 
changes. Alone, the ethnic explanation is too simplistic and lacks the ability to explain the 
causes of the conflict and contribute to its resolution. (Kabutaulaka, 2000) 
 
Kabutaulaka’s grievances accord with O’Sullivan’s (2001) idea that media prioritise the ethnic 
angle because it provides an easy explanation to a complex problem, whereas substantive coverage 
is antithetical to the methodology and requirements of modern media. This means that the elements 
necessary for better understanding – nuance, ambiguity and complexity – are avoided as they are 
perceived as an undesirable complication of matters. Instead, a convenient “packageable concept” 
that precludes more complex analysis is used (O’Sullivan, 2001, p. 54). In Fiji, the literature shows 
a multitude of conflict causes and triggers rooted in colonialism, electoral systems, competition for 
scarce resources, perceived threat to indigenous Fijian institutions and an over-generalised 
perception of Indo-Fijian wealth. Other factors include ethnocentrism and corruption, power 
struggles among politicians and within the traditional chiefly system, and conflicts of interest 
among politicians, businesses and the military (Firth, 2001; J. Bhagwan, 2011; Naidu, 2005, 2013). 
  
Some commentators, however, tend to approach conflict from an ethnic angle, with indigenous 
Fijians and Indo-Fijians portrayed as the two sole adversaries (see Boxhill, 1997; Ewins, 1998; 
Pirie, 2000; Robie, 2000; 2001; 2004; Teaiwa, 2000). Indeed, Kelly and Kaplan (2001) observe that 
ethnicity has been used to construct and reify social differences in Fiji. Some researchers even claim 
that the disproportionate media focus on ethnicity played a part in Fiji’s coup culture (Obini, 2000; 
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T. R Singh, 2011), although two former Fiji Times editors-in-chief, Russell Hunter (2009) and 
Netani Rika (2009), have strongly rebutted such allegations. To some extent at least, academic 
analysis of Fiji’s 2000 coup coverage validates claims by the Suva-based civil society organisation, 
Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF), that the Fiji media played a “significant role” in propagating 
racial stereotypes and inciting racist feelings by publishing inflammatory material (CCF criticises . . 
., 2008). However, to put the blame squarely on the media, and to ignore the reality of pre-existing 
ethnic tensions in Fiji, whatever their origins, could be counter-productive. As Connor notes, 
“ethnic conflicts have been around for centuries”. To overlook this historical fact is antithetical to 
understanding a “phenomenon that has demonstrated marked disregard for time and place” (Conner, 
2004, pp. 26–27). With regard to the Solomon Islands conflict, Stratford (n.d.) suggests that 
Kabutaulaka (2000) may have downplayed the significance of ethnicity. He cites recent 
anthropological studies to highlight the observation that conflict and political upheaval lie at the 
heart of Pacific societies, rather than at the periphery. As such, the latest conflict is not an anomaly, 
but a new chapter in a long history of conflict at various levels of Solomon Island society (Stratford, 
n.d.; also see Murray & Storey, 2003). Moreover, scholars like Kaufman (2006) insist that peace-
building efforts that pay insufficient attention to ameliorating the emotional and symbolic roots of 
extremist ethnic politics are likely to fail. However, insofar as the media is concerned, the literature 
suggests that there is not too little, but too much focus on ethnicity, not to mention a perceived fixation 
on negative news, as in the case of Fiji. Connell (2007, p. 87) notes that, “as in most other national 
newspapers, casual reading of Fiji’s press suggests that all news is bad news”. This particular research is 
attempting to empirically examine such assertions. 
 
2.6 Conflict reduction journalism 
 
The post–Cold War surge in conflicts and concerns about media’s assumed role in escalating these 
disturbances led to numerous efforts to introduce “conflict-reduction journalism” (Betz, 2011; 
Ward, 2005). There are two apparent views in this field. The first holds that conflict is inherent in 
humans and society, so media cannot do much. Such doubters include Hamelink (2008), Gowing 
(1994) and Loyn (2003). An opposing view holds that conflict is derived from a mixture of media 
and other societal variables in certain situations/contexts so media could play at least some part in 
the solution (Galtung, 1986, 1996, 2006, 2010; R. Howard, 2003, 2009; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; 
Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Manoff, 1997). This field argues that media have a “unique capacity” 
to escalate or de-escalate situations by conditioning public attitudes and influencing policy 
responses (O’Sullivan, 2001, p. 54).  
	   23	  
 
A significant part of this genre is peace journalism, the creation of prominent Norwegian scholar 
Johan Galtung, with roots in a seminal paper entitled ‘The Structure of Foreign News’ (Galtung & 
Ruge, 1965). The paper analysed the Norwegian press portrayal of three international conflicts in 
the Congo, Cuba, and Cyprus. It uncovered an alleged value bias towards violence, a preference for 
elite sources, disinterest in peace initiatives, disregard for grassroots views, and little evidence of in-
depth reporting (pp. 65–71). Galtung called this type of reporting war journalism because of its 
apparent potential to escalate a tense situation. Later, he would propose peace journalism, which he 
defined as an interpretative, non-elite, grassroots approach to conflict reporting (Galtung, 1986).  
S. T. Lee (2010, p. 363) describes peace journalism as a goal-oriented, non-objective and self-
conscious promoter of peace. Bratic, Ross and Kang-Graham (2008, p.2) see peace journalism as a 
reformist vehicle seeking to change journalistic practices that “too stringently control and limit 
access” to the media and “too narrowly define information”. Lynch (2006, p. 72) has sought to 
broaden the genre’s theoretical framework, positing it as a “critical realist theory” applied to 
conflict reporting.  
 
Critical realism views reality as complex and evolving, and recognises the role of both agency and 
structural factors in influencing human behaviour (Clark, 2008). The critical realist view of reality 
as fluid, amenable and complicated dovetails with Galtung’s (2002, 2004, 2006) notion of conflict 
as a multi-faceted, multi-dimensional and multi-layered phenomenon. This contrasts with the 
conventional media portrayal of conflict as dualistic; that is, confined to two parties engaged in a 
win-lose struggle (Lynch & Galtung, 2010). Lynch and Galtung’s (2010) emphasis on reporting the 
background of conflicts is well-founded when one considers Obonyo and Fackler’s (2009) analysis 
of the Kenyan media’s 2007–2008 election coverage. Based on a qualitative analysis of three major 
dailies, the pair concluded that journalists’ lack of appreciation for context played a part in igniting 
the nation’s latent ethnic tensions.  
 
Media failed to consider that every Kenyan election since 1992 had witnessed some degree of 
violence, and they continued to report with abandon. Stories dichotomised and ‘ethnicised’ the 
political race into a zero-sum game; they repeated hate messages and aggravated the dividing line; 
they displayed a preoccupation with political elites; and there was a tendency for mudslinging, 
which de-emphasised the real issues at stake (Obonyo & Fackler, 2009, pp. 22–25). Predictably, the 
cycle of violence was repeated, and more than 1,000 people were killed, 3,500 injured, and 600,000 
displaced, while 100,000 properties were destroyed (Seils, 2012). Ominously, Obonyo and 
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Fackler’s (2009) findings are consistent with similar studies in some other countries. See, for 
example, S. T. Lee and Maslog’s (2005) seminal work on the coverage of conflicts involving India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines. Also see Wilson and Devere’s (2013) paper on 
Radio New Zealand’s coverage of some troubled Pacific Islands countries. The apparent gaps 
identified in these studies seem to justify longstanding calls by scholars like Loo (1994) for a 
redefining of conventional news values to reflect that journalists have a societal role to play.  
 
But conflict reporting frameworks such as peace journalism have their detractors. In terms of 
professional practice, peace journalism is rejected on the basis of a manifest belief that the “way we 
have been reporting up to now is not that bad” (Loyn, 2003); a sense that peace journalism is simply 
“good journalism” (Hanitzsch, 2007); and a conviction that peace journalism is unnecessary – 
journalists simply have to “work better in the frame of traditional standards” (Gjelten, 2001). Peace 
journalism is also criticised for its alleged lack of empirical validation; for being too normative and 
prescriptive; and for lacking a solid theoretical base (Bratic & Schirch, 2008; Hanitzsch, 2004, 
2007; Shinar, 2009; S. T. Lee, 2010). In addition, peace journalism scholars are commonly accused 
of jumping from theorising to media reform without producing empirical data to inform and guide 
their initiatives (McMahon & Chow-White, 2011).  
 
Apparently, a major obstacle for the implementation of conflict reporting frames such as peace 
journalism is economics. Such frames need to reflect a multitude of dramas and side dramas rather 
than one linear narrative (Lynch & Galtung, 2010). This clearly entails more work and requires 
additional resources. As Hanitzsch (2004) aptly points out, peace journalism unrealistically 
demands additional resources at a time when the industry is downsizing. But peace journalism 
proponents counter that they are proposing a long-term project based on small changes and 
incremental gains, with minimal costs (Lynch & Galtung, 2010). Hanitzsch’s (2004, 2007) 
argument – that peace journalism ascribes too much blame and power to the news media with 
regards to causing and solving conflicts – is compelling. For instance, in Fiji’s case, the literature 
does not show any apparent provocation on the part of the media in the 1987 coup, which took 
place just a month after the new Labour-National Federation Party Government was sworn in (see 
Ewins 1998).  
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Another major concern regarding peace journalism and concepts like development journalism is 
self-censorship, described as:  
 
a set of editorial actions ranging from omission, dilution, distortion, and change of 
emphasis to choice of rhetorical devices by journalists, their organisations, and even 
the entire media community in anticipation of currying reward and avoiding 
punishment from the power structure.  (C.-C. Lee, 1998, p. 57) 
 
Thorgeirsdottir (2004, p. 384) sees self-censorship as one of journalism’s most “ineffable hazards”. 
But analysts from conflict-prone societies tend to have a more nuanced view. Uganda’s Daily Monitor 
argues that when it comes to self-censorship, identical standards, logic and ideology cannot be 
uniformly applied to different media cultures, political arrangements and social settings. The editorial 
added: 
 
A newspaper in a country in transition emerging from a violent past is different from a  
newspaper in London or New York. Every day we must calculate the impact of what we 
write, in ways that our colleagues in other, richer parts of the world do not have to do. (We 
will remain fair . . ., 2013) 
 
Skjerdal (2010) points out that in conflict-prone African countries, self-censorship is instinctively 
applied to coverage of ethnic conflict or national security issues. This is defensible, even if it is 
sometimes open to abuse. Moreover, “the same way that self-censorship practices do not always 
indicate lack of professionalism, the presence of self-censorship doesn’t necessarily mean absence 
of critical journalism” (p. 105).  These persuasive arguments show that when it comes to analysing 
and understanding self-censorship, a ‘one-size fits all’ approach may be both imprudent and 
limiting, especially when the contexts are different. Putting it another way, the conventional 
meaning and understanding of self-censorship does not apply equally in every cultural/national 
setting. In terms of peace journalism and its goals, self-censorship can actually be counter-
productive: as Sturges (2008) says, not talking openly about social problems is quite simply a 
formula for their perpetuation.  
 
Another point of contention with concepts like peace journalism is their perceived subjectivity. 
Loyn is adamant that journalists are (and must be) “observers not players” (2003). He insists on 
“traditional values” – fairness, objectivity and balance – at all times. Even the likes of Kempf 
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(2007), who waver on the side of peace journalism, warn against a radical departure from 
objectivity. The likes of Loyn and Kempf are emphasising the journalist’s traditional role, which is 
to provide information that allows people to read a situation and make their own decisions and 
reach their own conclusions. The argument that it is not for the journalist to patronise the people by 
making decisions on their behalf is compelling. But others feel that such criticisms are not only 
premature, they are out-dated and discredited. McQuaid (2009) insists, perhaps somewhat strongly, 
that media objectivity is obsolete, and that the paradigm has shifted as a result of media losing 
swathes of “public trust” over the past 40 years.  
 
Then there are those seeking a middle ground in the objectivity–subjectivity debate, such as R. 
Howard (2003, 2009), who advocates new approaches in conflict reporting but without abandoning 
the “first principles” that legitimise journalism. He points out that professional journalists do not set 
out to reduce conflict, but to present accurate and impartial news, which in itself is useful to the 
goals of peace (2003, p. 8). According to him:  
  
Instead of taking on more roles, journalism in conflict-stressed zones must strengthen its  
original roles. What is needed is some sophistication in reporting conflict without 
inflaming it – a rudimentary understanding of conflict and conflict resolution and the 
news media’s role. Part of being a reliable provider of information is not to advocate what 
should happen but to reveal what can happen, including peace.  (R. Howard, 2009, pp. 3–4) 
 
Like R. Howard’s conflict sensitive reporting concept, Frohardt and Temin’s (2003) “use and abuse 
of media in vulnerable societies” framework is designed for reporting intra-State conflicts. 
Vulnerable societies are “highly susceptible to movement towards civil conflict and/or repressive 
rule”, they point out. For the most part, such countries include multi-ethnic societies in developing 
countries, which are more likely to fall victim to conflict than are societies with greater ethnic 
homogeneity. These ‘at risk’ societies tend to be struggling to make the changeover from 
authoritarian to democratic government (Frohardt & Temin, 2003, p. 2). Fiji, with simmering ethnic 
and political tensions leading to four coups since 1987, slips neatly into the descriptive category of 
vulnerable societies. 
 
Because of various weaknesses in the media landscape, journalists in vulnerable societies are 
deemed to be more susceptible to political manipulation and abuse than media in developed 
countries, which is something this research will investigate in the Fiji context. A major focus of the 
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Frohardt and Temin framework is how to equip journalists not only to resist overt manipulation by 
powerful interests but also to avoid involuntary or passive incitement to violence. This occurs when 
journalists have poor professional skills, when the media culture is underdeveloped, or when there 
is little or no history of independent media. Under such circumstances, journalists can inflame 
grievances and promote stereotypes by virtue of the manner in which they report, even though their 
intentions are not malicious, and they are not being manipulated (Frohardt & Temin, 2003, p. 2).  
 
2.7 Fiji and Pacific Islands media theorists and analysts 
 
In Fiji and other Pacific Islands, discussion about the forms of journalistic practice better suited for 
the developmental needs and the political and cultural conditions of the region has been sporadic at 
best. Such discourse has often lacked specifics, although Robie (2012a) has gone further than most 
in proposing the Four Worlds news values paradigm for Pacific media. Based on the principles of 
deliberative journalism (Romano, 2010), Four Worlds news values would focus on a range of 
perspectives often disregarded by the “mono-cultural” Western news model, as typified by 
Australia and New Zealand. Important, but neglected topics include indigenous culture, and custom 
and tradition as critical agencies (Robie, 2012a, p. 84). Other regional scholars concerned about the 
apparent heavy Western influence on Pacific Islands media include Rooney, Papoutsaki and Pamba 
(2004), whose focus is Papua New Guinea. In their view, the urban-based, elite-focussed press had 
failed the country due to a “blind acceptance” of Western-style reporting. This style cannot be 
“transplanted” into “fragile” Pacific societies on the assumption that it will serve the same purpose, 
meet the same objectives and be absorbed in the same manner (Rooney, Papoutsaki & Pamba, 2004, 
pp. 6–7). While the concerns raised by Rooney and co-authors are widely shared in the Pacific (see 
Thaman, 2004), perhaps they put too much responsibility on the national media for the nation’s 
problems. They also overlook the important role of the so-called Western-style journalism in 
upholding transparency, accountability and free speech in the Pacific. Indeed, in his commentary on 
Pacific media, Hackett (2013) argues against totally discarding Western free press ideals even while 
recognising their “significant shortcomings” (2013, pp. 23–34). Similarly, former Tongan journalist 
Latu (2010) calls for a middle ground, rather than a total abandonment of Western reporting values.  
 
Other prominent Pacific Islands journalism thinkers and practitioners have called for a form of 
journalism anchored in indigenous values. Tongan publisher Kalafi Moala advocates a “Pacific 
values” approach reflecting “our way” and “our cultural view of realities”, while former PINA 
president Monica Miller advocates going beyond conventional news definitions to focus on issues 
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that impact on Pacific people’s lives (Perrottet, 2010). However, Pacific values, our cultural view of 
realities, and issues that impact on Pacific people are not defined in any great detail. Only a few 
papers on Pacific Islands media discuss the subject of alternative conflict reporting frames like 
peace journalism (J. Bhagwan, 2011; Iroga, 2008; Obijiofor, 2011; Robie, 2011; S. Singh, 2011; 
Wilson & Devere, 2013). Two of these papers (Iroga, 2008; Wilson & Devere, 2013) are based on 
empirical studies. Obijiofor’s (2011) paper, based on primary research on conflict reporting in 
Nigeria, was used as a comparative study with the situation in the Pacific Islands. The remainder of 
the papers are largely essay-based, anecdotal or descriptive.  
 
Wilson and Devere’s (2013) study was constructed around exploratory work on Radio New 
Zealand’s coverage of four conflict-prone Melanesian countries – Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. A content analysis of 108 articles between June and July 2012 
returned a 74.1 per cent war journalism frame, a result consistent with similar international studies 
(see Obonyo & Fackler, 2009; S. T. Lee, 2010; S. T. Lee & Maslog, 2005). Interestingly, Solomon 
Islands journalist Iroga’s (2008) research into his country’s media in the post-conflict situation 
returned a peace journalism frame. His content analysis of the Solomon Star, and interviews with 
local journalists, found many examples of media practising peace journalism without realising it. 
Media complemented the State’s reconstruction efforts, even while free to criticise government. 
Senior reporters who were interviewed stated that the country had suffered. As responsible citizens, 
the reporters did not want to see further derailment (Iroga, 2008, pp. 166–172).  
 
From a conflict reporting perspective, several significant insights can be drawn from Iroga’s 
findings: 
 
• In post-conflict situations, media are more cautious in their reporting. Media play facilitative 
and collaborative roles (see Christians et al., 2009) with the State to aid national 
reconstruction, while striving to uphold their watchdog role. 
• The Solomon Islands media were blamed for the social unrest (Media rapped . . ., 2005; 
Pacific media ‘gatekeepers’. . .,  2002). Iroga’s paper implies a contrite national media 
supporting nation building as part of the atonement processes.  
 
These observations are consistent with assertions by peace journalism scholars like J. Lynch and R. 
Howard about an inherent capacity and willingness within media for peace-building roles that could 
be nurtured, especially in societies experiencing conflict (see International Media Support, 2003). 
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The question that arises is why should media engage in peace-building retrospectively, only after 
the damage has been done? Indeed, some think that with  the right kind of training in conflict 
theory, media could display the same proactive attitude prior to the outbreak of conflict rather than 
after the fact (see R. Howard, 2009; Iroga, 2008; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). In the next section, 
we conceptualise conflict reporting through normative media theories to gain a deeper 
understanding of the problem.  
  
2.8 Normative media theories 
 
Normative theories derive from media’s ideal functions rather than their actual conduct in society 
(Skjerdal, 2001). As a theoretical construct, normative principles are based on the philosophy of 
idealism, which emphasises how human ideas – especially beliefs and values – shape society 
(Macionis, 2012, p. 81). From this, one understands that while normative theories may not always 
accord with journalistic practice, they still go beyond the abstract, in that institutions draw upon 
them, implicitly or explicitly, when shaping media policies (see Benson, 2008).  
 
Normative models derive from, and expand on, the Hutchins Commission (1947) report entitled, A 
Free and Responsible Press. In addressing criticisms about newspaper operations in the United 
States, the Hutchins report supported the notion of a free but socially responsible press. It warned 
against over-commercialisation, media concentration and ethical breaches while emphasising truth, 
objectivity, and plurality, in part to safeguard media’s own health and freedom (Hutchins 
Commission, 1947). Today, this message resonates even more with Fiji and some other Pacific 
Islands countries, where autocratic-minded governments habitually attack what they see as the lack 
of journalist professionalism to justify stricter controls (Hunter, 2009; M. Chaudhry, 2000; Perrottet 
& Robie, 2011; Rika, 2009).  
 
The Commission’s ideas were further developed by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) in their 
seminal Four Theories of the Press. They differentiated: Authoritarian (privately-owned, 
government-controlled, barred from criticising the State); Libertarian (privately-owned, no 
government control, watchdog role); Soviet (State-owned and controlled, cannot criticise the State); 
and Social responsibility (privately-owned but socially-orientated, with community access and 
control). Paradoxically, The Four Theories thesis was hailed as a “classic” that filled an intellectual gap 
in understanding world media systems and condemned as an “ethnocentric, functionalist and simplistic” 
idea, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet system (Merrill, 2002; McQuail, 1994; Hallin & 
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Mancini, 2004). Despite their perceived shortcomings, the Four Theories continue to inspire new 
research. McQuail’s (1994) work on two additional models – development and democratic-participant – 
is premised on the original Four Theories. A timely revision of the concepts by Christians, Glasser, 
McQuail, Nordenstreng and White (2009) has resulted in an insightful book, Normative Theories of 
the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies. It looks into how media roles have evolved since 
the end of the Cold War. Christians and co-authors provide new and updated insights into media 
roles in relation to contemporary post–Cold War conflicts and online media. We contextualise the 
discussion by outlining the four roles – monitorial, facilitative, radical and collaborative – as they 
apply to Fiji and other relevant Pacific Islands contexts.  
 
Monitorial role (for reporting power): The monitorial role, embedded in the fourth estate tradition, is 
associated with watchdoggism around the world, Fiji and the South Pacific included (Brislin, 1979 
Christians et al., 2009; Devi & Chand, 2008; Hunter, 2009; Rika, 2009).  Over time, the monitorial 
role has become associated with a broader set of responsibilities, such as “forger of social consensus”, 
sometimes “deliberately”, but more often “implicitly” (Christians et al., 2009, pp. 141–143). One 
could link this paradigm shift to the post–Cold War proliferation of intra-State conflicts and 
subsequent calls for a re-examination of journalism’s role in times of violent conflict, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter.  
 
The “forger of social consensus” in the monitorial role has parallels with both peace journalism and 
conflict sensitive reporting. This tells us that frames like peace journalism, which are essentially about 
a different approach to conflict reporting, are not necessarily a substitute for conventional journalism, 
which has useful watchdog functions if exercised in an ethical and accountable manner. Rather, any 
such frameworks could be seen as a balancing or harmonising model existing within, or alongside, 
conventional watchdog journalism, adding scope and depth to this traditional role. This is particularly 
the case in fragile societies. Other monitorial roles that are relatable to responsible conflict reporting 
frames include media “barking” when a social actor is perceived to be going against the public 
interest (Christians et al., 2009, pp. 146–147). One apparent drawback of the monitorial role as far as 
conflict reporting is concerned is the heavy reliance on elite sources. Because the news agenda is 
often set by the centres of power, grassroots people – usually on the frontlines and on the receiving 
end of conflicts – do not usually get much of a hearing. This is an area in which a facilitative role, 
seeking to give voice to the ordinary people, could provide a balance.  
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Facilitative role (for serving civil society): In this role, media reflect the political order in which 
they are situated. Reporting seeks to support, enrich, improve and strengthen civil society by 
promoting media consumers’ active participation in the public sphere (Christians et al., 2009, p. 
158). In Fiji’s case, aspects of the facilitative role is most evident in social media such as blogs, 
which provide individuals the space to critique and condemn the Bainimarama Government, 
especially so in the face of the restrictions on mainstream media (C. Walsh, 2010). This is an 
example of the facilitative role acting as a vehicle for “democratic pluralism” by allowing a 
“diversity of groups” to exert influence within the polity (Christians et al., 2009, p. 158–159; 
Plattner, 2010, p. 89).  
 
Democratic pluralism has parallels with consociationalism, a political system premised on 
guaranteed power-sharing and proportionate representation between groups to manage conflicts in 
deeply divided societies (see Lijphart, 1999, 2004). Underpinned by values of democratic pluralism 
and consociationalism, a facilitative media role could conceivably serve a purpose in countries 
where social conflict is the predominant security threat. However, there are some knotty issues to 
consider. Politically, consociation denotes a lesser role for oppositional politics. Empirical evidence 
shows that a weak opposition could breed corruption, including patron–client relationships 
(Shouman, 2013). It would seem that accommodative political systems based on consociation 
warrant a greater rather than a diminished watchdog role.  
 
Cheng and Zuam (2012) wrestle with the same vexing issue in their edited book, Corruption and 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the Peace? They acknowledge that corruption threatens 
economic development, political stability and good governance in post-conflict countries. However, 
they argue that in conflict-prone countries, corruption needs to be situated in the “wider context of 
peace-building”, and the additional competing priorities that arise from such environments. These issues 
require “nuanced discussion” that acknowledges the difficult trade-offs involved. For one, corruption 
could have limited positive effects through facilitating the “purchase of peace” and in its redistributive 
benefits (Cheng & Zuam, 2012, p. 8). Such matters pose some thorny moral questions for the media in 
Fiji and other Pacific Islands countries when it comes to choosing between elements of monitorial or 
facilitative roles.  
 
Radical role (for questioning the political system): The radical role is distinguished by media 
fundamentally departing from the diktats of the State and other power structures of society (Christians 
et al., 2009). Such media are antagonistic towards dominant forces, offering alternative channels and 
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perspectives to those reflecting entrenched political, economic and cultural hegemony. Media act as a 
critical voice in their own right, challenging authority and supporting change – including violent 
revolution – to achieve just societies by overcoming exploitation, corruption and human rights 
violations (Christians et al., 2009, p. 191). A much touted example of radical media is the Havana-
based weekly anarchist newspaper, ¡Tierra!, which played a critical part in forging both a Cuban-
wide and larger Caribbean-wide anarchist network from 1902 to 1915 (Shaffer, 2009). Notably, 
radical media are not only present, or relevant in revolutionary situations. They can also have an 
impact during ‘normal’ periods. Downing (2001) explains that mainstream media professionals in 
capitalist societies are often bound by self-censorship and standard professional media codes. Because 
radical media are free from such constraints, they are better positioned to challenge these control 
systems (pp. 15–16).  
 
In this scenario, radical media resemble what Gramsci (1971) calls an “anti-capitalist”, “counter-
hegemonic” force (also see Rupert, 2005). More recently, the Internet has come to symbolise radical 
media, serving as a major tool for today’s crop of “cyber radicals”, both for political organisation and 
cultural production (Atton, 2004; Kahn & Kellner, 2002; C. Walsh, 2010). Krotoski (2010) calls this 
trend the “most powerful harbinger of social change the world has ever seen”. The tools are 
websites, blogs, emails, mobile phones, and other platforms used by dissident groups all over the 
world to mount political campaigns and kick-start people-power movements (C. Walsh, 2010). The 
radical role is the antithesis of the collaborative role, which is discussed next. 
 
Collaborative role (for serving the State/other power institutions): Normatively, a collaborative 
role implies a partnership between the media and the State built on mutual trust and a shared 
commitment to mutually agreeable goals (Christians et al., 2009). While media also cooperate with 
community activists and advertisers, collaboration with the State stands out, for only the State can 
intervene in the affairs of journalism and fundamentally alter the nature of everyday news (pp. 139–
198). As Christians et al. point out, the collaborative role is often viewed suspiciously since media 
largely exist as a “check on power, not as a conduit to it” (2009, p. 197). Sections of the Western 
media establishment are particularly uncompromising on this issue. For example, the Anglo-
American media establishment vehemently dismisses development journalism – which calls for 
certain levels of collaboration with the State – as “government-say-so journalism” (Gunaratne, 
1996, p. 66). But media in countries such as Singapore, Israel and parts of Africa and Latin America 
are more accepting of development journalism, usually in the name of nation-building and/or 
national security, the utmost priorities in these lands (Nossek & Limor, 2001).  
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The collaborative role can be divided into three distinguishable types – compliance, acquiescence 
and acceptance (Christians et al., 2009). Under compliance, three categories are distinguished – 
coercion, apathy and tradition. Collaboration through coercion is regarded as the weakest and the 
least compelling since it is enforced, rather than voluntary or mutual. Collaboration based on apathy 
sees media conserve the status quo through indifference or ignorance, whereas in collaboration 
based on tradition, the status quo is maintained through custom or habit (Christians et al., 2009, pp. 
198–199). In the second type, collaboration through acquiescence, cooperation is reluctant and 
somewhat unappealing, but deemed necessary, to avoid retribution. Furthermore, it could also be 
useful instrumentally. Collaboration through acceptance, the third type, may be considered the most 
satisfactory in that media willingly and knowingly cooperate because they believe it is “correct” or 
proper (Christians et al., 2009, pp. 199–200).  
 
A collaborative role can be useful in conflict-prone societies, as in Kenya, where after the deadly 
2007–2008 elections, the country’s media rallied behind government to help calm tensions (Ojwang, 
2009, p. 23). But, as some international precedents show, a collaborative role is also fraught with 
risks, especially in the long term. For instance, the State–media–military collaboration in Israel has 
been likened to a “marriage of convenience”. Media are partners rather than rivals of the elite 
establishments and power centres with which they share common interests (Nossek & Limor, 2001, 
pp. 1–11). But most citizens appear to accept this as a pragmatic, necessary arrangement to safeguard 
national security. In Turkey, a similar alliance apparently turned sinister, with the country’s media 
barons accused of complicity in military coups in return for lucrative tenders in the energy, mining 
and banking sectors (Keneş, 2012). In some ways, these issues are relevant for Fiji, where the 
military has been quite influential since the 1987 coup. It been the major power since the 2006 coup 
and, at the time of writing, should the election scheduled for September 2014 proceed as planned, 
would have been effectively running the country for almost eight years. In the following section, we 
return to the four roles of the media as discussed above, and apply them to the contexts in Fiji and 
other relevant Pacific Islands countries. 
 
2.9 The four roles in the Fiji and Pacific Islands contexts 
 
In the Fiji and Papua New Guinea contexts, Robie’s (2003a) survey of journalists found that 70 per 
cent in both countries agreed that the phrases “fourth estate” and/or “watchdog” applied to them (p. 
346). This indicates the dominance of the classical monitorial role in a democratic setting. 
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However, as the application of the four roles to Fiji will show, media roles are neither static nor 
stratified but oscillate between different roles, based on shifting political and economic power. The 
most immediate and dramatic fluctuations in media roles occur when there is a major shift in the 
political landscape and a sudden transfer of power, resulting in a loss or weakening of democracy. 
In Fiji, prior to the 2006 coup, the monitorial role was dominant under the country’s democratic 
framework (Hunter, 2009; Rika, 2009; Pareti; 2009). Shortly after the coup, authoritarianism set in, 
and media struggled to maintain any sort of monitorial profile. As the State tightened its controls, 
media changed tack. In a last-ditch effort to maintain their independence and preserve their powers, 
they decided to confront the regime, and adopted a radical role. As veteran Fiji journalist Samisoni 
Pareti (2009) explained: 
  
The political landscape had undergone a dramatic, if not revolutionary, change, so should 
the business as usual kind of reporting continue or should the change in landscape require a 
change in approach?  (Pareti, 2009, p. 271) 
 
The metamorphosis of media’s role after the 2006 coup is further reflected in former Fiji Times 
editor-in-chief Netani Rika’s comments. In a presentation at the 2009 PINA Conference, Rika 
likened the Fiji Times to a matanivanua – the traditional herald and communication channel 
between chiefs and peoples in indigenous Fijian society. Rika described the matanivanua as a 
messenger, and likened aspects of this role to that of present-day journalists, who serve as a vital 
communication link in society. The Fiji Times, he stated, had been a matanivanua for the Fiji 
community since 1869 (Rika, 2009). This defining label has certain parallels with a monitorial role 
for media of information gatherer and disseminator. 
 
But that is not all. Earlier, Rika had described the Fiji Times as the “unofficial opposition” with an 
“even more important role to play” since the 2006 coup, with no “stepping back” (Edwards, 2008). 
This stance was far removed from the matanivanua’s role of “ancient ambassador” and mere 
disseminator of information or commands received from the top (see Rika, 2009). The role was 
synonymous with media oppositionism. It was going beyond the realms of the monitorial role and 
entering into radical media territory. But in a repressive environment, a radical role on the part of 
the mainstream news media can go only so far. In Fiji’s case, the Bainimarama Government struck 
back, detaining several local journalists and deporting three expatriate newspaper publishers 
between 2008 and 2009 (Dutt, 2010; Reporters Without Borders, 2009). In April 2009, the regime 
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introduced the Public Emergency Regulations (PER), imposing prior censorship through 
government censors present in all newsrooms (Reporters Without Borders, 2009).  
 
A defiant Fiji Times protested by leaving some columns blank to represent the stories pulled by the 
censors, while the Fiji Daily Post turned to satire, publishing tongue-in-cheek titles such as 
“Watching the paint dry”, and “What I had for lunch today” (Greenslade, 2009). The Fiji Sun, for 
its part, banned the publication of all political stories and Fiji TV cancelled news bulletins 
(Greenslade, 2009). These moves exemplify a radical media approach, even if they were short-
lived. In June 2010, the Bainimarama Government promulgated the punitive Media Industry 
Development Decree 2010, stipulating stiff fines and jail terms for ethical breaches (Media Industry 
Development Decree, 2010). This forced the media into a more cautionary position and raised 
major concerns about self-censorship (Hooper, 2013). This characterises “coercive collaboration” 
through legislation. It leaves media with little choice but to comply (Christians et al., 2009, p. 199).  
 
Another provision in the Media Decree that forced some media into a collaborative role, albeit in a 
roundabout way, was Part 7, which limited foreign ownership of local media to 10 per cent (Media 
Industry Development Decree, 2010). This forced the sale of the Rupert Murdoch–owned Fiji 
Times to a local firm, Motibhai Company Limited (Robie, 2010). The sale marked the dismantling 
of remnants of resistance in the print media sector. Once a strong critic of the government, the Fiji 
Times signalled it was changing its stance. The new publisher, Dallas Swinstead, stated that a free 
press did not work in Fiji and that taking on government was neither wise nor constructive (Leaver, 
2010). He indicated that the Fiji Times supported government’s proclaimed multiracial policies: 
  
Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama is a Fijian working towards sharing his country with 
Indians. The PM knows it must happen or the place is doomed; too many good Indians and 
others have deserted the place. I strongly agree with the PM’s intentions and my paper will 
do what we can to achieve a means to a beginning and a nation of free speech. (Leaver, 
2010) 
 
Initially, the Fiji Times’ collaboration had been based on coercion, enforced as it was through the 
PER. Swinstead’s comments indicated that the Fiji Times was entering a different phase of the 
collaborative role – collaboration through acquiescence, based on pragmatic and instrumentalist 
reasons. Some might even interpret Swinstead’s professed support for Bainimarama’s multi-racial 
policy as collaboration based on acceptance. This is when media judge collaboration to be correct 
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and proper (see Christians et al., 2009, pp. 199–200). This trend shows that in the Fiji context, the 
four roles and sub-roles are at times quite fluid, with thin dividing lines between them.  
 
This point is further illustrated by the changing stances of the Fiji Sun. As discussed earlier, the paper 
was initially defiant. Later, it reversed its position, and in a relatively short time, began to openly 
support the Bainimarama Government’s policies (Greenslade, 2009; Narsey, 2013b, 2013c). Critics 
charged that the change in the Fiji Sun’s stance was commercially motivated and referred to the 
paper’s monopoly on State advertising as proof (Narsey, 2013b, 2013c; Woods, 2010). But the Fiji 
Sun claimed its support for Bainimarama was based on his vision for multi-racialism and nation 
building. In fairness to the paper, a Lowy Institute (2011) poll put Bainimarama’s personal approval 
rating at 66 per cent, although regime opponents claimed the results were unreliable (Narsey, 2011). 
Whichever way one looks at it, the Fiji Sun’s example denotes the variability of the four roles and 
sub-roles in response to the changing political environment: the paper went from a monitorial role 
(under a democratic framework) to a radical role, before transiting into a collaborative role (under a 
non-democratic political framework) based on acquiescence. Gradually, the paper (at least its 
publishers and owners) seemed to embrace the regime’s core policies and slipped into a 
collaborative role based more on instrumentalism and/or acceptance.  
 
The metamorphosis of the Fiji Times and the Fiji Sun highlight that a media role based on 
collaboration can be a slippery path ultimately leading to greater control by government using both 
incentives and retribution to enforce compliance. It underlines concerns about the perils of entering 
into such a role in the first place, although under Fiji’s authoritarian government, media had little 
choice. An interpretation of the literature suggests that other private media, like radio broadcaster 
Communications Fiji Limited, Fiji Television Limited, and Fijilive.com, engaged in collaboration 
through acquiescence to avoid the consequences of non-compliance. These media did not criticise 
government strongly, to avoid falling foul of the media laws, but unlike the Fiji Sun, neither did 
they show open support for government policies (Dorney, 2011;Narsey, 2013b, 2013c; Woods, 
2010). As Dorney (2011) somewhat harshly commented, “the rest of the Fiji media is not quite as 
sycophantic as the Fiji Sun”.  
 
The State broadcaster, Fiji Broadcasting Corporation, juggles two somewhat contradictory roles: 
promotion of State policy on the one hand and operation as an independent, commercial news 
organisation, on the other (Fiji Broadcasting Corporation, 2012; Pacific Media and 
Communications Facility, 2005). FBC’s chief executive officer Riyaz Sayed-Khaiyum believes 
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Fiji’s social and political conditions require “solutions-orientated development journalism” without 
abandoning the watchdog role (Vandhana, 2012). This denotes two dominant roles – facilitative and 
collaborative. But as Hooper’s (2013) work indicates, maintaining the watchdog role in full would 
be difficult, if not impossible, given government’s limited tolerance for criticism. 
 
In terms of the four roles, there is a clear pattern since the 2006 coup. The country’s slide into 
authoritarianism was matched by the media’s capitulation to more repressive forms of State control. 
Media went from a monitorial role to a short-lived radical role, before being coerced into a 
collaborative role. This trend invokes comparisons with Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s (1956) 
four theories of the press. This theory holds that the media do not function in a vacuum, but take on 
the form and colouration of the social and political structures within which they operate (pp. 1–2). 
Some had suggested that the four theories were irrelevant in the new world media order (McQuail, 
1994). In some respects, Fiji’s example defies predictions of the four theories’ obsoleteness. The 
exception was social media, which government could not control (see Foster, 2007; Hammond-
Thrasher, 2007; Harborow, 2008; C. Walsh, 2010). The proliferation of social media in Fiji shows 
that putting too many controls on the media could backfire on the State. Controls on media are 
usually imposed in the name of security (Hackett, 2013). But in the Internet age, this tends to drive 
dissident views underground, into the realm of social media, where they re-emerge in more violent 
and radical forms (see Foster, 2007; C. Walsh, 2010). In the next section we look at the problem 
through the framework of the political economy of the media. 
 
2.10 Political economy of the media and conflict reporting 
 
This section locates conflict reporting within political economy of the media and communications – 
a field that focuses mostly on mass media ownership and how this impacts on society (Graham, 
2007). Influential political economy of the media scholars whose works guide this study include: 
Herman and Chomsky (1988, 2003, 2008); Garnham (1990); McChesney (2000); Bagdikian (2000, 
2004); Mansell (2004); and Mosco (1996). Mosco (1996, p.25) posits political economy as the 
study of social relations, “particularly power relations”, which constitute the production, 
distribution and consumption of resources. Political economy of communication applies these 
principles to media and communication systems to determine how they are shaped by ownership, 
market structures, and government policies (Bagdikian, 2004; Chambers, 2000; McChesney, 2008).  
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The theory seeks to illuminate “how changes in an array of forces which exercise control over 
cultural production and distribution limit or liberate the public sphere” (Golding & Murdock, 2000, 
pp. 70–92). The political economy approach provides important insights into the economic and 
political dynamics of media ownership and control, variables that affect conflict reporting 
(Chambers, 2000; Frohardt & Temin, 2003; also see Lynch, 2011). McChesney (2000) has usefully 
divided the political economy of communication and media into two broad categories: 
 
First, it addresses the nature of the relationship between media and communication systems 
on the one hand and the broader social structure of society … with a particular interest in 
how economic factors influence politics and social relations. Second, [it] looks specifically 
at how ownership, support mechanisms (e.g. advertising) and government policies influence 
media behavior and content. [It] emphasises structural factors and the labor process in the 
production, distribution and consumption of communication. (McChesney, 2000, p. 109) 
 
Central to the political economy of the media theory is Herman and Chomsky’s (1988, 2003, 2008) 
much-debated Marxist-based propaganda model. This model holds the dominant media as profit 
seeking businesses funded by, and beholden to, big advertisers such as government and private 
enterprises. Media serve as levers of control to “mobilise” support for these special clients, which 
dominate State and private activity (1988, p. xi; 2003; 2008). Herman and Chomsky’s US-based 
study reflected concerns raised decades previously by the Hutchins Commission (1947) and by 
Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) about control and commercialisation of media. Ownership of 
the country’s major media had slid largely into the hands of a few large, vertically-integrated firms 
(owning means of media production, distribution and exhibition) and horizontally integrated firms 
(controlling majority market share) (Bagdikian, 2000). Globalisation accelerated the process, giving 
rise to firms like Time Warner, “the largest media company in the world, and the standard bearer of 
synergy and vertical integration in the digital age” (Mihal, 2004). 
 
In terms of the political economy of conflict reporting, Boyd-Barrett (2004, p. 26) discusses how in 
times of war, “insatiable” audience appetite for news attracts advertisers, who in turn create 
commercial opportunities for the media. This suggests that some media whet audiences’ pre-
existing appetite for conflict, then seek to satiate it. Hence, media’s preference for content with high 
drama and tension, a trait Galtung (1998) describes as war journalism – allegedly the dominant 
frame in conflict reporting. Both the political economy of the media and the peace journalism 
frameworks are critical of the conventionally strong preference for elite sources in mainstream news 
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reporting (Herman & Chomsky, 2008; Lynch & Galtung, 2010). Moreover, both fields regard 
media objectivity as a problematic concept. From a political economy viewpoint, the media are 
structurally locked into pro-systemic bias, and will rarely give objective coverage to anything that 
seriously threatens the social order of capitalism (McNair, 2009).  
 
Tehranian (2002, p. 58) gives further insights into synergies between political economy of the 
media and conflict reporting and how the two concepts can inform and reinforce each other. He 
observes that government and commercial media have their own interest in creating images of 
“self” and “other” – the government to command allegiance, and commercial media to sell products 
and services. As such, the promotion of particular commodities and identities is the main 
preoccupations of the two systems, which tends to exacerbate tensions by dichotomising, 
dramatising, and demonising “them” against “us”. Tehranian’s views are supported by Shinar 
(2007, p. 59), who highlights how media ownership determines the level of “production and 
dissemination of peace-oriented content during and after conflicts”.  
 
Such concerns are behind calls by analysts like R. Howard (2003, 2009) for greater conflict 
reporting research from a political economy perspective to create a better understanding of the link 
between media commercialisation and conflict reporting. Such calls are timely for Fiji and the 
South Pacific, where attention has mostly focused on the threat from the State. In comparison, the 
potential threat from the private sector has been largely overlooked, particularly by international 
monitors, who regard Pacific Islands governments as the main oppressors of the media (see, for 
example, International Federation of Journalists, 2010; 2012a and b). Robie (2014) has claimed 
appropriately that in the Pacific, media freedom has been defined in far “too narrow terms, as if Big 
Brother governments and politicians ignorant about the role of media are the only problem”. He 
states: 
 
There are many other issues that are vitally important in the region that impinge on media 
freedom yet are rarely mentioned … self-censorship, media ownership and convergence, 
poor qualifications and salaries for many journalists (which make them potentially open to 
undue influence and bribery) and lack of education.  (pp. 305–306)  
 
This inclination to focus on the State as the prime threat to media freedom can be attributed to 
western/liberalist interpretations of media. This leaning tends to lavish attention on State–media 
relationships while neglecting the impact of privatised capitalism on communication (C-C. Lee, 
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2001). In Fiji and the South Pacific, neo-liberalism was sold as a positive development. The private 
sector was lionised as the engine of growth and the saviour of sluggish, centralised Pacific Island 
economies, some riddled with corruption (see Firth, 2000). The hegemony of neo-liberalism could 
explain why governments are often seen as the major nemesis of the media in the region. In 
addition, the media sector in Fiji fiercely guards its independence, often portraying government as a 
threat to freedom of speech. In 2003 the Fiji media sector mounted a major ‘No Media Bill’ public 
campaign against the Qarase Government’s draft Media Bill, which was eventually shelved (Kaitani 
to dump media bill, 2004). Yet another reason why the corporate threat to media is overlooked is 
the dearth of studies into the issue. However, the political economy field has its doubters, both on 
the right and the left.  
 
These sceptics often use Herman and Chomsky’s theories to illustrate Marxist positions. They 
dismiss the propaganda model as polemic, or worse, a mere “conspiracy theory” (Edgley, 2009; 
Golding & Murdock, 1996, 2000; Klaehn, 2002). Entman (1990) believes the propaganda model 
has serious analytical flaws, a shaky hypothesis and disregards journalistic integrity and 
proficiency. These same issues rankle Hallin (2000), who points to the various high-profile 
government and corporate sector scandals exposed by media to debunk the idea that journalists are 
easy targets of manipulation. Entman and Hallin have a point. Generalism does appear to be a weak 
link in the theory in that journalists and the public are not treated as rational beings who can think, 
analyse, oppose and resist. As Lehrer (2004) says, the propaganda model exaggerates the power of 
media owners and underestimates the independence of journalists. Another alleged fallacy of 
studies in this tradition is that they are too concerned with the structure of production, and not 
enough with content, meaning and the symbolic (Mansell, 2004). 
 
Corner (2003) notes that the propaganda model was devised for the United States, and casts doubts 
about its relevance in countries with different media and political systems. This, however, is not a 
strong rebuttal since the theory has been effectively applied in different settings (for a list of 
political economy of the media studies, see Mullen & Klaehn, 2010). Like any theory, political 
economy of the media has its flaws. Nevertheless, as Klaehn (2002) pointed out, many scholars have 
presented evidence, from countries with different media systems and political structures, in support 
of the central hypotheses of the thesis. Media behaviour during the Iraq wars and the News of the 
World phone hacking scandal vindicated elements of political economy. In a content analysis of both 
news and editorials, McKnight (2012) showed that News Corp and News International used their 
media to campaign for the side of politics that best served their commercial goals.  
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In Fiji there is little, if any, previous research from a political economy of the media angle, even 
though media ownership, in line with global trends, has become increasingly corporatised and 
conglomerised since independence in 1970. Robie (2009a, 2009b) has been warning about media 
consolidation and commercialisation in Fiji, while economist Narsey (2013b, 2013c) has blogged 
insightfully about local media moguls “squashing media independence”. But in-depth scholarly 
research is virtually absent. What is more, the State in itself is a major media owner and since the 
2006 coup, it has been regulating the media (see Dutt, 2010). This, and the other gaps in the 
literature, are discussed in the next section. 
 
2.11 Gaps in the literature and research questions 
 
This review has revealed important gaps in the literature, which this particular PhD research will 
attempt to address. These are outlined below: 
 
• Existing research focuses mostly on Western news media coverage of conflicts. The role of 
non-western, domestic media lacks in-depth study (Betz, 2011). 
• Conflict reporting generally lacks research within a political economy framework. In the 
Pacific, there has been virtually no scholarly research from this perspective. 
• In both Fiji and the Pacific, governments are seen as the major threat to media freedom, 
while the corporate threat is overlooked. The negative impacts of self-censorship, media 
ownership and convergence, poor qualifications and salaries for many journalists need to be 
examined.  
• The literature on conflict reporting in Fiji heaps blame on the journalist or media 
organisations without considering the effect of the media landscape, or the structural factors 
at play (Gounder 2006; Gaunder, 2008; Kiran 2005; T. R. Singh, 2011).  
• The last survey of the Fiji media landscape was carried out by Robie (2003a). A follow-up 
survey is timely given the changes in the intervening decade. 
• Fiji’s media ownership regime has been evolving since Independence in 1970. It changed 
dramatically after new ownership laws were implemented in 2010. But the consequence of 
the law and the changing media ownership patterns have yet to receive an in-depth and 
focussed scholarly investigation, especially from a conflict reporting perspective.  
• Peace journalism is criticised for jumping from theorising to media reform without producing 
empirical data to inform and guide their initiatives (McMahon & Chow White, 2011).  
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• Studies in the political economy of the media tradition are said to focus on the structure of 
production, with not enough attention paid to content, including meaning making  and the 
symbolic (Mansell, 2004). 
 
These significant gaps in the literature give rise to the following core research questions in relation 
to conflict reporting: 
 
1. Are the Fiji print media inflammatory, as is often alleged? 
2. What is the level of journalist professional capacity and diversity in Fiji? 
3. What are the genesis and nature of Fiji’s media laws?  
4. What are the genesis and nature of media ownership in Fiji and the link with political and      
    economic power?  
 
2.12  Chapter summary 
 
Globally, there has been fairly widespread concern about the allegedly damaging manner in which 
the various media report conflict. This prompted calls for a rethinking in the question of reporting 
strategies and initiated some contemporary conflict reporting frameworks to address the problem. 
Fiji and the Pacific are largely behind in this relatively new trend despite the outbreak of violent 
conflict in some island countries in the post–Cold War era. Like media elsewhere, Fiji media are 
accused of prioritising the primordial angle while downplaying valid instrumentalist and 
constructivist motives for conflict. Such allegations were viewed through the political economy and 
normative media theoretical frameworks, as well as contemporary conflict reporting frameworks 
such as peace journalism, conflict sensitive reporting and use and abuse of media in vulnerable 
societies. On the whole, these concepts recommend a broader conflict reporting approach anchored 
in an understanding of a country’s social, historical and political experiences (constructivism). 
Based on the gaps in the literature review, this study proposes to examine both media content and 
media landscape together to analyse conflict reporting in Fiji. In the next chapter, we follow the 
instrumentalist and constructivist traditions of conflict analysis by discussing Fiji’s history, culture 
and politics in relation to conflict reporting.  
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CHAPTER 3 – THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SETTING 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, a key argument was the media’s apparent tendency to report conflict on the 
basis of primordialism (ethnic hatred) while downplaying instrumentalist (elite 
manipulation/political economy) and constructivist (historical) causes. The disproportionate focus 
on ethnicity was deemed reductive and potentially damaging with regard to understanding conflicts 
in all their complexity and taking appropriate corrective measures. Consequently, this chapter 
approaches conflict in Fiji from various instrumentalist and constructivist perspectives, such as the 
impact of British imperialism, the country’s pluralistic composition, its somewhat unusual political 
system, its distinctive cultures and traditions and the numerous power dynamics at play. This 
holistic approach to conflict analysis is consistent with contemporary conflict reporting frames such 
as peace journalism and conflict-sensitive reporting (Frohardt & Temin, 2003; R. Howard, 2003, 
2009; Lynch & Galtung, 2010). These frameworks view conflict as a process – a steady build-up 
and manifestation of social, political and economic influences grounded in history – rather than a 
series of isolated events driven solely or largely by ethnic hatred.  As such, this chapter considers 
the various individuals, groups, formations, organisations, events, issues, agendas, cultures, 
communications and histories relating to conflict and how the Fiji media function at the 
intersections of these multi-layered undercurrents.  
 
The chapter begins by looking at indigenous migration and settlement of Fiji; the country’s 
‘discovery’ by Europeans; the onset of modernisation (including colonialism, industrialisation and 
globalisation); and the lasting and ongoing impact of these trends on Fijian society. Next, it 
considers the arrival of the agricultural industry and the influx of Indian indentured labourers and 
how these trends gave rise to intractable conflicts on the basis of ethnicity, demography, the land 
issue, perceived threat to indigenous culture, perceived Indo-Fijian wealth, affirmative action, 
cultural assimilation and contestations for political and economic power. Also forming part of the 
discussions are Fiji’s struggles with constitutional and electoral systems, the apparent presence of 
oligarchic structures within Fiji’s hybridised democratic framework and a renewed examination of 
the country’s four coups.  
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The coups were a chain of violent outcomes of pre-existing conflicts and the inspiration behind new 
and additional ones. Many journalists and non-academic commentators interpreted the coups 
uncritically in primordial terms and treated them as isolated, unconnected and spontaneous events 
(see Ewins, 2008).  This thesis looks at the coups holistically and collectively to tease out the 
linkages and find meanings in them. The thesis argues that the coups are indicative of competing 
and shifting power balances within Fiji’s various power structures – traditional, modern, political 
and economic, with the military emerging as the apex authority. The military’s ascendency is 
symptomatic of increasing militarisation, a process that has been in the making for decades. Finally, 
the chapter deliberates on the 2006 coup and the path to the 2014 elections. The discussions are 
interspersed with analyses of how the media have understood and reported these tensions. 
 
3.2 Historical background 
 
Adequate comprehension of the structural drivers of conflict in Fiji requires a brief look at the 
county’s history (constructivist approach) and the various powers, power structures and vested 
interests within its systems (instrumentalist/political economy approach). This strategy can help 
explain the root causes of conflict, including when, where, how and why the ethnic dimensions 
(primordialism) become relevant. Based on the literature review, this analysis de-emphasises 
primordialism, but does not totally rule it out. Rather, it attempts to show that in Fiji, what are 
termed as ethnic conflicts are almost invariably  underpinned by the instrumentalism and 
constructivism they screen. This approach is supported by the widely-held scholarly view that 
ethnic identities are socially constructed (Evera, 2001). 
 
This could very much be the case in Fiji, a modern, if complex, multi-ethnic South Pacific nation of 
some 322 islands scattered over 650,000 square kilometres of ocean. Fiji has a total land mass of 
18,343 square kilometres, of which the two largest islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu, comprise 
around 90 per cent (Ministry of Information, 2004/2005). Fiji’s 2007 census shows a population of 
837, 271. The majority, 56.8 per cent, are indigenous Fijians; 37.5 per cent are Indo-Fijians; and 5.7 
per cent are European, Chinese and other mixed ethnicities. Most of Fiji’s population is settled on 
the main islands of Viti Levu (80 per cent) and Vanua Levu (15 per cent) (Bureau of Statistics, 
2007). The majority of Fiji’s population, 64.5 per cent, is Christian, mainly from the indigenous 
community. Of this, the largest denomination, 54 per cent, is Methodist. The second-largest 
religious group, Hindus, makes up 28 per cent, followed by Muslims, at six per cent, both largely 
from the Indo-Fijian community (Bureau of Statistics, 2007). English is the common language, but 
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the Bauan Fijian dialect (promoted by missionaries and colonial administrators as the lingua franca 
for all indigenous Fijians) and Fiji Bhat, a pidginised version of Hindi (spoken by Indo-Fijians) are 
also widely used (Naidu, 2013).  
 
According to some accounts, archaeological evidence suggests that Fiji was first settled by the 
“Lapita People” from Southeast Asia some 3,500 years ago (Ministry of Information, 2004/2005; 
Pirie, 2000). It is posited that over time, incursions from close eastern neighbours Tonga and Samoa 
added Polynesian elements to Fiji’s Melanesian components, including 13 distinct dialects (Pirie, 
2000). The communal society was organised along tribal lines, with two major classes – chiefs and 
commoners – assigned specific roles. Tribal warfare among rival chiefdoms was common (Ewins, 
2008; Pirie, 2000). Among Europeans, Fiji was first sighted by Dutch explorer Abel Tasman in 
1643, followed by Captain James Cook in 1774, then Captain William Bligh in 1789 (Kikkert & 
Dexter, 2007). The first White settlers – mostly sailors, beachcombers, traders and missionaries – 
arrived in the early decades of the 1800s. Thus began the rupture of native Fijian society with the 
introduction of guns, alcohol, a new religion and alien diseases (Ewins, 2008; Kikkert & Dexter, 
2007; Pirie, 2000; Sutherland, 1992).  
 
Soon, a small but powerful White bourgeoisie emerged, untrammelled by law, in that they were 
outside and beyond the reach of any jurisdiction that they recognised. Their self-centred and self-
serving values of private enterprise caused major social and political disruptions within collectivist 
native societies, including an increase in confederacy wars (B. Lal, 1992; Sutherland, 1992). On 
October 10, 1874, Fiji’s most powerful chieftain, Ratu Seru Cakobau, supported by a claque of 
(mostly Eastern) chiefs, ceded the country to a less than eager Great Britain, stating that otherwise 
the “White stalkers on the beach, the cormorants, will open their maws and swallow us” (B. Lal, 
1992, p. 11). Fiji’s first Governor-General Sir Arthur Gordon arrived in 1875 to find an estimated 
40,000 natives, a quarter of the entire population, devastated by measles, with the survivors facing 
dispossession. Gordon, who himself fought a war of pacification against the natives, also worked to 
end tribal wars and safeguard indigenous land by decreeing that all land should be held in 
inalienable right by the mataqali (traditional land-owning clans) (B. Lal, 2008, 2011; Sutherland, 
1992).  This law remains in force today; close to 90 per cent of all land is communally-owned by 
indigenous clans. To this day, despite various legal safeguards, indigenous fears about the loss of 
land, whether real or imagined, continue to be the major source of conflict (Ewins, 2008; B. Lal, 
2011; Pirie, 2000; Qarase, 2000).  
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For the colonial administration, land was a resource to develop Fiji and attain financial self-
sufficiency, as required by the Crown (B. Lal, 1990). Based on a blueprint adopted in other 
colonies, Gordon planned large-scale sugarcane plantations in Fiji. This attracted the Australian 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) in 1882, signalling the arrival of foreign capital and the 
agricultural industry.  To preserve indigenous Fijians’ subsistence lifestyle, Gordon imported 
plantation labour from India (B. Lal, 1990). This was to be a fateful decision that laid the 
foundation for future, generational conflict.  Between 1879 and 1916, there was an influx of over 
60,000 indentured Indian labourers, with most opting to remain in Fiji at the end of their contracts. 
The decision to import foreign labour and allow them to settle permanently was made largely by the 
colonial administration. There was apparently no real consultation with indigenous Fijians, who are 
said generally still to view their relations with Indo-Fijians as those of (less than willing) host and 
(grudgingly tolerated) guest (B. Lal, 2011; Leuprecht, 2012; Pirie, 2000; Ramesh, 2008). According 
to Naidu (2013), ethnicity was the “fundamental” organising principle of the colonial economy and 
society, with European skills and capital at the top, followed by ‘Indian’ labour, then ‘Fijian’ land.  
 
Fiji’s first English language newspaper, the Fiji Times, was founded and produced in Levuka from 
1869. Owned by a white settler, the paper allegedly adopted a pro-establishment/anti-worker stance 
and actively stimulated inter-ethnic hostility on behalf of its patrons (Gillion, 1997; Gaunder, 2008; 
Heartfield, 2002).  The paper’s reportedly ethnic overtones and its pro-establishment stance appear 
consistent with elements of normative media theory, which states that media reflect the “basic 
beliefs and assumptions that society holds” (Siebert et al., 1956, pp. 1–2). The paper’s posture is 
also reflective of political economy theory, which asserts that profit-driven media represent the 
interests of the dominant elites in society (Herman & Chomsky, 2008). As a colonial State, Fiji also 
epitomised the broad view in conflict studies that the “root causes” of most conflicts lie in economic 
and political factors even if people are organised and mobilised around ethnic or religious identities 
(Stewart, 2009, p. 1). Indeed, social conflict in Fiji increased along with the increase in competition 
for political and economic resources among the different communities.  
 
This was evident after the Indo-Fijians emerged from the harshness of indenture with a greater 
assertiveness about their rights rather than meekly accepting their designated place at the bottom of 
the colonially-instituted racial hierarchy. Challenging the power balance often saw Indo-Fijians 
pitted against the Europeans, who regarded them as a threat to their own commercial dominance (B. 
Lal, 2011). The Europeans made ‘anti-Indianism’ a common cause with the native population, who 
viewed the recent immigrants as a danger to self-determination. For instance, when Indo-Fijian 
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CSR workers went on strike for better wages during World War 1, the colonial government used 
250 specially commissioned indigenous Fijian constables to break up the action. As B. Lal (2011) 
writes, an industrial strike acquired a racial element, further polarising two communities already 
separated by religion, language, culture and history.  
 
The Fiji Times was an important tool for established private interests in disseminating anti-Indian 
messages. In 1929, the paper called for the deportation of all Indians, opining that Fiji’s lands and 
climate “are for Europeans” (Gillion, 1977, p. 116). By making ethnicity central to the issues 
affecting the country, the Fiji Times was attempting to preserve the status quo, aiding and abetting 
elite domination and the exploitation of those on the lower rungs of society. The seminal work of 
Fiji economist Wadan Narsey (1979, p. 98) reveals the strong economic rationale for maintaining 
the ethnic divide: the prevailing social/economic structure gave the CSR a guaranteed supply of 
cheap labour and bumper crops – the basis for spectacular profits amounting to 13 million pounds 
between 1914 and 1924, compared to 3.7 million pounds for its Australian operations. These 
financial facts show how primordialism masked instrumentalist motives when it came to conflict in 
colonial Fiji. To put it another way, the veneer of race was used to camouflage the CSR’s 
exploitation of Indo-Fijian labour and indigenous Fijian land to achieve what Narsey (1979, p. 98) 
termed as “superprofits”.  
 
Moreover, fostering the ethnic divide served as a useful buffer against the formation of class 
solidarity to oppose the capitalist establishment. As Sutherland (1992, p. 36) observed, “racism 
became absolutely central to capitalist profit”. These developments lend weight to the popular 
assertion among social scientists that ethnicity is “socially constructed” (Weir, 2012), although the 
link between ethnic violence and the social construction of ethnicity is said to lack empirical 
validity (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 847). From a constructivist viewpoint, one of the major causes 
of enduring inter-group conflict in Fiji is the colonial policy of racial segregation, which included 
the confinement of native Fijians to their villages, ostensibly to protect their communal lifestyle. 
This was achieved through the collusion of the chiefs, who stood to lose most if their people were 
allowed to leave their villages at will and establish any kind of autonomous lifestyle. Critics, in 
hindsight, deride the segregationist policy as a paternalistic, divide-and-rule strategy that prevented 
social integration, confined native Fijians to the subsistence sector, and delayed their move into the 
modern economy (Dakuvula, 2004; Sutherland, 1992; Yabaki, 2009).  
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By the time the natives emerged from their villages in the 1950s, Indo-Fijians were well entrenched 
in the main towns and centres (Dakuvula, 2004). Prevented from owning land, Indo-Fijians had 
started small farms and businesses, learnt the trades and acquired education to gain a head start in 
the money economy. Native Fijians were left feeling economically marginalised (Dakuvula, 2004). 
However, whether two culturally distinct communities would have interacted socially even in the 
absence of colonially-imposed barriers is open to question. To this day, inter-ethnic relationships, 
including marriages, remain uncommon. But to put the issue into perspective, marriages even 
within the Indo-Fijian community across class, caste, and religious lines are discouraged (see 
Narsey, 2014a; Sienkiewicz, 2000; Rao, 2004). Intermarriage, as one of the most definitive social 
and cultural indicators of social integration (Richmond, 2003) is worth further discussion given the 
nature of this thesis. In Fiji, intermarriage and cultural integration are largely viewed through the 
primordial lens. The nationalist politician Apisai Tora stated that “we took in the Indians” and let 
them “live in peace and make money” but there has been “no single act of reciprocity. They won’t 
learn our language, our customs, or join our political parties” (cited in Rao, 2004, p. viii).  
 
The scenario described by Tora is quite typical of pluralist societies. Basically, a society is plural 
when there exist differences in ethnicity, language, race, assumed blood ties, customs and/or 
territory (Ramli & Jamaludin, 2012). The different groups largely remain separate and maintain 
their religious and ethnic identities, which can persist over time (Sidanius & Petroicik, 2000). 
According to Penny & Khoo (1996), intermarriages signify the dissolution of social and cultural 
barriers. In Fiji, Richmond (2003) has conducted probably the only empirical study on the subject. 
She highlights that while the lack of intermarriage is often ascribed to ethnic differences, there are 
various structural and institutional obstacles involved.  
 
These include colonial policies that resulted in the development of schools, political parties, and 
residential communities along racial lines. This is said to have hindered cultural assimilation, even 
after independence (see Richmond, 2003). The Fiji situation is consistent with Penny and Khoo’s 
(1996) assertion that endogamy (marriage within one’s specific social group) and exogamy 
(marriage outside of a specific social group) are affected by access to education and employment, 
opportunities for young people of all ethnic backgrounds to participate in social and community 
activities, and government policies and programmes that facilitate inter-group associations. These 
institutional factors are constructivist in nature but receive less attention than do primordial 
elements.  Towards this end, the Bainimarama Government has been praised for introducing some 
radical integrationist policies – for instance by abolishing the ethnic element in the naming of 
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schools, making the teaching of Hindi and Fijian languages compulsory and establishing a common 
name, “Fijian”, for all citizens – even though these imposed policies are not universally popular 
(Lane, 2012; Naidu, 2013). However, intermarriage is not a sure protection against ethnic conflict. 
Intermarriage among Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks was fairly common but this did little to slow the 
Bosnian slaughter of 1992–1995 (Evera, 2001).  
 
3.3 The intra-ethnic divides  
 
While Fiji’s dominant inter-ethnic cleavages capture the most attention (Lane, 2012), significant 
intra-ethnic differences also exist. These need to be acknowledged if the objective is a fuller and 
truer measure of social conflict in the country.  Some pre-existent conflicts within the indigenous 
community were suppressed by colonialism while others became worse and re-emerged under new 
guises. The formation of tribal leaders into a body called the Council of Chiefs is a case in point. 
The colonial administration granted greater powers to the fair-skinned Eastern chiefs as a reward for 
helping to capture the western part of Fiji, much to the chagrin of Western chiefs (Ewins, 2008; M. 
Howard, 1991). This skewed system was maintained after independence and produced lasting 
tensions (Pirie, 2000; Teaiwa, 2000). Western chiefs have, on occasion, even called for separation 
from Fiji, complaining that while most of the national wealth was produced in their region, the seat 
of political power remained in the east (Ewins, 2008; M. Howard, 1991; Pirie, 2000).  
 
This defies the popular notion that competition for political power and economic resources in Fiji is 
a dualistic battle between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians. It also highlights that Fiji’s major 
conflicts are underpinned by grievances over the sharing of national wealth and resources. This is 
not to deny that within the indigenous community, deep-rooted tribal differences, regional tensions 
and chiefly rivalries that existed before European contact still persist at one level or another, even if 
they are masked by the politics of race (Sutherland, 1992). Teaiwa (2000) has even gone so far as to 
claim that, “there is no Fijian nation”, only “Fijian provinces, and traditional Fijian confederacies”. 
For instance, the 2000 Speight coup was purportedly carried out on behalf of ordinary indigenous 
Fijians. But a core (if covert) aim was to allegedly restore the influence of the traditional political 
elites from the Kubuna confedracy (Firth & Fraenkel, 2009). Dobell (2008) noted that the longer the 
2000 coup crisis ran, the more it became clear that this was a fight among indigenous Fijians, 
though efforts to scapegoat the Indo-Fijians were not altogether abandoned.  
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By the same token, Indo-Fijians are perceived and portrayed as a homogeneous group despite 
differences, distinctions and discrimination along regional, religious, linguistic, caste and class 
lines, such as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians; North Indian or South Indian origin; 
descendants of indentured migrants as opposed to free migrants, the latter mostly composed of 
Gujaratis and Punjabi Sikhs (Narsey, 2014a; M. Reddy, 2011). Despite a fairly common social and 
political ideology, the two major Indo-Fijian-based political parties have been bitter rivals since the 
1990s (Ramesh, 2010). When it comes to reporting conflict in the news, a dual focus based on 
ethnicity not only hides the inequalities prevalent within ethnic societies but also masks the formation 
of elite networks across ethnic boundaries to consolidate power. As Pirie says, to describe the Fiji 
situation as a ‘Fijian–Indian conflict’ both “oversimplifies” the context and renders many critical 
factors invisible. In addition, the named groups can serve as “lightning rods” in conflict rhetoric and 
the tension intensifies (2000, p. 57). 
 
3.4 The tradition–modernity binary and cultural stereotypes 
 
Interestingly, while nationalists like Tora and former Prime Minister Qarase (2000) speak about the 
lack of cultural assimilation, they also emphasise the need to protect and preserve indigeneity. At 
the surface level, such comments indicate a classic tradition–modernity tussle (see Qarase, 2000).  
Tradition and modernity encompass a huge and complicated field of study and this is not a place to 
delve into the intricacies of this debate. For the purpose of this thesis, it suffices to define modernity 
as a new order based on social progress, human reason, individualism and technological advances, 
along with the attendant hazards such as cultural breakdown and environmental destruction 
(McGregor, 2003). Tradition defines cultural practices such as group welfare, social stability, 
observation of traditional customs and deference to authority (Macionis & Plummer, 2008).  
 
Regarding Fiji, some contradictions are discernible in the tradition–modernity binary, symbolised 
by none other than Qarase himself. In his speech at the 55th Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, Qarase praised indigenous chiefly traditions and communal values, contrasting them 
with supposed Indo-Fijian values of individualism and entrepreneurship (Qarase, 2000). This same 
Qarase was at one time the head of the Fiji Development Bank and author of the Ten Year Plan for 
indigenous Fijian affirmative action. He was a board member of Fijian Holdings Limited (FHL), a 
profitable indigenous Fijian-owned enterprise that is a major player in Fiji’s corporate sector. In 
addition, Qarase was the chief business and financial advisor to the Fijian Affairs Board and Great 
Council of Chiefs (Ratuva, 2013). During the 2001 election campaign, Qarase made much of the 
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fact that his Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party had as candidates only successful 
business and professional men and women (MacWilliam, 2002, p. 139). Throughout his career as a 
merchant banker, company director and later prime minister, Qarase was at the forefront of efforts 
to advance indigenous Fijian capitalist ventures (Davis, 2012).  
 
On a personal level, Qarase was part-owner of a family company that was among the largest 
shareholders in FHL (Ratuva, 2013). Despite his misgivings about certain aspects of modernity, 
Qarase has been a major beneficiary, and indeed an emblem, of modernity in Fiji, at least in the 
commercial sense. The former prime minister’s contradictions are perhaps symbolic of the struggles 
within the wider indigenous community. Brison (2007) highlights how indigenous Fijians, 
especially in rural areas, want to live up to communal ideals but they also face pressure to prove 
they are autonomous individuals who can achieve personal success (p. xiii). Indigenous business 
“failures” are often attributed to cultural traits such as collectivism, while Indo-Fijian 
entrepreneurial success is credited to their supposed individualism (Rao, 2004, p. 55).  
 
Collectivist societies advocate mutual dependence, teamwork and harmony, while individualistic 
cultures champion self-sufficiency, competition, personal initiative and private success (Drake, 
2001, p. 320). The concepts of individualism–collectivism were developed by Dutch social 
psychologist Geert Hofstede as part of five different dimensions of national cultures. 
Individualism–collectivism denotes the extent to which individuals are integrated into groups or 
not. Individualism prevails in Western and other developed countries while collectivism is common 
in Eastern and less developed countries (see Hofstede, 2001). In Fiji, perceptions about indigenous 
economic backwardness and Indo-Fijian wealth are a major source of ethnic tensions and warrant 
further discussion. Sienkiewicz’s (2000) anthropological study of ethnic relations in Fiji rejects the 
stereotype that indigenous Fijians are too bound by the perspectives and demands of their culture to 
care about money. To the contrary, indigenous Fijians conceptualise themselves as “commercial 
beings” eager to make money rather than show a disregard for wealth, as some leaders claim.  
 
A related issue is affirmative action on behalf of indigenous Fijians. Ratuva’s (2013) empirical 
research invalidates some blanket assertions about these schemes. His findings blame the failure of 
some schemes on poor planning, poor disbursement and poor implementation. This includes capture 
of the programmes by an elite political and business class from all ethnicities (Ratuva, 2013). This 
elite group allegedly used the “veneer of indigenous advancement” to circumvent the programmes 
to serve various personal, political and commercial interests (Ratuva, 2013, p. 177). For instance, 
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FHL was set up primarily for the benefit of rank and file indigenous Fijians. But the premium 
shares with the highest returns were secured by a clique of well-connected indigenous elites through 
family-owned companies (Ratuva, 2013). This included Qarase, jailed for a year in 2012 for abuse 
of office over the matter (Davis, 2012). A strong theme that emerges from Sienkiewicz and 
Ratuva’s revelations is that ethnicity and culture alone do not by any means fully explain the cause 
of indigenous Fijian business setbacks. Other structural factors at play include corruption 
perpetuated by class and corporate interests that cut across ethnic lines. These conflict triggers are 
instrumentalist in nature, even if masked by primordial manifestations. The perception of Indo-
Fijians’ wealth, which is misleading because it is by no means true of all Indo-Fijians, is also a 
major cause of ethnic tensions in Fiji (Narsey, 2014b). Given that the aim of this thesis is a deeper 
understanding of conflicts, these issues are addressed at some length. 
 
Towards this end, Amy Chua’s (2003) book, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy 
Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability, provides a good basis for analysis. Chua points out that 
across South-East Asia, parts of Africa and South America, a small, market-dominant, ethnic minority 
has secured a disproportionate share of economic wealth. This has bred resentment among the 
disadvantaged majority, and caused serious outbreaks of violence and a backlash against democracy 
(Chua, 2003).  Chua makes a passing reference to Fiji, which has some similarities, but also some 
striking differences, with her major case studies. For a start, Indo-Fijians are not a small minority in 
Fiji as the Chinese are in the Philippines. The Filipino-Chinese make up one per cent of the 
population, but dominate commerce at every level of society, and control over half the country’s 
wealth (Chua, 2003). Indo-Fijians form a significant 37.5 per cent minority in Fiji. Their control of 
the Fijian economy is not as pervasive as Chinese control in South-East Asia (Bureau of Statistics, 
2007; Chua, 2003). Statistically, the population distribution of business by ethnicity is 53 per cent 
Indo-Fijian (37.5 per cent of overall population); 27 per cent ‘Other’ ethnicities (5.7 per cent overall 
population); and 20 per cent ethnic Fijian and Rotuman (58.6 per cent overall population) 
(Samisoni, 2010). Notably, most Indo-Fijian-owned businesses are in the hands of Gujaratis, a 
small, distinct and exclusive group within the Indo-Fijian community.  
 
Known for their thrift, hard work and business acumen, the Gujaratis arrived from Northwestern 
India from 1916 onwards as free migrants (B. Lal, 2011; Narsey, 2014a; Ramesh, 2008). According 
to one estimate, Gujaratis make up approximately seven per cent of the Indo-Fijian population but 
own up to 80 per cent of all Indo-Fijian businesses, although this community also has its poor 
(People Groups, 2013; Ramesh, 2008; for a fairly thorough account of the economic contribution of 
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Gujaratis to Fiji, see, Gujaratis in Fiji Islands: Personal Glimpses, Jinna & Mangubhai, 2008). 
Furthermore, Indo-Fijian businesses do not have a strong presence in the financial, mining, fisheries 
or tourism sectors, which are dominated by foreign firms (Aporosa, 2007; Naidu, 2013). In 
addition, ethnic Fijians are gaining ground. They form a strong and growing middle class, dominate 
the public sector, some are part-owners of tourism resorts and some run small-scale agricultural 
cooperatives (Naidu, 2013; Ramesh, 2008). The indigenous Fijian-owned FHL had an investment 
portfolio worth $87 million in 2013 (Fijian Holdings, 2013). Fiji’s 2008–09 Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey shows that the bulk of indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians are virtually at the 
same levels in terms of poverty and middle class income earners (Narsey, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; 
also see Narsey et al., 2010). 
 
However, many major enterprises are still Indo-Fijian owned and most of the professionals come 
from this community (Lane, 2012). While indigenous Fijians form a substantial part of formal 
sector employment, many have failed to make inroads into the corporate sector and urban home 
ownership. Narsey’s (2014b) view is that in the interest of future stability, the gap needs to be 
narrowed through strategically-targeted affirmative action, particularly at the business and corporate 
levels. This same theme is apparent in Chua’s (2003) research, which shows that worldwide, the 
presence of “market-dominant minorities” inevitably results in an ethnically-targeted, violent, 
backlash against free market democracy.  
 
Fiji had its own violent backlash during the 1987 and 2000 coups, when Indo-Fijian businesses in 
the capital city were burnt and looted by indigenous Fijian mobs (T. R. Singh, 2011: Ramesh, 
2010). Fiji’s founding Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara is reported to have said that if the 
Indo-Fijians ever gained political power, Suva would burn to the ground since all that the 
indigenous Fijians would lose would be the Indians’ records of Fijian debt (Narsey, 2014b; 
Sharpham, 2000). One of the ironies becoming apparent in Chua’s (2003) book is that the market-
dominant minorities became fabulously rich due to globalisation and through connections with 
indigenous political elites. Similarly, the tiny minority of wealthy, dominant, Indo-Fijian businesses 
are said to owe their success to the protectionist policies of successive indigenous Fijian 
governments, with consumers of all ethnicities subsidising these operations through higher prices 
and taxation (Narsey, 2014b). These consumers include 31 per cent of people from both ethnicities 
who live in poverty (Narsey, 2014b; also see Narsey et al., 2010). Indeed, a running theme in 
Chua’s (2003) thesis is the inequalities caused by globalisation and free market democracy and how 
this breeds ethnic hatred (pp. 5–6). 
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In Fiji, well-placed political and business cartels exploited the opportunities and advantages offered 
by a globalised capitalist economy to consolidate links and market position. The cost was borne by 
the grassroots people of all ethnicities, both financially and in the form of social conflict. This 
scenario underlines the limits of primordial explanations of conflict. They create misconceptions 
and make it harder to identify the real issues and devise appropriate policies for rectification. 
Indeed, in Fiji’s case, Narsey (2014c) is adamant that race-based poverty alleviation policies are 
redundant as both the major ethnic groups are equally poor. Because of the declining Indo-Fijian 
population, poverty alleviation based on needs alone would fairly allocate the majority share of 
State assistance to indigenous Fijians.  
 
3.5 Demography, electoral systems, coup culture and oligarchism 
 
According to Choucri (1984), conflict is a central feature of all political behaviour, including 
population variables, which shape social and political responses. In Fiji, population has been 
another major and longstanding cause of tensions, partly due to misconceptions perpetuated by 
politicians and propagated by the media. Chung’s (1999, p. 131) research indicates that tensions 
over population issues escalated in the 1920s when both Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijian numbers 
grew rapidly, triggering political perceptions of a “population race”. By the mid-1940s, Indo-Fijians 
outnumbered ethnic Fijians, which generated a “political furore” that dominated public debate 
through to the 1960s and remained a potent political force thereafter. According to Chung (1991, p. 
131), the debate’s: 
 
touchwood was fertility and the political nature of comparisons between Fijian and 
Indian fertility, thinly disguised by seemingly objective statistics. In public accounts, the 
Fijian crude birth rate was described as “normal”, or “slow and steady”, in comparison to 
the Indian’s “truly horrible fecundity”.  
 
However, the real reason for the difference in growth was because of the different age structures of 
the two populations and the high number of Fijian infant and child deaths (Chung, 1999). But raw 
statistics showing an excess of Indian over Fijian fertility became “powerful tools” in political 
campaigns waged by the colonial government and ethnic Fijian leaders. The media played a part in 
the disinformation campaigns by emphasising that “Indian numbers would eventually swamp Fijian 
interests; portraying Indians as land-grabbers and blaming their fertility as threatening Fijian 
cultural survival” (Chung, 1999, p. 131).Tensions increased in the 1950s and 1960s as Indo-Fijian 
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numbers reached an absolute majority due to a wave of free settlers from Gujarat and Punjab (B. 
Lal, 2011; Leuprecht, 2012). During Independence talks in London, indigenous leaders rejected 
common roll, fearing it would confer advantage on Indo-Fijians. As Leuprecht explains, indigenous 
“feelings of being ‘swamped’ were compounded by an unintended (Indo-Fijian) challenge to native 
political incumbency” (2012, p. 84).  
 
But insinuations about Indo-Fijian designs to take over Fiji through biological means did not 
correspond with the facts: Chung’s (1999) research shows that Indo-Fijian clients responded in 
greater numbers to a national family planning campaign launched in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting 
in a steeper decline in Indo-Fijian fertility rates. These facts apparently did not make it into the 
private national media, which at the time constituted the Fiji Times. Ultimately, to placate 
indigenous concerns, the country adopted a mixed voting system based on both communal (racial) 
and open seat allocations (Leuprecht, 2012). The founding 1970 Constitution established a 52-seat 
parliament consisting of 27 communal seats and 25 open seats. The electoral procedure was based 
on majoritarianism, which is premised on a two-party race, with successful candidates required to 
win an absolute majority (Norris, 1997). The constitution gave recognition and power to colonially-
constructed ‘indigenous institutions’ such as the Great Council of Chiefs and recognised customary 
ownership of land (M. Howard, 1991).  
 
In totality, this arrangement resembled what Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan (2008, p. x) 
describe as “hybrid political orders”. Such orders combine elements of Western models of 
governance with local indigenous traditions. In Fiji’s case, the system was designed to safeguard the 
paramountcy of Fijian elites (M. Howard, 1991; Naidu, 2005, 2008, 2013). Over time, this 
permutation was to result in various unforeseen and unfortunate consequences in Fiji. 
 
But for the first 17 years of independence at least, Fiji enjoyed relative stability under Prime 
Minister Ratu Mara’s predominantly indigenous Fijian-supported Alliance Party. The flaws in the 
ethnically-based political arrangement became apparent only after the Alliance, inundated with 
allegations of corruption, lost the 1987 elections to the mainly Indo-Fijian supported Fiji Labour 
Party–National Federation Party coalition (Alley, 1987; M. Howard, 1991). The change in 
government was a momentous event that upset the delicate balance that preserved the semblance of 
national unity. As A. Prasad (2008) writes, prior to 1970, indigenous Fijians maintained political 
control whilst the Indo-Fijians had acquired economic pre-eminence. In the following decades, 
Indo-Fijians improved their political representation yet indigenous Fijians did not ascend 
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significantly in the socio-economic hierarchy. This “disjuncture” fermented coups d’état and 
conflicts (A. Prasad, 2008, p. 953).  
 
The 1987 coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka claimed that his act was inspired by God 
to save Fiji from an Indo-Fijian takeover. The potent mix of religion and nationalism resonated with 
Rabuka’s indigenous brethren for whom the loss of political power was an old fear. At the time of 
the coup, Indo-Fijians made up 48.6 per cent of the population, slightly outnumbering indigenous 
Fijians at 46.2 per cent (Fraenkel & Firth, 2009; Garrett, 1990; Sharpham, 2000).  However, 
demographic trends had been indicting an eventual decline in the Indo-Fijian population. Since the 
early 1980s, lower fertility rates had seen Indo-Fijian numbers decrease against ethnic Fijian 
increases (Chung, 1999). Various critics felt that Rabuka had exaggerated the threats and that rather 
than God, he was acting on behalf of an earthly power. M. Howard (1991, p. 80) described this 
power structure as a political “oligarchy” that was unwilling to relinquish control of the nation.  
 
Oligarchic arguments derive from elite theory, pioneered by Italian sociologists Vilfredo Pareto 
(1848–1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941). The basic premise is that in many societies, 
political decision-making is controlled by small political and non-political elite groups who exercise 
a pervasive hold on society. Oligarchies are discernible in situations where royalty, wealth, family 
connections, corporate power, and/or military control maintain a strong grip on government and/or 
the national economy (Legaspi, 2011). A pioneer in the field, German sociologist Robert Michels, 
developed the ‘Iron law of Oligarchy’, arguing that any political system inevitably evolves into an 
oligarchy (1962; also see Legaspi, 2011). While there are gaps in terms of a full theory linking 
elites to major irregularities in the political arena, political scientists watch elite power closely, 
particularly in relation to democratic transitions, breakdowns and revolutions (Higley, 2006). 
Scrutinising elite power formations in coup-prone Fiji could provide deeper insights into both the 
motivations for conflict and their true nature, especially from the perspectives of instrumentalism, 
which is linked to political economy. 
 
With regard to Fiji, the works of Baledrokadroka (2012), Halapua (2003), M. Howard (1991), 
Narsey (2014b) and Ramesh (2008; 2010) allude to elements of ‘oligarchism’, with roots in 
colonialism. As Michael Howard explains, decolonisation saw the British increase the people’s 
power while bestowing on the powerful Eastern chiefs and their local European allies enough 
authority to retain control of the state, at least initially upon independence (1991, pp. 80–81). Ratu 
Mara’s Alliance Party, which included a small but influential European arm, formed government 
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after the 1972 elections. The British-devised ethnically-based parliamentary system allowed the 
Alliance Party to extend and develop the colonial administrative system into an oligarchic structure 
by consolidating ties with the Great Council of Chiefs, the Methodist Church of Fiji and the 
predominantly-indigenous Fijian military. These patron–client relationships were underpinned by 
the dogma of indigenous political paramountcy (Baledrokadroka, 2012; M. Howard, 1991).  
 
This system extended downwards through an elaborate network of State patronage in the form of civil 
service jobs, university scholarships and contracts and development funds distributed through the 
Fijian Affairs Board and various other administrative arms of government. This arrangement enabled 
government to exercise considerable social, political and economic control over the indigenous 
population, with coercion applied through job transfers, the withholding of rewards, and the 
application of various other forms of social pressure (see Alley, 1987; Hagan, 1987; M. Howard, 
1991).  Oligarchies take different shapes and forms in different countries and settings. In Russia, 
they are connected with “big bad and sleazy Mafioso-type businessmen” whereas in the United 
States, they are associated with the “capture” of the State by the big corporations (Schechter, 2014). 
In the Philippines, oligarchies represent a few wealthy families who amassed phenomenal influence 
due to privatisation, and exercise a “stranglehold” on political and economic power (Chua, 2003; 
Legaspi, 2011).  
 
Analysis of the relevant literature indicates that in Fiji, oligarchies primarily comprised indigenous 
Fijian political, social and military power on the one hand, and Indo-Fijian, European, part-European 
and Chinese economic clout on the other (see M. Howard, 1991; Narsey, 2014b; Ratuva, 2013). The 
uniqueness and resilience of Fiji’s version of oligarchism lies in its link to indigenous politics and 
tradition through tie-ins with the Great Council of Chiefs (Bose levu vakaturaga), indigenous 
government (matanitu), and the Methodist Church (lotu). With these pillars of indigenous Fijian 
society interwoven with oligarchic rule, any threat to this system was bound to be met with strong 
resistance.  Bowman (2001) opines that oligarchies oppose democracy if it will lead to a decline in 
their wealth and power. In Fiji’s case, the FLP–NFP political coalition’s emphasis on class was seen 
as a threat to a system premised on ethnicity (see M. Howard, 1991). The oligarchy responded by 
arousing primordial feelings among the vanua (indigenous people), triggering a groundswell of 
support from the Fijian Administration, indigenous Fijian public servants, ethnic Fijian trade union 
leaders and ordinary ethnic Fijians, not to mention the bati (military) (Naidu, 2005. 2008, 2013).  
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These developments suggest that the 1987 coup was instigated by Fiji’s ruling oligarchs to regain 
power (instrumentalism) by arousing latent ethnic tensions (primordialism). Robertson and 
Tamanisau state as much by pointing out that the incoming FLP–NFP Government “represented the 
most complete challenge to the position of the chiefly bureaucratic class in the 20th century” (1988, 
p. 14). The media allegedly emphasised the primordial angle – the “most comfortable explanation” 
that neither “challenges the intellect nor poses disturbing questions” (Robertson & Tamanisau, 
1988, p.144).  However, oligarchies can be a puzzle. For one, their presence is not always obvious 
and their motives are not always clear in all cases. As Schechter (2014) states, often oligarchies start 
out as normal, idealistic and democratic institutions. But eventually they come to be dominated by a 
small, self-serving group of powerful people.  In Fiji the oligarchy was not necessarily a deliberate 
construct. It was not purposefully formed with bad intentions, neither was it malevolent and 
rapacious in every aspect. For instance, the State’s affirmative action programme was, before it 
evolved into a form of political patronage, a genuine effort to assist indigenous Fijians. Also, in 
spite of their pro-indigenous leanings, the chiefs and the church assisted national development by 
facilitating inter-ethnic compromises on crucial matters such as land and political reforms (see 
Norton, 2009).  
 
Moreover, the same military that had staged two nationalist coups in 1987 defused a racist coup by 
renegade soldiers in 2000. By the same token, notwithstanding the Alliance Government’s 
oligarchic tendencies, it provided 17 years of stability and a fair amount of progress and 
development (Ewins, 1998; Lane, 2012). So it is conceivable that the oligarchy’s complexities and 
contradictions made it difficult for the media to conduct proper and regular analysis. 
 
Indeed, just before the 1987 coups, a visiting Pope John Paul II had described Fiji as “the way the 
world should be” (Field, 2010). The Rabuka coups shocked both locals and the international 
community, perhaps because as M. Howard (2008, p. 11) writes, people had accepted Ratu Mara’s 
“propaganda about the Pacific Way” and the “special nature of Fiji’s society”. Howard’s words 
suggest that the Fiji media may have failed to interrogate Mara’s ideas sufficiently, which is 
plausible. As an articulate Oxford scholar and paramount chief, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was an 
imposing figure in a region in which great deference is shown to traditional authority (see B. Lal, 
2010a, for a preview essay on Mara). For cultural reasons, an adversarial approach or any kind of 
deeply probing interview on the part of the media would not have been encouraged. However, the 
problems went deeper than any one person, even if that person was a powerful figure like Ratu 
Mara, as we will see in the following section. 
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3.6 Faults in the ethnically-based electoral system 
 
Despite the peaceful impressions that fooled the Pope, post-colonial Fiji lacked the institutional or 
political frameworks for inter-group contact. Below the calm exterior, racial prejudices had free rein 
(Ramesh, 2008). Because the electoral system was ethnically-based, parties formed on the basis of 
race rather than ideology and voting largely followed ethnic patterns (Ramesh, 2010). Elections 
usually returned a Parliament largely made up of an indigenous Fijian government facing off 
against a mostly Indo-Fijian opposition. Adversarialism, a hallmark of Westminsterism, reached 
intense levels since the political demarcation was based on ethnicity rather than on ideology 
(Hagan, 1987, p. 126). Often, Fiji’s leaders lacked the will to collaborate lest such actions dilute 
their hold over their communal bloc (M. Reddy, 2011; Ramesh, 2008). As veteran New Zealand 
journalist Michal Field (2010) observed, “Fiji’s poison was its politicians”.  
 
Following a post-1987 coup period of interim rule, Fiji adopted a new constitution in 1990, based 
entirely on racial voting. This constitution sought to strengthen oligarchic rule by linking it even 
more strongly to indigenous self-determination. The 1990 Constitution guaranteed indigenous 
political supremacy by virtue of a fixed majority in parliament. It reserved the presidency, vice-
presidency, prime ministership and all other senior government positions for indigenous Fijians. 
The military was given extra powers to safeguard the State (Green, 2009; Naidu, 2013; Ramesh, 
2010). Traditionalism was strengthened by entrenching chiefly rule and by placing indigenous 
institutions and titles above criticism through laws protecting their dignity and esteem (Ewins, 
1998). From a hybrid democracy, Fiji had transited to a political system that fits Ghai’s (2008, p. 
667) description of a “nationalist” State. This conveys an ethnically-based leadership actively 
engaged in establishing a State on the principle of the supremacy of one ethnic group over others.  
 
The skewed system helped Rabuka’s newly-formed, chiefly-backed Soqosoqo Vakevulewa ni 
Taukei Party (SVT) to a strong win in the 1992 election. But the new constitution was soon linked 
to rampant corruption, decline in economic growth, a worsening of inter-ethnic relations and strains 
within the indigenous political order (Ghai, 2008). Apparently disillusioned by these developments, 
a chastised Rabuka teamed up with NFP leader Jai Ram Reddy to push for a review of the 1990 
Constitution. A consultative process through an independent Constitution Review Commission 
resulted in the more equitable 1997 Constitution, which combined elements of both majoritarianism 
and consociationalism (Fraenkel, 2006). Consociational democracy is based on power-sharing and 
proportional representation. Because it emphasises consensus over opposition, it is deemed more 
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appropriate for multi-ethnic societies (Lijphart, 1999, 2004). The 71-member Parliament consisted 
of 25 open seats and 46 communal seats. Twenty-three communal seats were allocated to 
indigenous Fijians, 19 to Indo-Fijians, three to General Electors, and one to Rotumans.  
 
The GCC was constitutionally-empowered to appoint the President, Vice-President and 14 members 
of the Senate. An important element was the mandatory power-sharing provision in Section 99. This 
guaranteed political parties with more than 10 per cent of the seats a proportionate number of places 
in cabinet (Fraenkel, 2006). However, Rabuka’s SVT and Reddy’s NFP lost the first election that 
took place under the new constitution in 1999 to a resurgent People’s Coalition, comprising the 
secular Indo-Fijian-supported FLP and two indigenous-supported parties – the Party of National 
Unity (PANU), and the Fijian Association Party (FAP) (Ramesh, 2007, 2010). Rabuka (2000) 
equated the SVT–NFP loss to a rejection of multiracialism and the media were quick to pick up on 
this discourse (Ramesh, 2010). However, ethnicity was but one variable. The SVT also fell victim 
to one of the flaws of multi-partism – voter fragmentation (Norton, 2000). Furthermore, both the 
SVT and NFP were outdone by a better-organised People’s Coalition, its astute exchange of 
preferences and its slick campaigning (B. Lal, 2000). The 1999 election returned Fiji’s first Indo-
Fijian prime minister in the shape of Labour Party leader, Mahendra Chaudhry, only for him to be 
ousted in the May 2000 nationalist coup.  
 
During its one-year stint, the Chaudhry Government scored well on economic management and 
social policies. But it was bedevilled by infighting, demonisation by ethno-nationalists, clashes with 
powerful business interests, differences with outspoken academics, allegations of favouring Indo-
Fijians, charges of bad governance and nepotism, and battles with the media (Robie, 2001; T. R. 
Singh, 2011).Moreover, government’s Land Use Policy became the target of an alleged 
disinformation campaign (Dakuvula, 2004; Ramesh, 2008; T. R. Singh, 2011). This was not 
unexpected: for indigenous people, land is both an economic and a cultural asset. As such, it easily 
lends itself to conflicts around which groups readily mobilise (Kurer, 2001; United Nations 
Interagency Framework, 2012). Misreporting by the media only exacerbates the situation. This is 
discussed in the next section.  
 
3.7 Conflicts surrounding the land issue and the role of media 
 
In Fiji, tensions over land epitomise a clash of differing values: ethnic Fijians view land as a central 
component of their identity – in their language, vanua, “land” also means “people”, and the two are 
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inextricable (Robie, 1989, p. 205). Indo-Fijians who farm land leased from indigenous owners see it 
as a source of livelihood, whereas Europeans regard it as capital (Pirie, 2000). At times, the Fiji 
media tend to report the land issue in rather emotional terms. At the height of the land dispute in 2000, 
the April 17 issue of the Fiji Daily Post editorialised that to indigenous Fijians, land is “culture”, their 
“soul”, and their “very spirit”. Land is “sovereignty”, something to be “defended to the death, like 
honour”. Land is so sacred that indigenous Fijians would rather see it “lying idle, overgrown with 
grass and not fetching any economic return at all” (cited in Rao, 2004, p. 40).  
 
The Post did not explain the basis of its claims. But its opinion piece was, in some important 
respects, in stark contrast to Sienkiewicz’s (2000) empirical study based on interviews with 
landowners. The study, in sharp contradiction to the Post editorial, showed that landowners were 
willing to offer leases for the right rental and also keen to farm their land to make money. One 
possible explanation for the Post’s reporting slant is that the paper was taking its cue from elite 
sources: Dakuvula (2004) had observed that some nationalist politicians were urging the non-
renewal of the 20,000 leases held by Indo-Fijians. Many landowners took heed, leading to reversion 
to bush of over 50 per cent of farms and a subsequent FJD21 million loss to the Fiji Sugar 
Corporation in 2002 alone (Dakuvula, 2004; Naidu, 2013). 
 
This situation accords with instrumentalist explanations of conflict in that “ethnicity is simply a 
way of aggregating individuals for collective ends, which is seized and used by politicians for 
political advantage” (L. Robertson, 1997, p. 269). Media like the Fiji Daily Post could have been 
drawn in because of their focus on elite sources of news. Or, as L. Duncan (2002) says, some Fiji 
media seemed to show lack of understanding about the special protections accorded to land 
ownership in the 1997 Constitution. If so, this is omission through ignorance, which Frohardt and 
Temin (2003) describe as passive or involuntary incitement to conflict by the media. This occurs as 
a product of poor media skills and knowledge. Journalists emphasise the ethnic angle due to its 
simplicity (see O’Sullivan, 2001). 
 
The case studies discussed so far show how a disproportionate focus on primordialism downplays 
and masks the underlying causes of what is termed as ‘ethnic conflict’ in Fiji. To the list of conflict 
causes can be added the failure of political leadership, including both Chaudhry and Qarase’s 
inability to negotiate multiparty arrangements after the 1999 and 2001 elections (Naidu, 2013; 
Robertson & Sutherland, 2001). In 1999 for instance, a successful post-election political settlement 
would have meant a broader national mandate given that Rabuka’s SVT commanded 39 per cent of 
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the indigenous vote compared to the FLP’s two per cent (Ramesh, 2007). A workable coalition with 
the SVT could have disproved some of the justifications used to stage a nationalist coup.   
 
In the next section, we take a deeper look at media’s potential role in conflict through the concept of 
hyper-adversarialism.  
 
3.8 Transnational media influences and hyper-adversarialism  
 
The focus on ethnicity masks the fact that the Chaudhry Government was not brought down by 
primordialism alone, but by a confluence of diverse forces ranging from defeated politicians, 
disgruntled native landowners, hostile ethno-nationalists, antagonistic academics, and aggrieved 
corporate interests (not to mention the Chaudhry Government’s own misjudgements). The 
oppositional discourses found their way into sections of the national media and other public 
platforms to put pressure on the government. Such sources of pressure included the Rupert 
Murdoch–owned Fiji Times, which was opposed to what it saw as government’s anti-neoliberal 
policy, including rolling back privatisation (Robie, 2000, 2001; T. R. Singh, 2011). The political 
economist McChesney (2001) refers to neoliberalism as the set of national and international policies 
that call for business domination of all social affairs with minimal countervailing force. This 
includes the freeing of commercial media and communication markets. Murdoch’s News 
Corporation is considered the “most aggressive” proponent of neoliberalism (McChesney, 2001). 
  
News Corporation’s neoliberal stance was arguably reflected in the opposition of the Fiji Times to 
the Chaudhry Government’s economic plans. One particularly scathing editorial accused 
government of “hammering the private sector” and “Robin Hood-style policies” that benefitted only 
politicians “sitting on their well-fed backsides collecting generous pay packages” (Why Robin 
Hood, 2000, p. 6). This comment was incongruent with some other assessments of the 
government’s economic performance (see Robie, 2001; T. R. Singh, 2011). The Fiji Times position 
caused some to question whose interests and ideology the newspaper was reflecting: the people of 
Fiji, or its owners (Robie, 2001; T. R. Singh, 2011). As a subsidiary of a global media 
conglomerate, it is plausible that the Fiji Times’ foreign ownership had a knock-on influence on the 
paper’s domestic coverage in terms of an overarching neoliberal philosophy that binds virtually all 
News Limited publications (see Hall, 2011; McChesney, 2001). This shows how local conflicts 
could be affected by greater global forces. 
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In analyses of the Fiji Times coverage of the Chaudhry Government’s short-lived term, T. R. Singh 
(2011), Kiran (2005) and Obini (2000) provide further clues of the toxic relationship. T. R. Singh’s 
(2011, p. 256) overall summary showed almost two-thirds (62.8 per cent) of the stories were 
negative (p. 256). Kiran (2005, p. 82), who also conducted a content analysis of the Fiji Times, 
spoke of a “media war” with government. Both Singh and Kiran claimed that much of the criticism 
was undeserved and over the top. The literature on media coverage of the Chaudhry Government 
betrays signs of what Fallows (1996) describes as “hyper-adversarialism”. This signifies a 
worldwide paradigm shift in political reporting characterised by a move from a “healthy 
skepticism” and an “independent, adversarial relationship with politics”, to a “corrosively cynical 
and hyper-adversarial” position (Fallows, 1996).  
 
In Fiji, aside from the Fiji Times, other local media could be quite brash. In response to the 
Chaudhry Government’s criticism of media standards, a Fiji Daily Post editorial in June 1999 said: 
“There is only one way to describe the attack on the media by Assistant Minister for Information 
Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi: rubbish. It is really not worth any other comment.” The newspaper then left 
the rest of its editorial column blank (New Fiji Islands government continues attacks on media, 
1999). McNair (2011) traces hyper-adversarialism to the United Kingdom in the 1950s. He 
describes it as an increasingly aggressive form of political journalism caused by a “decline of 
deference”, a trend fueled by expanding and increasingly competitive media system incentivised to 
“get the story first”, with political leaders considered fair game (McNair, 2011).  
 
In Australia, political journalist Laurie Oakes (2012), in his 2012 Andrew Olle Media Lecture, has 
alluded to a similar media culture, as did former Australian Labor minister Lindsay Tanner (2011) 
in his book, Sideshow, Dumbing Down Democracy. It is plausible that hyper-adversarialism spread 
to Fiji from Australia and New Zealand, the country’s major source of publishers, editors, trainers 
and funds for media development (Robie, 2010, 2014). It is perhaps more than a coincidence that 
Fiji and Australia share similar concerns in areas like self-regulation and the alleged belligerent 
nature of political coverage (see Bale, 2003; Robie, 2014; Rosen, 2011; Tanner, 2011).  
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Hyper-adversarialism is similar to what Spiess (2011, p. 6) refers to as “attack dog journalism”, an 
aggressive strain of reporting that goes beyond the watchdog role. It harms “fledgling democracies” 
by “nurturing intolerance and diminishing faith” in democratic leaders (Voltmer, 2009, p.5; Spiess, 
2011, p. 6). Obini’s conclusions based on his content analysis of the Fiji Times suggest a hounding 
of the Chaudhry Government. In Obini’s words: 
 
There is a clear difference between informing the public in a non-partisan, unbiased manner 
and waging a war of destabilisation. Without giving the People’s Coalition time to settle 
down in office, the Fiji Times started hammering on promises made by the People’s 
Coalition during the election campaign. Also some sensitive issues were blown out of 
proportion and given more attention than they deserved; they were amplified in the front 
pages, and regularly given prominence in the editorials. (2000, p. 59) 
  
The seemingly aggressive coverage of the Chaudhry Government and its subsequent overthrow 
seemed to alarm politicians and harden attitudes toward media. After winning the 2001 election, the 
Qarase Government tabled a tougher draft Media Council of Fiji Bill in 2003, having claimed that 
self-regulation had failed and media posed a danger to stability (Bale, 2003; Bale blasts media…, 
2003; Qarase, 2001). Sections of the public also seemed to favour tougher media legislation. The 
Fiji Times–commissioned Tebutt opinion poll in 2003 with a sample of 1005 people across the 
country found 71 per cent favouring either “a lot” of government control or “a little control” 
(Support for media control, 2002, p. 7). These developments seem to vindicate Spiess’s (2011, p. 6) 
assertions that an overly aggressive journalistic approach could harm fledgling democracies by 
diminishing public confidence in democratic leaders. The risk is arguably greater in Fiji due to a 
culture of respect for leaders (see Madraiwiwi, 2014). An overly belligerent approach on the 
media’s part could be deemed as rude and disrespectful, and provoke a backlash among sections of 
the public, as the 2003 Tebutt poll seems to suggest. 
 
In the next section we continue to examine the media-conflict link, this time from the perspective of 
media as a tool for propaganda. The section also discusses militarisation in Fiji. 
 
3.9 Racist propaganda and the resurgence of identities  
 
Jowett and O’Donnell (2012, p. 7) define propaganda as the “deliberate attempt to shape 
perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the 
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desired intent of the propagandist”. In Fiji, research indicates that racist propaganda has been used 
to disguise the hidden motives for power grabs, especially during coups. In 1987, the military 
singled out the media, particularly the indigenous language media, to tap into indigenous Fijian 
uneasiness about Indo-Fijians and reinforced the coup sentiment, “we are going to get our country 
back” (Ewins, 1998; Garrett, 1990, p. 91). In 2000, the Speight group used various techniques to 
arouse primordial feelings and mobilise group support during the 56 days they kept the Chaudhry 
Government hostage in parliament. The rebels styled themselves as bati, traditional Fijian warriors 
tasked with protecting the clan (Baledrokadroka, 2012; Halapua, 2003; T. R. Singh, 2011). This 
technique resembles what Giordan (1994) describes as the “resurgence of identities” or the 
“production of new identities”. It is designed to tap into emotions associated with inherited group 
identities to win support against the “other” through recourse to national traditions often deeply 
rooted in the collective memory. These are revived and reactivated through the use of propaganda 
(Giordan, 1994). 
 
In the Fiji context, this bati strategy would have appealed to indigenous Fijians’ strong martial 
heritage. It would have also played on the media’s weakness for exoticism as a core news value. 
Such media images could have had a hand in galvanising greater indigenous support for the Speight 
putsch. Indeed, indigenous Fijians answered the call in the hundreds, flocking to parliament to act 
as human shields for the coup plotters (Robertson & Sutherland, 2001; Ramesh, 2010).  
 
3.10 Militarisation  
 
The 2000 crisis ended with the eventual capture, conviction and imprisonment of the rebels 
(Ramesh, 2008, 2010). A landmark ruling by the Fiji Appeals Court on November 15, 2000, 
declared the military’s abrogation of the 1997 constitution unconstitutional. The subsequent 2001 
democratic election was won by Prime Minister Qarase’s newly-formed SDL party (Ramesh, 2010).  
However, Qarase rejected multi-racialism by refusing to share power with the second-largest party, 
the FLP, claiming that their policies were incompatible (Ramesh, 2007, 2010). Instead, Qarase 
sought to consolidate the indigenous hold on power by uniting the fragmented indigenous polity by 
partnering with the pro-Speight Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) party (Ramesh, 
2010). Qarase also reinforced the oligarchic order by consolidating State ties with the Methodist 
Church and the GCC. The latter received $20 million in State funds for the construction of a new 
complex (Fijian trust fund earnings . . ., 2005). In all, during Qarase’s term, the State disbursed over 
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FJD50 million through the Fijian Development Trust Fund for the benefit of the 14 provinces 
(Fijian trust fund earnings . . ., 2005).  
 
Qarase’s call on ethnic Fijians to support an Act to grant the GCC further powers (Fijian trust fund 
earnings . . ., 2005) was another apparent move to revive and strengthen the old oligarchic order. 
But the Qarase Government’s apparent sympathy for some high-profile coup convicts pushed it into 
conflict with the military. Some 2000 coup plotters were not only prematurely released from prison, 
but also given cabinet and senate positions (Ramesh, 2008, 2010). The tense situation was 
exacerbated by two proposed pieces of legislation – the Reconciliation Tolerance and Unity Bill and 
the Qoliqoli Bill.  Government asserted that the first bill was meant to heal the country from the 
2000 coup experience and the second to give native resource owners greater rights over traditional 
fishing grounds. Critics, however, claimed that the former was a thinly-disguised pardon for the 
Speight group and the latter a populist move that threatened the tourism industry (Green, 2009; 
Ramesh, 2010). The 2006 election was held against the backdrop of increasing politico-military 
tensions. The SDL won 36 seats to the FLP’s 31. What became increasingly apparent was the 
widening gulf between the two major ethnicities: the SDL had increased its indigenous Fijian 
support by 25 per cent whereas the FLP increased its Indo-Fijian support by 6.8 per cent (Ramesh, 
2007, 2008).  
 
In part, the divisions reflected Indo-Fijian concerns about on-going State discrimination in the event 
of an SDL win and indigenous Fijian anxieties about the forfeiture of affirmative action should the 
SDL lose (Ramesh, 2010). This exemplifies ethnic conflict based on instrumentalism, with political 
elites utilising economic rewards and divide-and-rule tactics to maintain power. In a sense, 
politicians feel compelled to use this strategy in order to win seats under Fiji’s ethnically-based 
electoral system, a legacy of colonialism. This typifies constructivism, whereby ethnic conflict is 
the end product of historical, social and political processes (L. Robertson, 1997). Fiji’s State–
military dispute, which culminated in the December 2006 coup, had elements of both 
instrumentalism and constructivism. Previous coups were nationalist in nature. Bainimarama staged 
his coup in the name of multiracialism, equality and “clean-up against corruption” (Ramesh, 2010). 
But critics saw the coup as an attempt by Bainimarama to thwart his alleged imminent sacking and 
derail investigations into the deaths of several mutinous soldiers in 2000 (Bhim, 2007; Firth & 
Fraenkel, 2009, p. 128).  
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However, what has been termed Fiji’s “coup culture” (Lane, 2012) is better understood if viewed as 
the outcome of a sequence of interconnected processes rather than the result of a series of unrelated, 
spontaneous, events. Conceptualised from constructivist (conflict being the outcome of historical 
processes) and instrumentalist (conflict is elite-instigated, often for pecuniary gain) perspectives, 
the Bainimarama coup indicates an ongoing process of militarisation, symbolised by the army’s 
growing assertiveness over the decades and an increasing desire for direct control of the affairs of 
the country and its resources. Militarisation has been conceptualised in a multitude of ways. 
Relevant for Fiji is a definition coined by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It 
describes militarisation as: 
 
[a] steady growth in the military potential of states … usually accompanied by an increasing 
role for military institutions both in national affairs, including economic, social and political 
affairs, and in international affairs.  (cited in Ross, 1987, p. 562)  
 
Also relevant is Enloe’s (2000, p. 291) description of militarisation as the “step-by-step process by 
which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives value from the military or 
militaristic criteria”. In Fiji’s case, Rabuka is often accused of releasing the coup “genie” (B. Lal, 
2010b, p. 366). However, Rabukas’ actions were part of a broader process of militarisation with 
roots in colonialism. As M. Howard (1991) writes, the British placed great importance on Fiji’s 
military tradition, and used it to establish colonial rule during the 19th century. Later, under chiefly 
leadership, the military was used to support Britain during both world wars and the Malayan 
insurgencies. Upon independence, the British bequeathed to Fiji a political system weighted in 
favour of indigenous Fijians (M. Howard, 1991). After independence, the Mara Government 
developed the military for the United Nations international peacekeeping operations largely as a 
source of income generation for Fiji. From a tiny force of 200 at independence, the military grew to 
more than ten times that number by 1987 (Baledrokadroka, 2012).  
 
Given the trend in developing countries with large standing armies, Fiji’s path to militarisation was 
perhaps predictable. Post-colonial Latin America, Africa and Asia had gone down the same route in 
the 1950s and 1960s, with the national militaries used to defend the oligarchs when social change 
threatened their power and privileges (Balebaledroka, 2012; Bowman, 2001; Lane, 2012). In Fiji’s 
case, the military’s relationship with government was built on the traditional chief–warrior (turaga–
bati) roles, with the warriors expected to do the chiefs’ bidding (Baledrokadroka, 2012; Sharpham, 
2000). Qarase’s SDL party had been anointed by the chiefs and was voted in by an overwhelming 
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number of indigenous Fijians (Ramesh, 2010), which perhaps explains the depth of the shock over 
its unceremonious toppling by the military. 
 
However, the warning signs were there even in 1987: Rabuka’s second coup on October 1 and the 
abrogation of the 1970 Constitution was in direct defiance of two high chiefs – then Governor-
General Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau and then Prime Minister Ratu Mara. It followed Rabuka’s 
dissatisfaction with a power-sharing deal the two chiefs had brokered with the ousted Bavadra 
Government (Garrett, 1990). Days later, on October 6, Rabuka again defied the chiefs when he 
severed connections with the Commonwealth and declared Fiji a Republic, installing himself as the 
head of state (Mason, 2009). However, successive indigenous Fijian governments appeared 
ambivalent towards the military. They possibly saw the military as an enforcer of the oligarchic 
structure and guarantor of indigenous rule rather than as a threat. This partly explains the military’s 
unchecked expansion and the granting of extra powers in the 1990 Constitution (Baledrokadroka, 
2012; Firth & Fraenkel, 2009). In proportion to overall population, Fiji’s 4000-strong army is larger 
than those in Australia and New Zealand and closer in size to those in coup-prone countries in the 
Asian region (Baledrokadroka, 2012; Lane, 2012).The media also overlooked the military’s growing 
size and the potential consequences of this trend. Instead,  sections of the media appeared to be 
glorifying coups and the military culture: Rabuka was dubbed “Colonel Steve Rambo”, while 2000 
coup strategist, former British SAS Ilisoni Ligairi, was nicknamed the “Invisible Man” for his 
mythical feats of daring (Field, 2010). A day after the Speight coup, the Fiji Times ran a cartoon of 
a masked man pointing a rifle at a figure labelled “The Peoples Coalition”, which could easily be 
construed as insensitive, if not gloating (see T. R. Singh, 2011).   
 
Pamela Thomas (2005, p. 158) has highlighted increasing concerns in Pacific societies about the 
media glorification of the “Rambo gun toting, macho image as a role model for young men”. In Fiji, 
the media’s apparent lionisation of the military appears to be part of a broader tendency to prioritise 
and elevate indigenous customs, institutions and tradition over those of other ethnic groups.  Norton 
(2000, p. 87) notes that indigenous Fijian culture “predominates” the public domain, with little 
attempt made to create a narrative of a shared history. Kaplan (1995, pp. 108–116) highlights the 
“dominance of Fijian chiefly rituals” in the rites of the nation.  It is conceivable that a positive 
disposition towards the military caused the media to overlook the threat of militarisation. One sign 
of this threat came at the height of the May 2000 coup, when Bainimarama declared martial law, 
sending President Ratu Mara into retirement. Some interpreted this as Fiji’s fifth coup (Field, 2010). 
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Henderson and Bellamy point out that an important aspect of the psychology of soldiers carrying 
out a coup is developing an “own sense of a special and separate identity” (2002, p. 126). This 
element of the Fiji military surfaced in the build-up to the 2006 elections, when Bainimarama sent 
military teams into the villages to articulate the military’s national vision in direct opposition to the 
ruling SDL Government’s election platform (Firth & Fraenkel, 2009; Green, 2009; Ramesh, 2010). 
Qarase’s SDL still won the election, and this time, complied with Section 99 of the 1997 
Constitution by awarding the FLP, as the second largest party, substantial ministerial portfolios, in a 
multi-party cabinet. Aside from being well-received by political representatives, community 
organisations and the general public, the formation of the multi-party cabinet had the appearance of 
at least partly addressing the military’s grievance about the SDL’s ethno-nationalistic leanings 
(Green, 2009). But Bainimarama still went ahead with the coup, which caused his critics to question 
his true motives (Green, 2009; Ramesh, 2010). 
 
Some observers felt the Fiji media were seduced by Bainimarama’s apparent egalitarianism and 
believed his promises to clean up corruption and not to hold on to power for too long (Media failed to 
grill coup leader, 2009, p. 10). Nor was it only media. Bainimarama also won support from 
considerable numbers of members of the public and civil society organisations (Green, 2009). Soon 
after the coup, Bainimarama was sworn in as prime minister and instituted a major crackdown on the 
media, the trade unions and the opposition. He consolidated his hold on power by dismissing 
numerous public servants and heads of government boards. He also brought the police, prisons, 
immigration and justice departments under the direct control of the military (Green, 2009; Firth & 
Fraenkel, 2009).  Reacting to media reports about the growing military presence in the civil service 
and diplomatic positions, naval officer and director of immigration Viliame Naupoto stated that 
military officers should be part of “nation building”. In an apparent reference to previous coups, 
Naupoto complained that the military had been used like a “tied watchdog” only to be marched 
back into the barracks after the job had been done. He warned that “if you keep using the military as 
a watchdog the chain might break and bite people” (cited in Firth & Fraenkel, 2009, p. 129). These 
sentiments betray the military’s intention to become more directly involved in the running of the 
affairs of the nation rather than carry out coups on behalf of other powers. 
 
Further evidence of the apparent march towards militarisation followed the April 2009 Appeals 
Court ruling declaring the 2006 coup illegal. Instead of retreating back to the barracks, the military-
backed government circumvented the court decision and further consolidated its position. The 
military-appointed President, Ratu Josefa Iloilo, dismissed the judiciary, repealed the 1997 
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Constitution, and re-appointed Bainimarama as interim prime minister (Ramesh, 2010). The self-
appointed government then issued several decrees that banned public gatherings and censored the 
media. These included the Public Emergency Regulations (PER) and in June 2010, the punitive 
Media Industry Development Decree 2010 (Lauder, 2012; Valemei, 2012). Critics like Fraenkel 
(2010) pointed out how over the years the 2006 coup priorities changed from an anti-corruption 
campaign, to electoral reform, followed by economic development, all of which elected 
governments had allegedly failed to deliver. Military funding increased by 40 per cent in 2010, with 
plans to spend an extra $199m in the following decade (Field, 2010; Firth & Fraenkel, 2009).  
 
Bainimarama dealt with any challenge to his authority in a firm manner. When the Fiji Methodist 
Church and the Great Council of Chiefs refused to cooperate, he simply banned their gatherings, 
claiming that they were hindering the “pursuit of a common and equal citizenry” (Bainimarama, 
2012a; B. Lal, 2009). The removal of an indigenous Fijian government, and the disempowerment of 
the Methodist Church and the chiefs showed that the military was no longer content to be a minion in 
the oligarchic order and had muscled its way to the top of the power structure. As former Fiji army 
Colonel Jone Baledrokadroka noted, Fiji’s military had become “a parallel state within a state” (2012, 
p. 109). In 2013 the military-backed government rejected a new draft constitution drawn up by an 
independent commission led by Professor Yash Ghai, claiming it was bureaucratic and 
undemocratic (Field, 2013; Nailatikau, 2013). But critics claimed the constitution was rejected 
because it ruled out the military’s role as “guardian of the constitution or conscience of the nation” 
(Field, 2013; Narsey, 2013a). A replacement constitution drawn up and adopted by the 
Bainimarama Government in September 2013, ahead of an announced September 2014 polling date, 
established a secular state based on non-racial constituencies, with a single-house 50-member 
national assembly, a first for Fiji. Polling was to be on the basis of one person, one vote. 
Bainimarama (2013) hailed the new constitution as one that met “the test of a genuine democracy”. 
He condemned previous constitutions, which “highlighted differences rather than commonalities”, 
adding: 
 
Every time we went to vote, we had to stand in separate lines. How could we expect our 
nation to be united? As a nation, we had lost our way. And I remain convinced that only the 
most radical intervention was capable of ever turning us around. With the revolution and the 
new Fijian constitution, our national compass has been reset. (Bainimarama, 2013) 
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Bainimarama’s apparent egalitarianism was a contrast to the Qarase Government’s perceived ethno-
nationalism and alleged corruption. It had won Bainimarama fairly strong support among civil 
society organisations, segments of the non-indigenous population, the then Catholic Archbishop of 
Suva, and some rural indigenous communities for whom Bainimarama reportedly did more than 
previous governments had (Firth & Fraenkel, 2009; Tabureguci & Matau, 2013). Chapter two in the 
2013 Constitution contains a Bill of Rights, guaranteeing the right to education, economic 
participation, a just minimum wage and freedom of speech, expression and publication 
(Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji Islands, 2013). But, somewhat paradoxically, the new 
constitution preserves almost all existing laws and decrees of the interim government, including the 
2010 Media Decree.  Moreover, it prevents the judicial scrutiny of these laws and decrees, and even 
provides that they will override the constitution in the event of any inconsistencies (Citizens’ 
Constitutional Forum, 2014; Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji Islands, 2013). 
 
In March 2014 Bainimarama resigned as military commander, announced his candidature for the 
2014 elections, and appointed Colonel Mosese Tikoitoga to the military commander’s post. In a 
media interview, Tikoitoga, seen by some as a Bainimarama loyalist, pledged to honour the election 
results, but added: “if people throw out the current constitution as current political parties are 
talking about, then they have thrown out the chance of avoiding coups” (Matau, 2014). Tikoitoga’s 
comments lent credence to allegations that an “ideology of political intervention now pervades the 
Fijian military’s senior command” (Baledrokadroka, 2012, p. 105). Tuitoga’s stance was another 
giveaway sign of on-going militarisation. However, his comments carried some constitutional 
weight. Section 131 of the 2013 Constitution gives the military the “overall responsibility to ensure 
at all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and all Fijians” (p. 83).  
 
A study commissioned by the Suva-based Citizens Constitutional Forum described the military’s 
constitutional role as “unusually expansive”, “contrary to democratic practice”, and tantamount to 
“supervising the civilian government’s compliance with the 2013 Constitution (Citizens’ 
Constitutional Forum, 2014, p. 8). The report conceded that “transitioning from military-backed 
government to a “fully-fledged” democracy is almost always gradual, spanning many years” (p. 15). 
The process of militarisation outlined in this thesis is another indication that the main conflict in Fiji 
is not only between the two major ethnicities. In addition, it exposes the perilous situation of the Fiji 
media. It shows that the media has not been operating in a fully democratic framework for some 
time. The trend underlines the fallacy of conceptualising and analysing the media solely from a 
fourth estate perspective. Not only is this stance divorced from the realities of the political 
	   72	  
developments that have taken place in recent decades, it disregards the political framework that is 
currently in place in Fiji. One-dimensional, liberalist, fourth estate interpretation of the media’s role 
could lead to unrealistic expectations of the media’s power and influence, how media should behave 
in terms of holding power to account, and what they could accomplish.     
 
3.11 Chapter summary 
 
To gain a deeper appreciation of ethnic conflict in Fiji, this chapter has approached the problem 
from the broader instrumentalist and constructivist perspectives. Primordialism, which has been 
largely discredited in academia (Evera, 2001), was de-emphasised, not completely ruled out. The 
chapter examined the major polarising issues in Fiji – land use and ownership; constitutionalism 
and political power; demography and cultural assimilation; coups and militarisation; and share of 
economic wealth, including affirmative action. It has been a significant disclosure that many long-
running onflicts with strong primordial overtones are in fact underpinned by and scarcely 
inextricable from instrumentalist and constructivist causes. Included are the capitalist policies of the 
colonial government, which saw to the importation of Indian labour; a colonial divide-and-rule 
strategy; and an ethnically-constructed social, economic and political system. 
 
These legacies are at the core of some enduring present-day conflicts largely blamed on ethnic 
animosity alone. Among other things, the hybridised electoral system incentivised the politics of 
race and worsened group-based conflict. This arrangement encouraged the formation of political 
and economic cartels that exploited the ethnic divide to stay in power. The cartels instigated 
military coups when their position was threatened by a new class-based political order. This led to 
the politicisation of the military and put Fiji on the path to gradual militarisation. Media missed the 
warning signs of apparent militarisation partly because the military, a revered indigenous 
institution, is seen as the protector, rather than the usurper, of indigenous power. The Fiji media’s 
focus on ethnicity to explain conflicts makes them lose sight of the underlying causes of conflict 
and evidently distort sensitive issues, such as demography and share of economic wealth. This 
could partly be due to bias and partly due to a lack of professional capacity in newsrooms, which is 
not uncommon in developing countries (Frohardt & Temin, 2003; R. Howard; 2003; 2009).  The 
media slant could also be due to elite manipulation, or for political economy reasons (Gaunder, 
2008). Or media could simply be a mirror of Fiji’s ethnically fractured society. The study will test 
some of these theories and assertions empirically. In the next chapter, we discuss the methods to be 
used for empirical validation. 
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CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters set the research context. This chapter articulates the plan, process, design and 
rationale behind the four qualitative methods selected to address this study’s research questions. 
The methods are, respectively, content analysis, survey questionnaire, document review and in-
depth interviews. The chapter begins by explaining the decision to choose multi-modal qualitative 
methods, including how the methodology was informed by the research questions. It then outlines 
the fieldwork and data collection procedures, before going into the details of each of the four 
methods. This includes a description of the process involved in developing a specific content 
analysis coding scheme and survey questionnaire for this particular project. The chapter outlines the 
final two methods – document review and in-depth interviews – as they relate to this study, before 
ending with a discussion on the challenges, ethical considerations and chapter summary. In arriving 
at the methodology for this study, this researcher revisited the basic, but crucial question about what is 
the purpose of research.  
 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 2), the rationale for research is multifaceted: “investigate” 
some existing situation; “provide solutions” to a prevailing problem; “explain” a new phenomenon; 
“generate new knowledge”; or a combination of any of the above. These research goals are usually 
pursued by two research approaches – quantitative (numeric form) and qualitative (non-numeric). 
The combination of the two is referred to as a mixed methods approach (Collis & Hussey, 2003). 
Quantitative and qualitative research relates respectively to positivistic and phenomenological 
paradigms. The positivistic approach sees reality as objective and singular, and the researcher as 
independent and value-free (Reinard, 2001). The phenomenological paradigm sees the world as 
socially-constructed and subjective. The focus is on meanings and ideas developed through 
induction from the data, rather than on statistical trends and measurements (Easterby-Smith, 
Richard & Lowe, 1991). Qualitative research is usually favoured by researchers in the social 
sciences – psychology, sociology, anthropology and so forth – who seek deeper understanding of 
human behaviour. Human social dynamics are better comprehended qualitatively in terms of 
developing explanations of social phenomena rather than in dry, quantifiable, terms (Hancock, 
Ockleford & Windridge, 2009). The above applies to communication-based social science projects 
(such as this thesis), which usually deal with understanding meaning making.  
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It involves delving into how “people make sense of their social worlds and how they express these 
understandings through language, sound, imagery, personal style and social rituals” (Deacon, 
Pickering, Golding & Murdock, 2007, p. 5). In the field of media and mass communication, some 
scholars (e.g., Lindlof, 1995) believe that a qualitative approach is sufficient, mainly because the 
focus is on the set of relationships within the sample whereas some others (e.g., Halloran, 1998) 
believe a mixed methods approach is more wholesome. This research is a mixed quantitative and 
qualitative survey. 
 
4.2 Methods, research questions, theoretical framework 
 
This study’s multi-modal methodology was informed by the research questions, gleaned from 
perceived gaps in the literature. The research is inspired by the works of Frohardt  and Temin 
(2003) and other conflict-sensitive reporting and peace journalism frameworks (Galtung, 1986, 
2002, 2010; R. Howard, 2003, 2009). In order to understand conflict reporting as fully as possible, 
identify problems, reach conclusions and make recommendations, Frohardt and Temin (2003) 
suggest analysing both media content and the national media infrastructure. This study applies 
Frohardt and Temin’s (2003) framework through a four-pronged methodological approach: 
 
• content analysis of the print media’s coverage of Fiji’s 2006 elections to gauge any 
reporting slants or patterns 
• survey questionnaire to gauge the level of journalists’ professional capacity and diversity 
• document research to study media ownership patterns and the legal environment  
• in-depth interviews with journalists and academics to supplement the above research 
methods and to fortify the findings.  
 
The first method focuses on the content to gauge the nature of conflict reporting. The remaining 
three methods look at the human, organisational, cultural, and institutional variables that affected, 
shaped and produced the content. This approach is based on the “pragmatic” research paradigm of 
“do what works best” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006, p. 320). It links the methods directly to the aims 
and the nature of the research questions (Creswell, 2003). Mason (2009) adopted the pragmatic 
approach for his PhD thesis on the Australian media coverage of Fiji’s 1987 and 2000 coups. 
According to Mason (2009, p. 71), pragmatism suits the nature of journalism, which faces different 
situations and possibilities in news reporting, ranging from sporting events to military coups. Yet, 
invariably, the goal is the same – to make decisions that will result in the best possible story.  
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The emphasis on linkages and the flexibility that a pragmatic approach offers could be an advantage 
for a qualitative research project such as this one, in terms of both methodology and data analysis. 
As Patton (2002, p. 432) states: 
 
Qualitative analysis transforms data into findings. No formula exists for that transformation. 
Direction can and will be offered, but the final destination remains unique for each inquirer, 
known only when – and if – arrived at. 
 
The research questions and adopted methods for this study connect as follows: 
 
1. Are the Fiji print media inflammatory, as is often alleged? (Content analysis) 
2. What is the level of journalist capacity and diversity in Fiji? (Survey questionnaire) 
3. What is the genesis and nature of Fiji’s media laws? (Document research) 
4. What are the genesis and nature of media ownership in Fiji and its link with political and 
economic power? (Document research).  
 
The in-depth interviews were designed to further explore the issues raised by the four questions, as 
well as other issues that emerged from the literature review and the data as a whole. The premise 
behind this multi-faceted approach is not just to identify patterns in conflict reporting (content 
indicators), but also to link them to journalist capacity, the legal environment and media ownership 
(structural indicators). This ties together the study’s methodology, research questions and the major 
theoretical concepts and frameworks, namely peace journalism, political economy of the media and 
normative press theories. These combined methods were adopted with the aim of addressing the 
gaps in conflict reporting frameworks such as peace journalism. These are criticised for jumping 
from theorising to media reform without producing empirical data to guide and support their 
initiatives (McMahon & Chow-White, 2011). 
 
Indeed, it makes sense to study media structure and media content in unison to understand how one 
affects the other. As Betz (2011) says, the foundation on which news content is built and created is 
the national media structure or landscape. The approach adopted by this study addresses another 
criticism about concepts like peace journalism – that too often, such frameworks are premised on 
the conduct of media organisations and/or individual journalists rather than on structures that 
support news selection and news reporting procedures (Hanitzsch, 2004).  
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Certainly, in Fiji and the Pacific, existing literature on conflict reporting tends to heap blame on 
journalists or media organisations for alleged mistakes and bias but does not fully consider the 
larger forces at play, and how these might be affecting and shaping the final news product. In 
looking at this apparently under-researched area, the study is attempting to get to the root of the 
problem. As McChesney (2008) articulates it, to reinvigorate journalism – and with it democratic 
governance – it is necessary to understand the source of the problem first before recommending the 
correct solutions.  
 
4.3 Data collection and content analysis 
  
Fieldwork for data collection, which took place in Fiji in 2012 and 2013, was divided into two 
phases (Table 1). 
 
 
 
Phase One took place over four weeks from August to September 2012. It involved a nationwide 
journalist survey of 10 media organisations, in-depth interviews, and document research. Phase 
Two, from February to March 2013, involved a content analysis of the 2006 general elections and 
further document research.  
 
Content analysis: The aim of the content analysis was to identify patterns in the reporting of 
national issues during the 2006 election, through the application of a peace journalism–inspired 
coding scheme. Content analysis is a well established method that uses written, visual and spoken 
material as data for the study of recorded human communication, qualitatively and/or quantitatively 
(Babbie, 2001). If employed prudently and self-consciously, content analysis is said to be a useful 
means of summarising or describing selected aspects of a large body of material (Hackett, Gilsdorf 
& Savage, 1992). For all its strengths and popularity, content analysis, like any other method, has 
its drawbacks. A major one is that the selection and scoring of coding units can be rather subjective. 
In other words, content analysis is limited to, and by, the choices researchers make about categories 
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and by the degree to which they select and treat the material systematically (Hackett, Gilsdorf & 
Savage, 1992). For this reason, the effort was made to remain mindful of Eysenck’s (2004) 
instruction that the chosen coding categories should reflect accurately the content of the 
communication, with each of the categories defined as precisely as possible.  
 
On its own, content analysis is deemed insufficient for thoroughly analysing the meaning and 
motive of a message (Buddenbaum & Novak, 2001). Kohlbacher (2006) suggests “integration” with 
other methods to capitalise on content analysis’ potential for advancing social research. As such, 
this Fiji study is based on an integrative approach: it combines content analysis with in-depth 
interviews, as recommended by Merten (1996), and two other methods, questionnaire survey and 
document research. The advantage of such a multi-modal strategy is that the weaknesses in each 
single method are potentially “compensated” by the counter-balancing strengths of another (Jick, 
1979, p. 604). The choice of content analysis as one of four methods has, of course, various other 
justifications. Content analysis could fill a gap in the literature from national, regional and 
international perspectives. In Fiji, media content is rarely studied for general reporting, let alone 
from a conflict-reporting perspective.  
 
Applying a conflict-reporting content-analysis frame would further test various claims made about 
the Fiji media’s alleged culpability in conflict (see T. R. Singh, 2011). Internationally, the literature 
on war and media is substantial, but studies informed explicitly by a peace-journalism perspective 
are said to be lacking (Hackett, 2007; Lee & Maslog, 2005). Thus, a Fiji study based on a peace 
journalism–inspired framework could make an important contribution to empirical research in the 
genre as a whole. Leading scholars of peace journalism like Hackett (2007, p.51) recommend 
content analysis to “monitor” and “evaluate” how news media perform in conflict situations. In the 
Fiji context, national elections are a form of non-violent conflict. This study is one of the rare 
occasions in which a peace journalism content analysis framework has been applied to assess 
conflict reporting during a general election. Additionally, content analysis may support and 
reinforce this study’s political economy and normative media theoretical frameworks by, among 
other things, clarifying whether elite and official sources heavily dominate mainstream media 
discourse in Fiji, as alleged.  
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Why the 2006 general elections: Turning to general elections, these are ‘hot moments’ in Fiji. 
Claims that news reporting during an election in Fiji is driven not only by ideological debates and 
party manifestos but also by an unhealthy dose of political and racial rhetoric need to be empirically 
tested (see Alley, 2001; M. Howard, 1991; Kant, 2012). From a conflict reporting perspective, 
elections could provide an outstanding case study for determining how the Fiji media report socially 
and politically sensitive topics in a plural society. Elections provide a good case study because 
during elections, it is not only the politicians who are competing but also the media. Elections offer 
an opportunity to test Fog’s (2004) claim that “competitive news media” select and frame stories in 
ways that could hamper the democratic system’s ability to solve internal social problems in an 
optimal manner. Fog blames this alleged tendency on the “unintended consequences of the structure 
of the media market” (Fog, 2004, p. 1). Fog’s assertions underscore this study’s rationale for 
studying content in relation to the media structure. They underpin the need for ‘catching’ media 
during an election, when they are arguably at their most competitive. Fog’s observations also justify 
this study’s political economy of the media-based theoretical approach.  
 
Moreover, Fiji’s 2006 election marked seven years since the 2000 coup, within which time frame 
the country was expected to have returned to normalcy. The 2006 election was the last held under 
Fiji’s much-vaunted, reportedly equitable, 1997 Constitution. Just seven months later, the 
Bainimarama coup took place. From a conflict reporting perspective, a content analysis of the 2006 
election coverage could provide fresh insights into any links between media, democracy and coups 
in a fragile country like Fiji. While this analysis recognises that political rhetoric is part of 
democratic elections, the issue in tense, multi-ethnic societies like Fiji is where to draw the line 
given the links between rhetoric, propaganda, misinformation and media manipulation established 
by various studies (see Carruthers, 2000; D. Kumar, 2006).  
 
4.4 Sample size, unit of analysis and coding categories 
 
The study analyses coverage of Fiji’s 2006 general elections by the three national dailies – the Fiji 
Times, Fiji Sun and the Fiji Daily Post. The print editions of the papers were accessed at the 
University of the South Pacific library in Suva, Fiji. The Fiji Times was the country’s biggest 
newspaper (as well as the oldest) at the time, followed by the Fiji Sun. Both were privately-owned. 
The Fiji Daily Post, the smallest of the three and jointly owned by government and private interests, 
closed because of its financial problems after the 2006 coup and the introduction of new media 
ownership laws in 2010 (Usman, 2012).  
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The initial period chosen for study was one month (April 4 to May 64) before the start of elections 
from 6 to 13 May 2006. This time frame covered 30 issues of each newspaper, yielding around 
1300 election-related articles in the 90 issues. The sheer volume of the data proving too much, the 
sample size was reduced by narrowing the time frame to the final 10 days of campaigning, to 
capture the most intense period of the political contest. The focus of the analysis was to be on hard 
news, which deals with public interest matters concerning political, economic and social issues, 
rather than soft news, which is more sensational and entertainment-focussed (Baum, 2003). As 
such, weekend editions of the papers were set aside since they are dominated by soft news – 
entertainment lift-outs from Hollywood and Bollywood, as well as features, lifestyle and sports.  
 
Another issue relating to the content was the smallness of some election-related articles. They 
resembled notices rather than news stories. Such articles usually appeared in the “briefly” columns 
or as “fillers”. These shorter articles were omitted based on Harrower’s (2007) definition that a 
news story should contain six or more paragraphs. Op-eds, editorials and letters to the editor were 
also omitted as they did not fit the definition of hard news (see Baum, 2003). The culling process 
left a more specific and manageable sample of 350 articles. The coding categories and scoring 
system borrow from Lee and Maslog (2005). This coding category has been used by Wilson (2013) 
and Wilson and Devere (2013) to analyse Radio New Zealand’s coverage of conflicts in five Pacific 
Island countries. A score of one (1) is recorded for each peace journalism indicator found in a story. 
Likewise, a score of negative one (-1) is recorded for each war journalism indicator. If an item did 
not meet the criteria outlined in the coding categories, it was ranked unclassified and given a score 
of zero (0).  
 
Based on the scores, each story was classified as peace journalism, war journalism or neutral. When 
the peace journalism indicators exceeded the war journalism indicators, the story was classified as 
peace journalism, and vice-versa. If the score was equal, the story was classified as neutral (Lee & 
Maslog, 2005, pp. 316–317; Wilson, 2013; Wilson & Devere, 2013, p. 140). For this particular Fiji 
investigation, the researcher devised a specific coding scheme based on the works of Galtung (1998, 
2006); Lee and Maslog (2005); Frohardt and Temin (2003) and Youngblood (2009, 2011).  
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Lee and Maslog, Galtung: Lee and Maslog (2005) were the first to expand and actualise Galtung’s 
(2006) peace–war journalism typology in five Asian countries – India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines. Their typology comprised 13 indicators in two broad categories, 
approach and language – as outlined:  
 
1. Approach – 1) reactivity; 2) visibility; 3) elite orientation; 4) focussed on differences; 5) 
focussed on the present; 6) dichotomises between good and bad; 7) two party orientation; 8) 
partisan; 9) winning orientation; 10) does not report peace initiatives.  
2. Language – 1) victimising; 2) demonising; 3) emotive.  
 
Reactivity and visibility refer to media’s attraction to, and focus on, the violent manifestations of 
conflict. These indicators were deemed irrelevant for a case study involving a non-violent, internal 
conflict such as the 2006 Fiji election. The same applies for the 10th indicator, does not report 
peace initiatives, which largely covers media’s failure to report ceasefire agreements and peace 
treaties. These indicators were dropped. 
 
Elite orientation refers to media’s alleged partiality towards political, corporate and other elites as 
actors and sources of information. This indicator is retained as it is relevant for understanding the 
link between conflict, power, influence, and elite manipulation of media, particularly from a 
political economy angle. Partisanship, which denotes bias for one side in the conflict, has also been 
retained. 
 
Focused on the present was brought under a new indicator introduced for this study, “context”. This 
indicator is more holistic in assessing whether media consider the present in relation to the past 
when reporting contentious issues. It aims to test criticisms that conflict reporting in Fiji is often 
bereft of context. For instance, in her analysis of Fiji Times and Fiji Daily Post editorial comments 
during the 2000 disturbance, Duncan (2002) asserted that the editors failed to provide “any in-depth 
analysis of the causes of the political crisis nor relate it back to historical events”. Instead, they 
tended to write “sensational statements” rather than promoting “audience thought” (pp. 23–24). The 
indicator “context” is used to expand on Duncan’s work to determine to what extent her findings 
apply to coverage of the 2006 election. 
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The essence of three indicators – focused on differences, two-party orientation and zero-sum, win-
win orientation – is captured under a new indicator, “consociation or majoritarianism”. 
Consociation denotes political and social cooperation and accommodation, particularly in plural 
settings. Majoritarianism means competition and contention based on a two-party, win-lose, 
political system (Lijphart, 1999; 2004). This new indicator is particularly relevant for coverage of 
Fiji’s 2006 national election since it was contested under the 1997 Constitution, designed to 
encourage consociation (Green, 2009). Previous racially-based constitutions were majoritarian in 
nature (winner-take-all), which is said to have polarised the two major ethnic communities even more 
and caused coups (Green, 2009; Ramesh, 2002, 2007). Consociation and majoritarianism are similar 
to two indicators in Galtung’s (1998, 2006) typology of peace–war journalism, as outlined:  
 
a) Two-party orientation versus multiparty orientation – war journalism adopts a two-party, 
zero sum orientation [majoritarianism] with one winner and one loser. Peace journalism 
denotes a multiparty orientation [consociation] by giving voice to the many parties involved 
in conflict. 
b) Zero-sum orientation versus win-win orientation – war journalism is represented by the 
former. The overriding goal is to win, usually at any cost [majoritarianism]. Peace journalism 
values are inherent in the latter. There are multiple goals and issues, and various options for 
reaching consensus and finding solutions to problems [consociation].  
  
Consociation/majoritarianism combines two similar elements of Galtung’s typology into one 
indicator. This indicator could determine the extent to which the print media, politicians and society 
at large embodied the spirit of Fiji’s 1997 Constitution. These factors could be assessed by the 
proportion of coverage given to the larger political parties compared to the smaller ones. It could be 
further gauged by the utterances of politicians and the level of coverage given to voices advocating 
unity and cooperation as opposed to voices promoting disunity. Another new category is “undue 
reference to race and/or religion”. The idea was to test allegations that Fiji media make 
uncorroborated, unbalanced or excessive references to race and religion (see CCF criticises ‘media 
contribution to racism’, 2008; Kant, 2012; T. R. Singh, 2011). In order to assess this indicator in an 
objective manner, the researcher was mindful that as a society, Fiji is structured along ethnic lines – 
politically, socially and economically – and that media reports may simply reflect these 
demarcations. 
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Dichotomy differentiates between good–bad or victims–villains by putting them into exclusive 
compartments with no middle ground. This classification has been retained. The three overlapping 
language indicators (Lee & Maslog, 2005, p. 326) have been combined into one indicator, 
“language”, to cover for all forms of provocative, demeaning, victimising and emotive discourse 
reproduced by the media without counteraction. 
 
Frohardt and Temin  
Frohardt and Temin (2003, pp. 5–6) propose a series of indicators to access media’s susceptibility 
to manipulation. These “clues to conflict” are divided into “indicators” dealing with media structure 
(the way the media sector is set up) and those dealing with media content (the articles and 
programming that media outlets produce). This section deals with content indicators, which help to 
shape an individual’s view of the world (Frohardt & Temin, 2003). There are two specific types of 
content. The first, content creating fear, deals with the construction of fear and is likely to be a 
component of any effort to use media to promote conflict. The second, content creating inevitability 
and resignation, involves the use of media to convince people that conflict is inevitable. This could 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy: media consumers become resigned to the notion that conflict will 
happen, thus conflict prevention seems futile. Hence, people are much easier to move to violence 
(Frohardt & Temin, 2003, pp. 6–8). For the purpose of this study, both these indicators have been 
combined into one indicator, namely “fearmongering”, to identify news items that aimed to 
influence voters through the articulation of threats and intimidation.  
 
Steven Youngblood 
Youngblood’s (2009, 2011) framework is derived from Galtung’s peace–war journalism typology, 
but with a focus on domestic disputes. The indicators are:  
 
1. language: 1) inflammatory/emotional; 2) demonising/name calling; 3) victimising. 
2. writing/reporting: 1) opinions treated as facts; 2) historical wrongs mentioned; 3) writer’s 
opinion/position one sided; 4) only ‘one side’ interviewed/quoted; 5) story spreads official 
propaganda; 6) information/quotes taken out of context. 
3. parties: 1) blame assigned to one party. 
4. solutions: 1) peace proposals dismissed; 2) story dwells on differences and/or shuns 
similarities. 
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The language indicators were covered earlier in this section. Under writing/reporting, two related 
indicators – opinions treated as facts and writer’s opinion/position one-sided – have been grouped 
under a single indicator, “opinion”. The indicator historical wrongs mentioned is already covered 
under “language”, whereas story dwells on differences and/or shuns similarities is covered under 
“dichotomy”. Another indicator, only one side interviewed/quoted, falls under partisanship; story 
spreads official propaganda is covered by indicators such as “sources”; and information/quotes 
taken out of context is covered under “context”. 
 
Collectively, Lee and Maslog (2005), Frohardt and Temin (2003), and Youngblood (2009, 2011) 
make up 23 indicators. The relevant indicators from this lot were retained, with some modifications. 
Those indicators deemed irrelevant for the coverage of a non-violent, intra-State conflict were 
eliminated. Some superfluous indicators were combined and at least two new indicators introduced 
to make the coding category relevant for this specific Fiji case study. The applicable peace 
journalism indicators were retained to allow for a comparative analysis between this study and 
similar ones conducted overseas. As such, this study could add new knowledge to international 
research in peace journalism and conflict reporting.  
 
The selection, elimination, modification and finalisation of the indicators resulted in a more 
manageable and focused coding category for the study, with 10 indicators specific for application to 
Fiji’s 2006 elections. They are outlined in Table 2 on the following page: 
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As Table 2 shows, the most salient indicators of war journalism to be a disproportionate focus on 
elite sources; use of single sources; stories devoid of background; stories showing bias for a 
particular side; a two-party win-lose focus; use of victimising, demonising or emotional language; 
undue reference to race and/or religion; journalist’s opinion intruding in news stories; content 
designed to create fear and nurture resignation to the inevitability of conflict; and dichotomising by 
categorising people as good or bad. The most salient indicators of peace journalism would be the 
inverse of the aforementioned characteristics. Insofar as this study is concerned, reporting 
inflammatory comments does not in itself constitute war journalism. Indeed, suppressing such 
comments would be tantamount to censorship. However, reporting inciteful statements without 
including a multiplicity of views and context would be classified as war journalism, particularly if 
they breached Fiji’s hate speech laws. Whether Lee and Maslog (2005) made this distinction in their 
studies is not made clear in their paper.  
 
In the next section we look at methods used to identify the “structural indicators” of conflict in the 
national media landscape in terms of journalist professional capacity and diversity, the legislative 
environment and the media ownership scheme. For these, the study applies a survey questionnaire, 
followed by document analysis. 
 
4.5 Survey questionnaire 
 
The survey questionnaire deals with the second element of structural indicators of conflict in the 
media landscape – media professionals – as outlined in Frohardt and Temin’s (2003) framework. It 
concerns identifying potential fault lines in the national journalist corps in terms of experience, 
training, qualification, diversity, and so forth. The information needed to assess this on a nationwide 
basis can be obtained efficiently by means of a national newsroom survey administered through a 
self-completion questionnaire. Survey questionnaires are an effective way of gathering “information 
about the characteristics, actions, or opinions of a large group of people” (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 
1993, p. 77). Isaac and Michael note the use of survey questionnaires to: 
 
 answer questions that have been raised, solve problems that have been posed or 
 observed, assess needs and set goals to determine whether or not specific objectives have 
 been met, establish baselines against which future comparisons can be made, analyse 
 trends across time, and generally, describe what exists, in what amount, and in what 
 context.  (1997, p. 136) 
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One of the things this survey hoped to address was the questions raised over the years about 
journalists’ qualifications and professionalism. This could provide an empirical framework for 
assessing journalists’ training needs, salaries and working conditions. A similar survey was last 
published by Robie (2003a) a decade before. It provides an important benchmark for analysing 
trends that have occurred in the intervening decade. As mentioned, this survey was administered to 
journalists only. In this study, a journalist is defined as a person who produces news, information 
and opinion for public consumption, and one who makes decisions directly affecting news content 
(Donsbach & Klett, 1993; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996). Thus, the survey was administered to all 
editorial staff involved in producing news, opinions and features in politics, government and current 
affairs. This included editorial decision-makers and gatekeepers, such as chief-of-staff, news editor 
and features editor. 
 
The researcher used the work of Malhotra (2006) to guide the formulation of the survey questions. 
Malhotra  advises that questions should be organised around topic areas and asked in a logical 
order. The survey questions in this research focussed on the following core themes in the context of 
their impact on conflict reporting:  
 
• journalist diversity – gender, ethnicity, religious background, political leanings  
• journalist capacity and professionalism – training, qualifications, age, experience  
• working conditions and job satisfaction – pay, career progression 
• professional values – cognition and application of media law and ethics 
• pressures faced by journalists – cultural, political, organisational, institutional 
• conflict reporting – attitudes toward notions of objectivity and contemporary 
• conflict reporting frameworks. 
 
Some questions were modelled on Robie’s (2003a) Fiji survey to allow for a comparative analysis 
to determine what had changed in the intervening decade. This survey also drew from Romano’s 
(1998) survey examining normative theories of development journalism in Indonesia. Like Fiji, 
Indonesia has struggled with social and political strife, including coups. Some other issues covered 
by this study’s questionnaire arose at two journalism seminars on media, peace and development in 
the Pacific Islands. The seminars were held at the Auckland University of Technology in New 
Zealand and the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji, in December 2010.  
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Further questions were derived from the literature review to address key contemporary media issues 
at the local, regional and international levels. At the local level, there is little research into how Fiji 
journalists’ political biases and religious beliefs might be affecting their work, even though this is 
acknowledged as a topic of interest in other multi-ethnic societies. The same can be said about 
research to gauge Fiji journalists’ insights into current debates on media and society, both local and 
global. This includes their understanding of, and openness toward, contemporary concepts in 
journalism, including in conflict reporting. This survey is also informed by Weaver and Willnat’s 
(2012) global media survey covering more than 29,000 journalists in 31 countries and territories. 
This international survey covered topics such as ethics, professionalism, pressures on journalists 
and other issues that cut across national, regional and international boundaries.  
 
In all, the eight-page survey designed for this study contains 37 questions, divided into two 
sections. For the most part questions are of the multiple choice type, though they include “explain 
briefly” and “other (specify)” options where appropriate to cover the full range of possible 
alternatives (see Malhotra, 2006). The questions are prefaced by an explanatory “abstract”, a 
“research project information sheet”, and an “informed consent form”. Extra pages are provided for 
any additional comments. The first section of the questionnaire includes demographic information, 
such as respondents’ ethnicity, religion, language, gender and age, as well as qualifications, 
training, experience and work conditions. The second section deals with respondents’ perceptions 
about professional norms; the work challenges they face; their understanding of the role of 
journalism in society; and thoughts on conflict reporting.  
 
Structured survey questionnaires are not without associated disadvantages and inadequacies. 
Because they are standardised and predetermined, such surveys often elicit rational responses while 
tending to overlook (or assess inadequately) the emotional dimension (Wimmer & Dominick, 
2000). In addition, while questionnaires can provide evidence of patterns among large populations, 
they lack more in-depth insights into participant attitudes, thoughts, and actions (Kendall, 2008).  
Moreover, Fiji’s repressive political climate and media owner sensitivities regarding journalists’ 
working conditions imposed restrictions on what the researcher felt able to include in the 
questionnaire. In order to address such shortcomings, in-depth interviews were added as a fourth 
research method, after document analysis. These are discussed in the following sections. 
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4.6 Document review 
 
This section deals with the first and third elements of structural indicators in Frohardt and Temin’s 
(2003) framework – media ownership and the legislative environment. The method used to assess 
these variables is document review. Mogalakwe (2006) writes that document review in social 
science is a useful (if under-utilised) scientific method with rigorous adherence to research 
protocols. Documents can be from private, public and personal sources. Personal documents include 
photo albums, medical records, diaries, personal letters and the like. Public documents, which this 
study is primarily concerned with, include government publications, Acts of Parliament, policy 
statements, statistical bulletins, commissions of inquiry and departmental annual reports 
(Mogalakwe, 2006, p. 222). Private documents, which are also utilised by this study, emanate from 
civil society organisations and the private sector (Mogalakwe, 2006, p. 223).  
 
This research utilises organisation and consultancy reports, news reporting frameworks and training 
manuals, Fiji’s four national constitutions (1970, 1990, 1997 and 2013), annual reports, various 
speeches and presentations and government bills and legislation. These are supplemented by articles 
from news archives, blogs, books and academic journals. The main documents and sources include 
but are not restricted to: Committee to Protect Journalists, 1998; Freedom House, 2011; 
International Journalists Federation, 2012; United States Department of State report, 2012; Minority 
Rights Group, 2013; The Center for International Media Assistance, 2009; Future media legislation 
and regulation for the Republic of the Fiji Islands, 1996; Fiji Human Rights Commission, 2008; 
Free and responsible: Towards a more effective Fiji Media Council, 2009; Constitution of the 
Republic of the Fiji Islands, 1997; Media Council of Fiji Bill, 2003; Fiji Public Emergency 
Regulation, 2009; Media Industry Development Decree 2010. 
 
As an analytical tool, document review can be used on its own as the principal research method or 
triangulated with other methods for greater effect (Mogalakwe, 2006). For this particular study, 
document review is used in collaboration with content analysis, survey questionnaire and in-depth, 
unstructured interviews to facilitate triangulation in data analysis. The presentation and reporting of 
the data were guided by qualitative research principles. This involved summarising the frequencies 
of variables and the differences between them. Towards this end, documents can be categorised into 
themes and analysed similarly to focus group or interview transcripts (Denscombe, 2007; Hancock, 
Ockleford & Windridge, 2009; Love, 2003; Mogalakwe, 2006). The steps involved included: 
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1. Read the document thoroughly, more than once if need be. Record some observations and 
reflections.  
2. Return to the transcript to transform the initial notes into emerging themes. 
3. Examine and cluster emerging themes according to conceptual similarities.  
4. Identify patterns and produce a structure to highlight converging ideas. 
 
In following the four steps, the researcher used the “constant comparison” approach. This addresses 
the research questions in a systematic way to facilitate the identification of important themes and 
communicate the most important features so as to arrive at “the big picture”, or the major findings 
(Hancock, Ockleford & Windridge, 2009, pp. 23–26). Throughout the data collection, presentation 
and interpretation processes, the researcher was conscious about some disadvantages in document 
review in relation to accuracy, completeness, credibility, reliability and legitimacy of authorship 
(Scott, 1990). As such, any documents about which there were any doubts were cross-examined and 
verified before being utilised.  
 
4.7 In-depth interviews 
 
Because methods such as structured surveys, content analysis, and document research are criticised 
for being too technical (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000), unstructured, in-depth interviews were 
incorporated as a fourth method, particularly for gaining insights into, and direct contact with, the 
subjects and their lived experiences. This approach enabled deeper delving into issues brought to 
the foreground by the other three methods, which proved enabling when it came to exploring and 
gaining new insights into new topics. In-depth interviews were developed in anthropology and 
sociology to elicit people’s social realities with minimal researcher intervention (Zhang & 
Wildemuth, 2009). The researcher has no predefined theoretical framework but engages in 
conversations with interviewees and generates questions in response to their narration (Zhang & 
Wildemuth, 2009). The researcher tries to encourage the interviewees to relate experiences and 
perspectives relevant to the topic (Burgess, 1984). The questions are usually broad in nature, 
allowing interviewers freedom to determine what further questions to ask to obtain the required 
information (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000). As Kvale (1994, p. 14) says, the researcher derives 
knowledge from the “social situatedness” and the “centrality of human interaction for knowledge 
production”.  
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In addition, unstructured interviews seemed to have an advantage in Fiji’s politically coercive 
environment. Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) point out that because of their conversational and non-
intrusive characteristics, unstructured interviews can be used in settings where it is inappropriate or 
impossible to use other more structured methods. In the present Fiji situation, in which the media 
have to deal with punitive legislation, some questions that could not be articulated in the survey 
forms could be investigated in face-to-face interviews conducted in private settings. This included 
questions about how the recently-introduced media laws were affecting journalists’ work. 
 
Still, there are major challenges with in-depth interviews to consider. For example, in a new setting, 
it can be difficult trying to gain access to interviewees and win their trust (Zhang & Wildemuth, 
2009). This researcher was not new to Fiji, his country of birth and residence. But since the 2006 
coup, the setting had changed radically, with various new impediments to contend with. Journalists, 
apprehensive of possible repercussions, could not be expected to be as open as they might have 
been prior to the 2006 coup. Moreover, because of their loose and free-flowing nature, in-depth 
interviews can generate large amounts of often contrasting data. This makes it hard to determine 
patterns, establish themes and draw concrete conclusions, especially when each interviewee is asked 
a different series of questions (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).  
 
Another issue with in-depth interviews is who to interview. According to Stake  (1995, p. 64), the 
selection of candidates who can “best help us understand the case” is critical. With regards to the 
present study, this researcher’s background knowledge as a Fiji-based journalist and academic was 
useful in terms of selecting the sample. The researcher interviewed relevant and knowledgeable 
candidates from the media and non-media sectors to gain both insider and outsider perspectives. 
Having to be conscious of his biases as an insider conducting research in his own country, this 
researcher spoke with editors, journalists, publishers and executives from all the major news media 
companies, irrespective of their stances regarding the 2006 coup and the Bainimarama Government.  
As well as journalists, editors, publishers and media company CEOs, interviewees included 
academics in economics and sociology, chosen randomly on the basis of their published works and 
public statements regarding the 2006 coup, the Bainimarama Government and the state of affairs in 
the country. Interviewees from different fields were linked by their wide-ranging experience and 
knowledge about media, politics and society in Fiji. Variation in interviewees’ ages and experience 
– to capture memories and perspectives of different time periods since independence – garnered a 
cross-section of understandings about the state of journalism, including conflict reporting, based on 
trends since Fiji’s independence in 1970. 
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On the issue of how many candidates to interview, McCracken (1988) suggests a minimum of eight 
respondents for most interview research, although there are no set rules for this. What is important 
is targeting people who possess knowledge that would assist the researcher to answer the research 
questions (Patton, 2002). In other words, size is not as always as important as the information-
richness of the cases and people selected. This project ended up with 19 interviewees, bearing in 
mind the subject matter, the time and resources available to the researcher and the accessibility of 
suitable interviewees. In light of the time period being covered – from independence to the present 
– it was envisaged that 19 interviewees from various backgrounds and ages would provide a good 
cross-section of lived experiences and in-depth views about the problem being investigated.  
 
The face-to-face interviews were conducted between September and October 2012. Most sessions 
were held at the Radio Pasifik office at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, where this 
researcher was based for the duration of the fieldwork. Others took place at the offices of the 
interviewees. Virtually all the interviews were conducted in English, digitally recorded, and 
transcribed. To synthesise the interviews, ascertain links and patterns and identify and build 
narratives, the researcher followed McCracken’s (1988, p. 42) five stages of data analysis as a 
guide: 
 
• observe useful utterances in isolation and relative to the text’s other aspects  
• develop observations by themselves, then relative to the text/previous literature 
• examine inter-connections, focussing on ideas that emerge from the observation and 
comparison process 
• scrutinise observations collectively, isolating inter-theme consistencies and contradictions 
• take patterns or themes emerging from all interviews and subject them to analysis.  
 
McCracken’s five steps are linked to Kvale’s (1996, p. 192) concept of “meaning condensation”, 
whereby the researcher reads, scrutinises and summarises long interviews into concise ideas. This 
follows on to a thematic analysis of the text to identify “common content themes and the function of 
these themes” (Gaskell, 2003, p. 53). This researcher carefully read through the individual 
transcripts, highlighting interesting points. This included commonalities and contrasts in 
respondents’ experiences and viewpoints and any recurring themes or unexpected or surprising 
utterances. After this, the findings from each interview were collated and collectively analysed. This 
involved comparisons with the literature, including theories, concepts and frameworks as they 
related to the Fiji situation. Any new and relevant aspect not covered by the existing literature was 
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highlighted. Direct quotations were used to present an accurate depiction of what was being 
evaluated, as recommended by Schuh and Upcraft (2001). Based on this approach, it was possible 
to create several inter-connecting themes under which the information was grouped, analysed and 
presented.  
	  
4.8 Cross-data fertilisation 
 
Table 3 summarises the data and sample size for this study. 
 
 
 
As discussed, the multi-modal methodology provides for data triangulation. Alexander and others 
(2008, p.127–129) suggest that this approach facilitates the cross-checking, the accuracy of research 
findings and the level of confidence in the outcome. It also generates new knowledge through a 
synthesis of the findings from different approaches to reflect the complexity of a phenomenon. 
 
4.9 Challenges and limitations 
 
In erstwhile, ordinary circumstances, this researcher’s activities would not have aroused any 
suspicions or concerns in Fiji. But with Fiji effectively under military rule since December 2006, 
the situation was challenging.  Fiji’s 2010 Media Decree stipulates steep fines and custodial 
sentences for any legal breaches by journalists and also for what were once regarded as ethical 
breaches (see Dutt, 2010). As such, some media professionals were noticeably apprehensive and 
nervous. Fiji editors, publishers and journalists gave the impression of looking over their shoulders 
at a watchful, suspicious and cantankerous regime. Like the rest of the country, the Fiji media corps 
appeared divided between supporters and opponents of the 2006 coup (see Tacchi, et al., 2013). In 
such situations, being a local could be a disadvantage: interviewees, uncertain about the 
researcher’s position on the 2006 coup and the Bainimarama Government, may have been guarded 
in their responses, if not untruthful. Indeed, truthfulness (or rather, apprehension of its possible 
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absence) is a major weakness with interviews, even in normal settings. There is always the risk of a 
“social desirability bias”, which refers to interviewees’ general tendency to provide socially 
desirable rather than honest answers (Eysenck, 2004, p. 4). It would seem that such a risk is 
heightened in autocratic and coercive political environments.  
 
With these problems in mind, the researcher sent a carefully-worded email request to all editors, 
publishers and other potential interviewees prior to arriving in Fiji. The aim was to inform them 
about the objectives of the research and to reassure them about confidentiality. This was followed 
up by phone conversations. Face-to-face meetings with selected interviewees after the researcher’s 
arrival in Fiji re-emphasised the study’s importance, provided further guarantees of confidentiality 
and gave reassurance of researcher impartiality. The chief executive of one major broadcaster 
wanted to know the rationale for the questionnaire survey differentiating journalists on the basis of 
gender, ethnicity and religion, reflecting the sensitivities surrounding these issues in Fiji. He dropped 
his objection once he was satisfied with the explanation that the information was crucial for 
determining newsroom diversity in a multi-ethnic country like Fiji.  
 
The researcher’s anticipation of the potential problems, his advance planning, his considered 
approach and his long-standing ties with Fiji’s news media executives helped to build some trust 
and confidence. Despite some initial reservations, all the major media companies willingly 
participated in the questionnaire survey. Senior executives, editors and journalists from all the 
major news media organisations took part in the in-depth interviews. After securing the full 
cooperation of the media companies, the next big hurdle was getting individual journalists to 
complete the questionnaires. In some instances, the recovery of completed forms went without 
problem. In others, the process proved to be more difficult. Journalists in some media organisations 
did not fully complete the forms. All journalists at one organisation chose not to fill in the section 
on ethnicity and gender because as a group they decided these sections were irrelevant. Nor did they 
sign the forms, being concerned about confidentiality. The researcher had to return to this media 
organisation to convince the respondents again of the necessity for having these sections filled and 
redistributed and re-collected the forms.  
 
Similar mopping up was required at some other media organisations: several return visits were paid to 
media companies and personal approaches made to individual journalists. The researcher, while 
organising the survey, had requested that participating organisations nominate an employee to liaise 
between the researcher and the survey participants. These nominees were useful in helping recover 
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the questionnaires. Some of the researcher’s former University of the South Pacific journalism 
students working at media companies were also enlisted to assist with distribution and recovery of 
questionnaires, so that the recovery process was able to continue after the researcher’s return to 
Brisbane. This type of pre-planning and the persistent follow-ups were invaluable in securing an 
improvement in the questionnaire return rate. In all, 10 news organisations with 114 eligible 
journalists were surveyed for a response rate of 63 per cent (72 returnees). This is a fairly good 
outcome in a region associated with historically low responses (Robie, 2003a) and if the difficult 
political climate in Fiji is accounted for. The rate is comparable with similar surveys in the Pacific: 
Layton’s (1993, 1995) survey analysing press freedom in eight selected Pacific Island nations had a 
response of rate of 60 per cent for 300 forms distributed to 47 organisations; and Robie’s (2003a) 
survey of 13 news organisations in Fiji and Papua New Guinea in April–May 2001 recorded a 
response rate of 60.7 per cent for the distribution of 152 questionnaires.  
 
The researcher was deep into the second phase of his fieldwork when a video showing local police 
and prison officers beating recaptured prison escapees was released on YouTube 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GgdrQ0j-rSI). The video was seen worldwide and painted the 
ruling establishment in an extremely poor light (Lagan, 2013; Schwartz, 2013). This did not help 
matters on the ground. Throughout the fieldwork, the researcher, conscious of his vulnerability in 
the unpredictable nature of the situation, was keen to complete the project as quickly as possible.  
 
4.10 Ethical considerations 
 
The study was directed by the University of Queensland’s comprehensive guidelines for ethical 
research (http://www.uq.edu.au/research/rid/human-guidelines). Approval for the study was granted 
by the university’s Behavioural and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee (BSSERC).  
Additional guidance was provided by the literature on the ethics of research. Resnik’s (2011) 
articulation of the need for researchers to adhere to ethical norms is useful. First, norms promote the 
aims of research, such as knowledge, truth, and avoidance of error. Second, they help to ensure 
accountability. Third, the norms promote important values, not least those of social responsibility, 
human rights, animal welfare, compliance with the law, and health and safety.  For this researcher, 
personal bias was a major consideration since this study was home-based. Having been born and 
lived in Fiji, he was challenged to keep a safe distance from the events and issues being researched, 
more so when he would have been influenced and affected by them. Moreover, the research was on 
media and journalism, a field he had worked in since 1988, starting as a cadet reporter before 
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becoming a senior journalist and editor and later an academic. He was dealing with people he knew 
at both personal and professional levels. This inside knowledge was both an advantage and a 
disadvantage: it facilitated his access to people, places and information. But it also made him 
vulnerable to prejudices borne out of years of personal and professional observations and 
experiences. These could lead to the reinforcement of preconceived notions and ideas that could be 
difficult to eradicate. Having held positions as both reporter and editor with two major Fiji 
newspapers and news magazines made the researcher well aware of the commercial, cultural and 
deadline pressures faced by the media and how this affects journalists’ work. In the face of this 
background, it was all the more important to maintain as balanced and open a mind about the 
subject matter as possible.  
 
Towards this end, a set of guidelines proposed by Rubenstein (2011) served as a useful reminder. 
The guidelines recommend:  
 
• Distancing yourself: Seeing yourself as an observer of the situation rather than an active 
participant. 
• Thinking logically, not emotionally: If you cannot dissociate yourself from the situation, 
then take a more dispassionate approach (i.e. facts/figures). 
• Thinking of the reasons: Consider all motives and explanations behind actions; look at 
things from all sides. 
• Realising that you may be wrong: Be aware that emotions can cloud judgments. 
 
Also critical was the confidentiality of participants. This central research ethic is even more 
significant where the military are in control, as in contemporary Fiji, where the possibility of 
retributive actions against people who speak against the ruling establishment needs to be seriously 
considered. Most interviewees signed a Consent Form that gave background information about the 
project and explained the methods used to maintain confidentiality and the security of the data once 
collected and stored. Some interviewees were reluctant to put their signatures on formal research 
consent forms. They were asked to give oral consent. This was taped on a digital recorder. By 
signing the consent forms, the interviewees indicated that they understood the nature of the research 
and their role in it as voluntary respondents. The respondents were given the option of withdrawing 
from the interview at any time they wished, without prejudice. Only one interviewee, a civil 
servant, withdrew her statement some weeks after having participated in the interview. A former 
journalism student the researcher had taught, she requested that her interview be withdrawn after 
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learning from her supervisor that it was a condition of her employment to gain prior permission 
before participating in such interviews. Based on this interviewee’s request, her participation was 
duly withdrawn.  
 
4.11 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has outlined the four research methods used to collect data for this thesis – content 
analysis, questionnaire survey, document research and in-depth interviews. A mixed-mode research 
method based on ‘pragmatism’ was chosen as the most appropriate since the research is essentially 
about understanding human motives and behaviour. Through this strategy, this research seeks to fill 
certain gaps in the literature, such as the apparent disconnect between content creation and the 
media landscape. The adopted strategy was deemed necessary to realise the core aims of this 
research – to understand a phenomenon and provide possible solutions. 
 
 Another core aim of this research was the creation of new knowledge. Toward this end, the 
development of a peace journalism–inspired coding category specifically for Fiji is unique. The 
application of this framework to a non-violent conflict such as a national election is also rare. The 
chapter outlined the procedures involved in the development of the survey questionnaire, which 
drew from local, regional and global themes in order to address a decade long gap in the literature 
since Robie’s survey (2003a).Document research is used to map media ownership patterns and 
trends in media legislation since independence in 1970. In-depth interviews with journalists 
highlight the impact of the legislation and other variables in everyday work. The chapter recounts 
the advanced preparations needed for operating in a restrictive political environment such as Fiji to 
minimise difficulties in the field.  
 
The next chapter outlines the results obtained from the fieldwork.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – RESEARCH RESULTS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter outlined the methodology employed to address this project’s research 
questions. This chapter deals with the application of the four research methods and the subsequent 
findings. The chapter first presents the results of the content analysis undertaken to gauge coverage 
of Fiji’s 2006 general elections and then it presents the results of the questionnaire survey, 
undertaken to assess diversity and professional capacity in Fiji’s national media corps. This is 
followed by the presentation of the analysis of documents relating to the genealogy of media 
legislation and media ownership in Fiji. Finally, the chapter presents the outcome of the in-depth 
interviews, undertaken to gain deeper insights into the research questions and the other issues being 
explored.  
 
5.2 Content analysis results  
 
Overview 
The content analysis was based on a peace journalism rubric modified for this specific study. It was 
used to address Research Question One: Are the Fiji print media inflammatory, as is often alleged? 
The sample consisted of 350 election-related news stories published in the 10 days prior to the 
polling dates (6–13 May 2006). As Figure 1 shows, 145 (41 per cent) were produced by the Fiji 
Sun; 105 (30 per cent) by the Fiji Daily Post; and 100 (29 per cent) by the Fiji Times. Overall, the 
peace journalism frame was dominant for 243 (69 per cent) articles, followed by the war journalism 
frame for 59 articles (17 per cent). The neutral frame best fit 48 articles (14 per cent). 
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Each of the 10 indicators produced different outcomes – four returned a peace journalism reading, 
three returned a war journalism reading, and three returned a neutral reading. The most salient 
peace journalism indicators were partisanship, consociation–majoritarianism, language and 
opinion. This result indicated that on the whole, the articles were not overtly biased towards one 
side, gave space to moderate views, used temperate language and were devoid of the reporter’s 
opinion. The most salient war journalism indicators were orientation, sources and context. This 
indicated the prevalence of single-source, elite-orientated stories that lacked depth. The indicators 
of ethnicity-religion, fearmongering and dichotomy produced neutral readings. The three 
newspapers differed also in their coverage (see Figure 2). The Fiji Sun contributed the greatest 
number of peace journalism-oriented stories to the overall total of 243, with 99 articles (41 per 
cent). This was followed by the Fiji Times with 73 stories (30 per cent) and the Fiji Daily Post with 
71 stories (29 per cent).  
 
 
 
Proportionately, the Fiji Times showed the strongest peace journalism leaning, with 73 per cent out 
of its 100 published items. The Fiji Sun and the Fiji Daily Post were equal second with 68 per cent 
of their respective totals.  
In the next section we look at each of the 10 indicators in more detail.  
 
Orientation (WJ) 
Orientation (see Figure 3), which sought to establish whether the stories were elite or people 
focused in their choice of news sources, returned a predominantly war journalism frame, with 252 
articles (72 per cent). This was followed by 71 articles (20 per cent), with a neutral frame. Only 27 
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articles (eight per cent) returned a peace journalism frame. Overall, the results show a heavy 
reliance on elite sources over ordinary people.  
 
Some examples of the elite sources who dominated print media space over the 10 days of election 
coverage analysis included: Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase; military commander, Commodore 
Frank Bainimarama; Fiji Labour Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry; and Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua party candidate Dr Tupeni Baba. Others included bureaucrats like Police 
Commissioner Andrew Hughes; Supervisor of Elections Semesa Karavaki; Finance Minister Jone 
Kubuabola; and Reserve Bank Governor Savenaca Narube. Chairman of the Commonwealth 
Observer Group KD Knight also received prominent coverage. It should be pointed out that the 
neutral stories mostly emanated from the bureaucracy and featured expert sources providing 
specialist, election-related information. The journalists did not have the option of sourcing such 
technical information from non-elite informants. Such stories were informational in nature, even 
though they were sourced from the bureaucracy. Consequently, these stories were framed as neutral 
rather than war journalism.  
 
Sources (WJ) 
Sources aimed to determine the extent to which media used single or multiple informants in stories 
(see Figure 4). This indicator also recorded a predominantly war journalism frame with 246 articles 
(70 per cent). This was followed by a peace journalism frame with 64 articles (18 per cent), and a 
neutral frame with 40 articles (12 per cent). An example of a single-source story in the Fiji Times 
on May 3 involved an academic accusing the electoral office of breaching the electoral act, with no 
comments from the electoral office or from other relevant parties. 
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Context (WJ) 
Context (see Figure 5) aimed to determine the number of stories with or without sufficient 
background information.  
 
This indicator returned a war journalism frame, with 239 stories (68 per cent). Such stories showed 
a strong emphasis on the present, with insufficient background. This was followed by 84 stories (24 
per cent) with a peace journalism frame. Such stories were deemed to contain sufficient contextual 
information. Twenty-seven stories (eight per cent) were deemed neutral. Generally, such stories 
were informational in nature. They did not require much background. An example of a story with 
insufficient context appeared in the Fiji Sun on May 2 headlined, “Military gears for election”. The 
five-paragraph story mentioned that a battalion was conducting a three-day exercise with battle 
drills and other tactical moves, using explosives and blank ammunition. There was no context 
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given, even though the backdrop to the story was increased tensions between the government and 
the military, and the drills seemed somewhat heavy-handed for an election. 
 
Partisanship (PJ) 
Partisanship (see Figure 6) assessed the prevalence of journalist bias and one-sidedness in news 
stories. Given the strong war journalism reading for sources, it is somewhat surprising that 
partisanship returned a peace journalism frame, with 246 stories (70 per cent). Only 22 stories (six 
per cent) were categorised as war journalism, while 82 stories (24 per cent) were categorised as 
neutral. The results indicate that for the most part, the stories did not show an overt journalist bias 
for any one party. 
 
Consociationalism-majoritarianism (PJ) 
Consociationalism refers to multi-ethnic cooperation and power-sharing (peace journalism), 
whereas majoritarianism embodies a two-party, win–lose contest (war journalism), in both the 
political and community senses. This indicator (see Figure 7) returned a peace journalism frame 
with 266 stories (76 per cent). Articles in this mould emphasised political cooperation and social 
cohesion. The war journalism frame constituted 29 stories (eight per cent). Such stories were 
characterised by a one-sided focus on the two major competing parties and the propagation of 
divisive messages without balancing comments. In all, 55 stories (16 per cent) were categorised as 
neutral. An example of consociation and multi-party focus was a Fiji Daily Post story published on 
May 3 headlined, “Leaders smoke the peace pipe”. The story was about the front-runners for the 
post of prime minister giving a rare undertaking to honour the Fiji Constitution and to work 
together if they qualified to form government after the election.  
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Language (PJ) 
Language determined the prevalence of victimising, demonising or emotional words in news 
stories, as opposed to rational and empowering words. Considering that an election campaign was 
underway, some intense political exchanges were normal and inevitable. They are accounted for in 
this analysis. In other words, reporting inflammatory comments was not war journalism per se, but 
merely reproducing and propagating such discourse without balancing comments was deemed war 
journalism. Even in the heat of elections, this indicator (see Figure 8), somewhat surprisingly, 
returned a peace journalism frame, with 298 stories (85 per cent). This was followed by a neutral 
frame with 32 stories (nine per cent) and a war journalism frame with 20 stories (six per cent). An 
example of war journalism language appeared in the Fiji Daily Post on May 3, in which Fiji Labour 
Party candidate Lekh Ram Vaishnoi claimed that the rival National Federation Party candidates 
were backstabbers and sellouts, with no refutations. However, the results indicate that journalists 
avoided the use of strong language, except in a small number of cases.  
 
	   103	  
Ethnicity-Religion (N) 
Ethnicity and religion as an indicator (see Figure 9) aimed to determine the prevalence of undue 
references to these variables in news stories. This indicator returned a high number of neutral 
articles at 278 (79 per cent). Many such articles dealt with the election’s logistical or operational 
matters. The nature of these articles was such that the issues of race and/or religion did not arise. 
This was followed by a peace journalism frame with 59 articles out of 350 (17 per cent). Such 
articles were deemed to have addressed issues dealing with race and/or religion in an even-handed 
manner. If controversial or divisive views were published, they were balanced with opposing views. 
For instance, comments by prime minister Qarase that Fiji’s prime minister must be indigenous 
Fijian would be deemed an unwarranted reference to ethnicity. However, the media also sought 
opposing views. The May 2 edition of the Fiji Daily Post reported that  “anyone can fill PM’s 
post”, regardless of ethnicity. The war journalism frame accounted for just 13 articles (four per 
cent). Stories of this persuasion contained undue and/or unbalanced references to ethnicity/religion. 
Such stories were rare. The results indicate that race and religion were not major preoccupations for 
most election candidates and subsequently, the media.  
 
  
Opinion (PJ) 
Opinion (see Figure 10), which measures the level of journalists’ personal views in news stories, 
returned a strong peace journalism frame, with 317 stories (91per cent). This shows that journalists’ 
personal views were indiscernible in most stories. The war journalism frame constituted 13 stories 
(four per cent). There were 20 neutral stories (five per cent), largely dealing with announcements 
and operational matters regarding the elections, such as a Fiji Employers’ Federation statement 
urging members to take time off work to vote. The question of journalists’ opinion did not arise in 
such election-related stories, hence the neutral categorisation. 
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Fearmongering (N) 
Fearmongering (see Figure 11) was used to determine whether media were being used as a tool to 
construct fear.  
 
 
A majority of the election-related stories, 226 (65 per cent), returned a neutral frame. Such stories 
dealt with logistical matters regarding the elections, such as the training of polling officers. The 
peace journalism frame accorded with 90 stories (26 per cent).  Articles in this mould were deemed 
to have handled potentially volatile issues in an even-handed manner by, among other things, 
seeking a multiplicity of views. War journalism stories totalled 34 (nine per cent). Such stories did 
not demonstrate fairness or sensitivity when dealing with controversial or volatile subjects. An 
example of fearmongering was a Fiji Daily Post article on May 2 with a bold, page one headline 
with exclamation marks that read: “Psst! Watch it Frank!” The story stated that Prime Minister 
Qarase had vowed a “permanent solution” to the standoff with the military and by implication, its 
commander, Commodore Frank Bainimarama. The headline and the tone of the story gave the 
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impression of an imminent confrontation, which could be deemed provocative and sensationalist 
according to peace journalism protocols. On the whole, results indicate that media stories did not, 
except in a small number of cases, contribute unduly to the creation of fear. 
 
Dichotomy (N) 
The last of the 10 indicators, dichotomy (see Figure 12), aimed to determine the extent to which 
media put people or groups in ‘good–bad’ or ‘victim–villain’ compartments.  
 
This indicator returned a high neutral frame, with 275 stories (79 per cent). Such stories could not 
be coded as peace or war journalism as they focused largely on logistical or operational issues. This 
was followed by a war journalism frame with 43 stories (12 per cent). Stories in this frame portrayed 
one individual or group as good, the other as bad, often based on unverified or exaggerated claims. A 
good example is a Fiji Sun article on May 5 in which nationalist politician Iliesa Duvuloco claimed 
that the Agricultural and Landlord Tenants Act had denied indigenous landowners a fair rent. 
Furthermore, Duvuloco declared that Indo-Fijians supported the land act as they wanted to perpetuate 
an illegal, unfair and unjust act against indigenous Fijians. This article fit the label of ‘good–bad’ or 
‘victim–villain’ compartmentalisation. The 32 stories (nine per cent) in the peace journalism frame 
avoided the ‘good–bad’ dichotomy trap. 
 
Synopsis of content analysis 
In summary, the overall content analysis results show a peace journalism reading. Based on that, the 
answer to Research Question One – are the Fiji print media inflammatory as is often alleged? – is 
negative. A fuller and truer account of this finding will emerge only after further data analysis in the 
discussion chapter. In the next section, we lay out the results of the questionnaire survey. 
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5.3 Questionnaire survey results 
 
The questionnaire survey was used to address Research Question Two: What is the level of 
diversity and professional capacity of Fiji’s news media corps?  
 
Overview 
The journalist survey was conducted in August and September 2012. The results have been grouped 
into the following categories: journalists’ age and experience; training and qualifications; gender, 
ethnic and religious background; working conditions and job satisfaction; and professional values. 
The survey also addressed the potential cultural, environmental, organisational, institutional and 
political pressures of the job. One section sought journalists’ views on some of the issues that arose 
from the literature review on Fiji and elsewhere. These included allegations of ethnic bias in the 
media and an apparent fixation on politics, elite sources and conflict. 
 
Where appropriate, the results are briefly compared with similar surveys carried out in Fiji and 
abroad, although the full analysis and discussions proper are presented in Chapter 6. The major 
basis for benchmarking is Robie’s (2003a) similar Fiji–PNG comparative study conducted in 2001. 
This gives an indication of the changes Fiji’s media sector has undergone in the intervening decade 
or so. Another key basis for comparison is Weaver and Willnat’s (2012) global journalist survey.  
 
Scope of survey 
Table 4 shows that the survey covered 10 news media companies and 114 eligible journalists, 
including full-time journalists working in daily newspapers, monthly magazines, and broadcast and 
online media. Eligible editorial staff numbers ranged from 38 at the 145-year-old Fiji Times to one 
at Repúblika, a Suva-based monthly news magazine launched in September 2012 – the same month 
that this survey was undertaken.  In all, 72 out of 114 possible respondents, from 9 of the 10 
companies, returned completed questionnaires, yielding a return rate of 63 per cent (cf. Robie’s 60 
per cent for his Fiji survey, p. 330). Only The Jet, a monthly community newspaper based in Nadi, 
western Fiji, failed to reply. All of Fiji’s five major news media companies responded, namely: Fiji 
Times, (including journalists from the Fijian and Hindi vernacular weeklies, Nai Lalakai and Shanti 
Dut); Fiji Sun; Fiji Broadcasting Commission (FBC); Communications Fiji Limited (CFM); and 
Fiji Television Limited (Fiji TV). The response rate from four of the five major news organisations 
was above 50 per cent. The highest response was from Fijilive at 100 per cent, followed by CFM at 
93 per cent.  
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Robie’s survey included seven Fiji news media companies. The common companies surveyed by 
this research and his are Associated Media Group (Fijilive); CFM; FBC; Fiji TV; and the Fiji Sun. 
The Fiji Times, at the time country’s largest news media sector employer, did not take part in 
Robie’s survey, which also included six Papua New Guinea news organisations. 
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Newsroom positions and media platforms  
Table 5 looks at the newsroom positions held by journalists. It shows that the majority of the 
respondents, 61 per cent, identified themselves as reporters. This is typical since reporters normally 
make up the bulk of the journalist corps. Newsroom leaders made up 35 per cent of the sample. Of this, 
22 per cent identified as editors or section editors and 13 per cent identified as news editors, chief-of-staff 
and the like.  
 
 
Table 6 gives a breakdown of the media platforms journalists work in. It indicates that the 
traditional platforms – print and broadcast – still dominate, although the online medium is gradually 
gaining ground. Slightly more than half the respondents identified as print journalists. Behind them, radio 
journalists stood at 20 per cent and television journalists at 14 per cent. A further 11 per cent worked across 
multi-platforms, while three per cent worked specifically as online media journalists. In Robie’s Fiji survey, 
print journalists also headed the list, although to a lesser extent (44 per cent), followed by television 
journalists (12 per cent), radio (seven per cent) and online journalists (two per cent) (pp. 329–331).  
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Journalist age, experience and qualifications 
Table 7 shows journalists’ age groups. The mean age is 31 and the median age is 30. However, the 
largest cohort, 27 per cent, is found in the 20–25 age group. In addition, more than 50 percent of the 
respondents are aged below 30, with only 27 per cent above the age of 35. 
 
Robie’s Fiji survey recorded a younger mean age of 24.7 years (p. 332). The mean age in the 
present survey has climbed by almost six years in the intervening decade. Weaver and Willnat’s 
global survey shows that journalism tends to be a young person’s occupation, but even then, Fiji’s 
journalists’ mean age is still lower than the global mean of 32 in the youngest categories (Weaver & 
Willnat, 2012). In neighbouring Australia, the average age was 37 years (Hanusch, 2013).  
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Table 8 details journalists’ work experience. The mean work experience is seven years and the 
median work experience is six years. This shows an important improvement over Robie’s finding of 
3.5 years a decade earlier (p. 337). However, a significant 54.5 per cent of journalists still had less than 
six years experience. The largest cohort, 31.8 percent, only had zero to three years experience, followed by 
22.7 per cent with three to six years experience. Only 12.1 per cent had more than 15 years experience, 
followed by three percent (two journalists) with over 21 years experience. 
 
 
Table 9 indicates journalists’ academic qualifications, with the latest data showing some significant 
gains over the Robie survey. A slight majority, 51 per cent, did not have any tertiary or other forms 
of formal post-secondary qualifications. The remaining 49 per cent had some form of tertiary 
qualification: 18 per cent held diplomas; 17 per cent, degrees; 11 per cent, certificates; and three per 
cent, postgraduate qualifications.  
 
This result is an improvement over Robie’s survey, which found just 26 per cent of Fiji journalists 
with some form of prescribed academic, polytechnic or industry certificate (p. 338). Whereas the 
present survey found two postgraduate degree holders, Robie’s survey included none.  
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Ethnicity, language and religious affiliation 
Table 10 displays the ethnic breakdown of Fiji’s national journalist corps, showing that the largest 
group represented in the survey is indigenous Fijian journalists at 49 per cent, followed by Indo-
Fijians at 30 per cent and other ethnicities at 10 per cent. Robie’s newsroom survey had found an 
even split between indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian journalists at 42 per cent, with the other races 
making up the balance (p. 334). The latest findings on the ethnic composition of Fiji’s journalist 
corps reflect Fiji’s changing demography as a whole, with indigenous Fijians now the dominant 
ethnic group in the country at 56.8 per cent (Bureau of Statistics, 2007). 
 
 
Table 11 reports journalists’ first language. It shows that Fijian is the mother tongue of most 
journalists in the sample (44 per cent), followed by Fiji Hindi (30 per cent) and English (25 per 
cent) following. These findings are consistent with the ethnic make-up of Fiji’s journalist corps, 
which is dominated by indigenous Fijians. Robie’s survey also found a prevalence of Fijian 
language speakers at 40 per cent, followed by Hindi speakers at 37 per cent and English speakers at 
19 per cent (p. 334).  
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Table 12 sets out the language of work, showing that while English was not the native tongue of 
most respondents, for the vast majority of them it was the language of work. In all, 76 per cent of 
the respondents gave English as their sole language of work, followed by 11 per cent giving both 
English and Hindi and another 11 per cent giving both English and Fijian. Two per cent (one 
person) worked across all three languages.  
 
 
Table 13 covers journalists’ religious affiliation. It shows that Christian journalists are in the 
majority at 59 per cent, followed by Hindus at 17 per cent and Muslims and ‘Others’ at three per 
cent each. Virtually all indigenous Fijian journalists are Christians and virtually all Indo-Fijian 
journalists are either Hindu or Muslim. The religious breakdown of journalists is roughly 
representative of the country’s religious character as a whole, with Christians making up 64.5 per 
cent of the population, Hindus 27.9 per cent and Muslims 6.3 per cent (Bureau of Statistics, 2007).  
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Gender balance  
Gender proportionality, seen as an important component of newsroom diversity in Fiji, the Pacific 
and elsewhere, is displayed in Table 14 (Nichol, 2006; Usman, 2012). The figures show that male 
journalists outnumber females by 56 per cent to 44, a difference of eight percentage points. Robie’s 
survey had recorded a more even balance – 51 per cent male, 49 per cent female (pp. 317–339).  
 
 
Table 15 looks at the gender breakdown in newsrooms with regard to journalists’ editorial positions 
and responsibilities. The results indicate that 22 per cent of males held managerial positions (editor, 
chief-of-staff, etc.) compared to 13 per cent of females. The genders were more fairly represented in 
the more junior news reporter positions, with females at 31 per cent and males at 34 per cent.  
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The typical Fijian journalist 
As Table 16 shows, the typical Fiji journalist is an ethnic Fijian male, aged below 30, Christian by 
faith, with less than six years of experience, trained on the job and likely to have no university 
qualifications. 
 
 
Satisfaction with career progression and remuneration 
Table 17 displays journalists’ job satisfaction levels, a variable often associated with journalistic 
standards. The results show that most journalists, 61 per cent, were satisfied with their career 
progression and general working conditions, though 17 per cent were not satisfied, eight per cent 
were unsure and 14 per cent declined to comment.  
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Table 18 addresses journalists’ salaries, another variable deemed to have an impact on journalistic 
standards. As the results show, most respondents, 39 per cent, felt they were fairly rewarded. 
However, a fairly significant, and not greatly lower, 34 per cent answered in the negative, while 10 
per cent were unsure. Seventeen per cent preferred not to say.  
 
 
Views on training, standards, grasp of professional codes and public view of media  
The questionnaire sought respondents’ views about the best mix of training strategies for future 
journalists. Table 19 shows that the majority, 68 per cent, favoured university education combined 
with cadetships. Second preference was for on-the-job training on its own, favoured by a reasonably 
high 21 per cent. University education on its own was favoured by only six per cent. In Robie’s Fiji 
survey, 54 per cent preferred a combination of university education and cadetships while nine per 
cent favoured on the job training (p. 341). 
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Table 20 tabulates respondents’ ratings on the standard of journalism in Fiji, a question asked to 
gauge their self-confidence and overall faith in the media industry. The results show that most 
journalists, 46 per cent, rate the standard of journalism in Fiji as ‘good’, while slightly less, 44 per 
cent, rate it as ‘average’. Four per cent rate the standards as ‘low’ whereas three per cent rate it as 
‘excellent’. This suggests that most journalists believe they are doing an adequate or better job.  
 
 
Asked to rate journalists’ understanding and application of media law and ethics – a crucial issue 
since the promulgation of the punitive 2010 Media Decree – respondents produced the range of 
responses, shown in Table 21. 
 
These results show that 47 per cent believe that journalists’ grasp of media law and ethics is 
‘average’, 35 per cent believe it is ‘good’, while six per cent feel it is ‘excellent’. Another six per 
cent gave a ‘low’ rating. Journalists’ perceptions of how the public views media are reflected in 
Table 22. The aim is to get a measure of journalists’ awareness of, and sensitivity to, public 
perceptions about their work.  
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Table 22 shows that most respondents, 46 per cent, thought the public regarded the media’s 
performance as ‘good’, followed by 34 per cent who gave an ‘average’ rating. Six percent thought 
the public had a ‘low’ perception of the media. The results suggest that a majority of Fiji journalists 
– 81 per cent – feel the public has a fairly positive or neutral opinion about the media. Only six per 
cent believe the public has an unfavourable view, while 13 per cent were unsure.  
 
 
Journalist perceptions of media owner and advertiser pressure on the news process  
Table 23 presents the distribution of responses to the attempt to garner journalists’ perceptions, as 
insiders, about the level of media owner influence on news. As the results show, 87 per cent of the 
respondents alluded to varying degrees of owner influence on the news process. As many as two-thirds, 67 
per cent, felt that there was ‘some’, or ‘a fair amount’ of influence. A further19 per cent stated that there was 
‘a great deal’ of owner influence, followed by 14 per cent, who said ‘none at all’. Depending on the 
reliability of the results, one would suspect that attempts by media owners to affect the news process are 
fairly prevalent. To get a more clear understanding, this issue is explored further in the in-depth interviews 
later in this chapter.  
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Table 24 reports respondents’ views about the level of advertiser influence on the news process. 
The results indicate that 87 per cent of the respondents feel that advertisers have varying degrees of 
influence on the news process. The majority, 68 per cent, stated that there was either ‘some’ or a 
‘fair amount’ of advertiser influence. This was followed by 19 per cent who stated there was a 
‘great deal’ of influence. Thirteen per cent indicated that there was no advertiser influence on the 
news at all. If the respondents’ perceptions are anything to go by, attempts by advertisers to 
influence the news could be fairly prevalent. 
 
 
Effect of journalists’ political beliefs, ethnicity and religion on their work 
Apart from commercial pressures, respondents were questioned about the political and social 
pressures that they might be facing, starting with a question about any political ties or affiliations 
that they might have. As Table 25 shows, a highly significant 97 per cent denied any political 
affiliation, as opposed to three per cent who admitted to it.  
 
 
This is a rather one-sided result, notwithstanding the fact that in Fiji’s present political context, not 
every respondent can be expected to be open and free about declaring any political affiliation they 
might have. Further probing about whether their political beliefs affected their journalism revealed 
that the majority, 79 per cent, were of the opinion that their political views do not affect their work 
(Table 26).  
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However, 20 per cent admitted that their political beliefs do influence their work to some extent, 
while one per cent (one person) accepted ‘a great deal’ of effect as a reasonable description. In other 
words, while a majority of journalists feel that their work is virtually unaffected by their political 
beliefs, up to one fifth admitted to some effect.  
In Fiji, ethnicity and religion are strong rallying points for group solidarity (Sutherland, 1992). 
Respondents were asked to what extent, if at all, their religious and ethnic backgrounds might 
prejudice their work. Table 27 shows that the majority, around two-thirds or 66 per cent, stated that 
their work was not affected by their religious or ethnic background. 
 
The remaining one-third, 33 per cent, claimed ‘some or a fair amount’ of effect and a minimal one 
per cent admitted a ‘great deal of effect’. These results appear, to some extent at least, belie claims 
of ethnic and religious bias in Fiji’s print media. 
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On the risk of violent conflict in Fiji, alleged media fixation on conflict, neglect of positive 
developments and training in conflict prevention  
This section presents responses on various issues regarding conflict reporting, starting with opinions 
about the risk of violent conflict in Fiji. As Table 28 shows, three-quarters of the respondents (76 
per cent) considered the risk to be ‘low’ to ‘moderate’. 
 
However, 13 per cent felt there is ‘no risk’, and four per cent felt Fiji is at ‘high risk’. These results 
suggest that Fiji journalists are fairly conscious of some level of risk of violent conflict erupting in 
the country, though they differ widely in their assessment of its severity.  
 
The next question concerned contemporary debates in conflict reporting, such as an allegedly 
disproportionate media focus on conflict, sensation and scandal (Lynch & Galtung, 2010). Fiji 
journalists are split fairly evenly over the issue (Table 29). 
 
A majority, 47 per cent, ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ with the notion. But a significant 43 per 
cent ‘agree’, while 10 per cent were ‘undecided’.  
	  
 
	   121	  
Asked to comment on allegations that journalists aggravate racial and political tensions by how they 
report conflict, most respondents, 47 per cent, ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ with the proposition 
(Table 30). 
 
	  
A significant 39 per cent, though, ‘agree or strongly agree’, while 14 per cent were ‘undecided’. 
These results indicate a fairly substantial split in the opinions of the national journalist corps over 
this matter.  
 
In Fiji, ethnicity and politics are often at the centre of conflict. Journalists were given an 
opportunity to respond to claims that they have misreported these issues (see C. Gounder, 2006). As 
Table 31 demonstrates, a majority of the respondents hold a favourable view of media coverage of 
ethnicity, politics and conflict. 
 
 
A significant 87 per cent felt that coverage was either ‘excellent’ or ‘good or fair’. Six per cent 
rated the quality of coverage as ‘low’, while seven per cent did not know. The results indicate a 
high level of satisfaction with conflict reporting within the national media corps.  
	  
	   122	  
Respondents were asked to comment on the claim that elite sources such as politicians and other 
prominent people get more than their fair share of media coverage. Division over this issue is 
evident in Table 32. 
 
A majority, 63 per cent, ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that elite sources get too much coverage. But 
a significant 34 per cent ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’. Three per cent were undecided. A 
related question investigated respondents’ sense of Fiji’s so-called ‘culture of silence’, in which 
elders, traditional chiefs, politicians  and other authority figures are said to be above criticism (see 
Madraiwiwi, 2014). A direct question asked whether politicians and traditional leaders should be 
subject to the same level of criticism as ordinary people.  
 
Table 33 shows that the majority, 86 per cent, ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that elites and non-elites 
should receive equal amounts of criticism. 
 
However, 11 per cent ‘disagreed or strongly disagreed’ while three per cent were ‘undecided’. If the 
results are anything to go by, the ‘culture of silence’ notion among the journalist corps is somewhat 
discounted, at least in theory. This result will be triangulated with the content analysis and in-depth 
interviews in chapter 6 for further verification.  
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Respondents were asked about another alleged mainstream media characteristic with regard to 
conflict reporting – the neglect of positive developments (Lynch & Galtung, 2010). Table 34 shows 
that an overwhelming majority, 81 per cent, ‘disagree or strongly disagree’ that media ignore 
positive developments. 
 
Ten per cent ‘agree or strongly agree’ while eight per cent are ‘undecided’. This indicates a rather 
strong belief among the Fiji journalist corps that media give positive developments a fair amount of 
exposure.  
 
Still on the subject of conflict reporting, respondents were asked whether Fiji journalists should 
receive training in conflict prevention, given the country’s history of coups. The intention was to 
gauge journalists’ receptivity towards alternative frameworks in conflict reporting. Table 35 shows 
that a significant 79 per cent ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the proposition. 
 
That only one-fifth of the sample disagreed or were undecided suggests that most Fiji journalists are 
fairly open to the idea of basic training in conflict theory, even if in the earlier question, most of 
them were happy with how the Fiji media report conflict. Respondents’ views were also sought 
about ongoing debates regarding some traditional media values, such as objectivity, in relation to 
conflict reporting (see Lynch & Galtung, 2010).  
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To start with, respondents were asked whether media objectivity was a realistic and obtainable goal. 
Table 36 shows that an overwhelming 91 per cent ‘agree or strongly agree’ that the goal of media 
objectivity is both realistic and obtainable. 
 
Only six per cent ‘disagree or strongly disagree’ while three per cent were ‘undecided’. These 
results reaffirm the apparent dominance of some conventional news media values within the Fiji 
media corps, at least theoretically or in the mind.  
 
Further probing about media objectivity in terms of whether it was the best and only way for media 
to serve the public interest elicited the responses displayed in Table 37. 
 
A significant 84 per cent ‘agree or strongly agree’ that objectivity is the best and only way to serve 
the public interest, another affirmation of the strong belief in media objectivity among most Fiji 
journalists. Only 13 per cent ‘disagree or strongly disagree’ and three per cent were ‘undecided’. 
 
In the final question in this section, the objectivity issue was rephrased. Respondents were asked 
whether the promotion of peace and social cohesion should supersede media objectivity if 
necessary. Table 38 shows that most respondents, 45 per cent, ‘agree or strongly agree’ that social 
cohesion should supersede media objectivity if it ever comes to that. 
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But 42 per cent ‘disagree or strongly disagree’ while 13 per cent were ‘undecided’. The results 
indicate a fairly significant split in the Fiji journalist corps over this issue. A similar division exists 
within the wider journalistic community regarding media objectivity and conflict reporting 
frameworks like peace journalism (see Obijiofor & Hanusch, 2011). 
 
Synopsis of the questionnaire survey 
The questionnaire survey was used to address Research Question Two: What is the level of 
diversity and professional capacity of Fiji’s news media corps? The survey also covered other areas 
in relation to conflict reporting, such as commercial, social and political pressures on journalists. 
The results show some progress in the areas of training and development and some evidence of 
external and internal pressure on the news process.  
 
In the next section, we look at the problem from a third perspective – the legislative environment 
concerning media. 
5.4 Document Research – legislative environment  
 
This section applied document review to address Research Question Three: What is the genealogy 
and nature of media legislation in Fiji?  
 
Overview 
Most attention has been focussed on the Bainimarama Government and the punitive 2010 Media 
Decree. This research, in line with its overall approach, broaches the question through a constructivist 
paradigm, which looks at trends and processes rather than events and individuals. The idea is to study 
the genealogy and nature of media legislation to understand how the legislation arrived at its current 
point. The methodology is largely guided by Frohardt and Temin’s (2003) conflict reporting framework, 
which considers three key variables: a) the history of past legislation; b) the degree of media freedom 
established in the country’s laws; and c) the extent to which the laws are enforced. The first element is 
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normally an indicator of future trends in legislation. The second element could control or cultivate 
media abuse by defining the space within which media are allowed to operate, as also does the third 
element.  
 
History of past legislation  
Let us start with Fiji’s first constitution (commonly known as the King Cakobau Constitution), 
which contained a set of human rights principles modelled on the French and American 
constitutions. It was designed by Charles James Herbert de Courcy St Julian (1819–1874), a 
journalist who served as Fiji’s first Chief Justice and Chancellor of the Kingdom of Fiji in 1872 (S. 
Shameem, 2011).  
 
Once Fiji became a colony in 1874, it came under the constitutional laws of England, including the 
Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights of 1688, which applied to all the colonies (S. Shameem, 2011). The 
British laws enshrined freedom of expression, notwithstanding certain caveats to protect the national 
interest, particularly during the two world wars (Cryle, 2004). Wartime censorship and other restrictions 
were vigorously opposed by the Empire/Commonwealth Press Union, conceived in 1909 as a 
mouthpiece and forum for British-language newspapers throughout the Empire. Fiji was on the agenda 
of the Union’s postwar conference at London in 1946 in relation to censorship of cable news (Cryle, 
2004). Following independence in 1970, Fiji’s legal system continued to be modelled essentially on 
that of Britain, with some recognition given to customary laws, particularly in the area of land 
ownership. Despite the constitutional guarantee of (and occasional lip service to) freedom of 
speech, virtually all Fiji governments since 1970, whether elected or unelected, have threatened to 
introduce tougher media laws. Sometimes such proposals were in response to embarrassing 
disclosures, at others to stem media’s alleged transgressions (Robie, 2009a, 2009b). 
 
One alleged media indiscretion often used to justify tighter legislation is the ostensible provocation 
of ethnic tensions. Such concerns have persisted since the establishment of the press in Fiji in the 
form of the country’s first newspaper, the Fiji Times, in 1869. The apparent apprehension about 
media’s alleged role in fuelling ethnic tensions, whether real or imagined, has influenced the 
evolution of media legislation in the country, as this research will show. In the 19th and most of the 
20th centuries, it was alleged many times that the Fiji Times, the country’s only newspaper back 
then, was attempting to drive a wedge between indigenous Fijians and Indians in support of a White 
Fiji campaign (Gillion, 1977; Gaunder, 2008; Heartfield, 2002). One letter published in March 1922 
described Indians as “evil smelling” and “treacherous” (Gillion, 1977, p. 81).  
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It prompted then acting Governor Fell to consider legislation to prevent newspapers “promoting 
racial discord” but there was no such legal precedent in the British Empire to allow this (Gillion, 
1977, p.82). In the lead-up to independence in 1970, the then editor of the Fiji Times, Len Usher, 
prompted calls for media control when he criticised indigenous Fijian leader and founding Prime 
Minister Ratu Mara for “lavishing praise” on the Indo-Fijian opposition. Ratu Mara, in turn, 
accused the paper of opposing his efforts to promote ethnic co-operation. Politician K. C. Ramrakha 
warned, “We must strangle this newspaper before it strangles us, and I mean it” (Gaunder, 2008, p. 
257). The question of stronger media legislation took a back seat in the face of two key 
developments – the euphoria over Fiji’s independence in 1970 and the arrival of the country’s 
second newspaper, the Fiji Sun, in 1974 (Gaunder, 2008). The Fiji Sun was jointly owned by the 
Hong Kong-based Sally Aw Sian publishing empire and New Zealand publisher Philip Harkness 
(Robie, 2001, p. 151).  
 
The buoyant post-colonial mood coupled with the harsh realities of competition forced the Fiji 
Times to drop its rhetoric. As the political and economic power of the White establishment 
dwindled, the paper had to re-invent itself from a publication for the elites to one catering for the 
mainstream. This metamorphosis was part of a global paradigm shift in the early 19th century, 
when market imperatives in the US and other countries saw newspapers abandon partisanship and 
embrace the middle ground (Fengler & Ruß-Mohl, 2008, p. 676). In Fiji’s case, the 1970 
Constitution was a catalyst for further changes in the media. Chapter two, section three, of the 
constitution guaranteed the freedom of “conscience, expression, assembly and association”, 
constrained by the respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest (Fiji 
Independence Order 1970 and Constitution of Fiji, 1970, pp. 18–19). These rights were further 
elaborated in section 12(1), which states: 
 
no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression … the freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and 
freedom from interference with his correspondence.  (p. 28) 
 
Other legislation affecting the media was covered under the Penal Code. This included section 66, 
seditious offences, which stated that any person who “prints, publishes, sells, distributes or 
reproduces any seditious publication” was liable to face two years’ imprisonment and/or a $200 fine 
(Laws of Fiji, 1945). Section 136 covered contempt of court, while section 148 covered intention to 
wound religious feelings through written or spoken words (Laws of Fiji, 1945). 
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The media were also bound by the Official Secrets Acts; Public Order Act [Cap. 20]; Defamation 
Act [Cap. 34]; Broadcasting Commission Act [Cap. 105]; the Television Decree 1992; Registration 
of Newspapers Act [Cap. 106]; and Press Corrections Act [Cap. 107]. The last two were repealed 
after the Bainimarama Government introduced the Media Industry Development Decree in June 
2010 (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010). 
 
The 1987 coup, first brush with censorship, and the heady 1990s 
 As the country’s post-independence honeymoon period cooled off, the political climate heated up, 
culminating in the 1987 nationalist coups. This gave media their first brush with censorship, short-
lived as it was (Pareti, 2009). The Fiji Sun reportedly closed rather than publish under self-
censorship restrictions. A new publication, The Fiji Daily Post, began operations in October 1987, 
going on to become the country’s third daily (Robie, 2001). While the military and others who took 
power in 1987 imposed restrictions in the name of preserving order, they used the indigenous Fijian 
vernacular newspaper Nai Lalakai and the Fijian program on the State broadcaster to promote the 
coup ideology, further sowing suspicion between the two major ethnicities (Ewins, 1998). 
 
After the 1987 coups, indigenous political supremacy and chiefly power were entrenched through 
the adoption of the 1990 Constitution (Ewins, 1998). Based on traditionalism, certain sections of the 
new constitution were in conflict with the British heritage of the Fiji press (as was the racially-
imbalanced political system as a whole). Section 13(2) in the 1990 Constitution granted special 
protections to the reputation, dignity and esteem of indigenous institutions and values, putting them 
virtually above scrutiny and/or criticism. Such institutions included the Great Council of Chiefs and 
some other traditional systems and titles (Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of 
Fiji, 1990; also see Ewins, 1998).  
 
Constitutionally and politically, Fiji embraced traditionalism. But economically it adopted free 
market reforms as part of the globalisation agenda (Firth, 2000). This had encouraged further 
opening up of the economy, including the media sector, in the 1980s and 1990s. It was one of the 
most robust periods in the media sector’s evolution. Aside from acting as a trigger for reinvestment 
in existing companies, deregulation spawned a plethora of new media companies in both print and 
commercial broadcast, ending government’s monopoly of the airwaves (Bhagwan-Rolls, 2007). In 
1999, a consortium of local businesses opened a new daily under the same name of the old Fiji Sun. 
This served as a catalyst for the rival Fiji Daily Post to announce a major revamp.  
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The then shareholders – government (44 per cent) and Colonial and the Unit Trust of Fiji (23 per 
cent each) – injected fresh funds to revitalise the ailing paper (Digitaki, 2000). At the time, a 
commentator described the Fiji news media market as “saturated, to the point of overflowing”, with 
three dailies, eight commercial radio stations, three monthly business magazines, one commercial 
TV station and numerous other commercial publications (Digitaki, 2000). The 1990s also marked a 
strengthening shift toward the Internet. Associated Media Limited, the parent company of the now 
non-operational news and business magazine, The Review, was a pioneer in this field, as was 
Communications Fiji Limited (Digitaki, 2000). All these developments were marked by a bigger, 
brasher and bolder journalist corps making new strides into previously uncharted territory, most 
notably investigative journalism. This drove State–media tensions to a new high. 
 
The new monthly publication, The Review, published by Fiji journalist Yashwant Gaundar, exposed 
the National Bank of Fiji collapse, implicating prominent politicians, businesses, and citizens. This 
was Fiji’s biggest banking scandal, with a recorded loss of FJD372 million (S. Reddy, 2010; also 
see Grynberg, Munro & White, 2002). The Review broke an unwritten taboo by exposing Fiji’s first 
political sex scandal, involving then Prime Minister Rabuka and a female journalist. Certain Rabuka 
Government ministers threatened stronger media legislation (Rabuka and the reporter, 1994). Such 
retributive actions are an example of the “backfiring effect” of investigative journalism in Fiji and 
the Pacific. The backfiring effect refers to the tendency for parties revealed in, and antagonised by, 
media exposés to take retaliatory actions against news media writers and publishers (see S. Singh, 
2012, for an article on this issue developed in the context of this present investigation into the media 
legislative environment in Fiji).  
 
Self-regulation, constitutional safeguards and market deregulation   
The Rabuka Government backed down from imposing stronger laws since the country was 
democratising and apparently craved international legitimacy. In order to deal with what it regarded 
as an increasingly belligerent media, government opted for an internationally more palatable plan. 
In 1996 it commissioned the Thomson Foundation of Britain to carry out a study on ‘Future Media 
Legislation and Regulation for the Republic of the Fiji Islands’ (Robie, 2009b). The ensuing report, 
implemented in 1998, stated that the most appropriate system for Fiji media accountability ought to 
be applied by an independent, non-governmental body (Morgan & Thomas, 1996, p. 17). The 
recommendations led to the establishment of British-style self-regulation via a media industry-
funded Fiji Media Council made up equally of media company representatives and the public.  
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A neutral committee would hear complaints lodged against the media and its rulings would be 
published by all news companies. Apart from naming and shaming offenders, the report did not 
stipulate any other forms of punishment. Self-regulation was compatible with Fiji’s newly-adopted, 
1997 Constitution, which was deemed fairer and more equitable than the racially-weighted 1990 
Constitution. The 1997 Constitution’s preamble recognised the “human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” of all groups (Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji Islands, 1997, p. 9).  
 
The media drew their authority from section 30, which stated that, “Every person has the right to 
freedom of speech and expression, including: (a) freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas; and (b) freedom of the press and other media (Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji 
Islands, 1997, p. 21). These constitutional guarantees coupled with market deregulation and media 
self-regulation stimulated further competition in the media sector. It led to a somewhat jingoistic 
media environment, with a proliferation of both good and bad journalism. If investigative 
journalism reached new heights, then media tabloidisation reached new lows. Market pressures saw 
the financially-struggling Fiji Daily Post resort to headline stories like an alleged sighting of a ghost 
in Parliament House and a woman giving birth to snakes (Usman, 2012). This phase did not last. 
Still, it was fodder for a government trying to justify the introduction of stronger media laws. 
 
The 2000 coup – a watershed event for media legislation in Fiji 
As the State–media tensions increased, there were renewed calls from conservative politicians for 
strict, Singaporean-style, media legislation (Committee to Protect journalists, 1998). In Singapore, 
“uninhibited” reporting was partly blamed for racial tensions and ethnic riots in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Ang & Nadarajan, 1996; Asiuzzaman, 2010). Consequently, social cohesion became an important 
State policy pillar for nation-building and informed Singapore’s future media legislation (Harish, 
2013). In comparison, Fiji had a relatively peaceful path to independence and the push for greater 
media regulation was somewhat milder. However, the pressure did build up during the heady 1980s 
and 1990s. State–media tensions peaked in 1999, when Mahendra Chaudhry became Fiji’s first 
prime minister of Indo-Fijian descent. Unsettled by the relentless criticisms, Chaudhry went as far 
as to accuse the Fiji Times of “subversive actions and provoking racism and sedition”. He 
threatened a “swift justice” media tribunal to curb a “distorting”, “lying” and “seditious” press 
(Chaudhry, 2000, pp. 6–10). But before he could act, he was ousted by the 2000 coup.  
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The 2000 coup was a watershed event for media freedom in Fiji. Apparently alarmed by the 
Chaudhry Government’s fall, future governments intensified their censorship efforts. The Qarase 
Government, elected into office in 2001, sought to exert greater State control on the media through 
the Media Council of Fiji Bill. But it dropped the idea in the face of a fierce “No Media Bill” 
campaign mounted by the media (Government of the Republic . . ., 2003). After winning a fresh 
mandate in 2006, the Qarase Government looked poised to re-introduce the media bill but it was 
ousted in the 2006 Bainimarama coup (‘Don’t blame media . . .’, 2006).  
 
The 2006 coup – cementing censorship and establishing State control  
Soon after seizing power in December 2006, the military government embarked on the most intense 
and sustained media crackdown in the country’s history. Initially its agents intimidated and 
maltreated journalists but later resorted to more sophisticated strategies, such as the use of decrees 
and emergency laws (Dutt, 2010). In 2008, the allegedly pro-Bainimarama Fiji Human Rights 
Commission released the Freedom and Independence of the Media Report (Robie, 2009b). 
Authored by Fiji-born-and-bred Hawaiian-based consultant Dr James Anthony, the report criticised 
media standards, condemned self-regulation, called for punitive measures against breaches of the 
Public Order Act and recommended that Fiji adopt legislation similar to the Singapore Sedition Act. 
 
The report, claiming that the Fiji media were controlled by a cabal of white editors and publishers 
(Fiji Human Rights Commission, 2008), was firmly rejected by the media sector as compromised, 
racist and undemocratic. But some critics, concerned about what they saw as declining standards, 
supported parts of it (see Robie, 2009b, for a detailed analysis of the Anthony Report). Some 
recommendations of the Anthony Report are manifest in the Bainimarama Administration’s 2010 
Media Decree, which is discussed more fully later in this section. A major piece of legislation that 
profoundly affected the media was the Public Emergency Regulation (PER). It was activated a day 
after the April 9, 2009, landmark ruling by the Fiji Court of Appeal declaring the 2006 coup 
unlawful. Through the PER the State obtained sweeping powers to censor the news and revoke the 
licences of offending media outlets. Compliance was enforced by State censors placed in all Fiji 
newsrooms to clear copy prior to publication (Dutt, 2010; Public Emergency Regulation, 2009).  
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The PER was continuously extended before it was lifted in January 2012, only to be replaced by the 
Public Order Act Amendment Decree (POAD). This decree gave government the discretion to use 
whatever force it deemed necessary to enforce public order and preserve the peace, including the 
use of firearms (Public Order (Amendment) Decree, 2012; United States Department of State, 2013, 
p. 9). In 2009, Fiji’s century-old Penal Code was replaced by the Crimes Decree (Freedom House, 
2011). Under section 65, “urging political violence or inciting communal antagonism” through any 
form of communication (including electronic communication) is an indictable offence liable to 10 
years’ imprisonment. The decree covers the use of electronic media, by Fiji residents or 
corporations from other countries, to commit offences (Crimes Decree, 2009, p. 1054–1056; 
Freedom House, 2011).  
 
The core, all-encompassing media legislation, the Media Industry Development Decree 2010, was 
promulgated in June 2010. It is outlined here at some length to establish the base for analysis and 
discussion in the following chapter. The media decree stipulates stiff fines and jail terms for any 
breaches of media code. A somewhat milder version of an earlier draft, the decree purports to 
incorporate all media-related laws under one regime. This includes the relevant constitutional 
provisions, the Public Order Act and the now void Fiji Media Council’s code of ethics (Freedom 
House, 2011). The decree, modelled partly on sections of Singapore’s media law (Dutt, 2010), 
establishes itself in Part One as part of the country’s law. Part Two empowers the relevant Minister 
to establish the Media Industry Development Authority (MIDA) consisting of a chairperson and 
five other members. This includes the Solicitor-General or his/her nominee and representatives of 
consumer affairs, children, women and the media industry (Media Industry Development Decree, 
2010, p. 734).  
 
MIDA is tasked with enforcing compliance with the codes of practice, advising the Minister on 
media matters, facilitating quality media services and promoting local content. The news and 
advertising codes are similar to those of the now defunct Fiji Media Council, except that what were 
once regarded as ethical breaches are treated as criminal offences (Media Industry Development 
Decree, 2010). Part Three integrates the media code of ethics and practice, the general code of 
practice for advertisements, the code for advertising to children and the television program 
classification code that governs all media organisations. Part Four deals with content regulation. It 
disallows any material that is against the “public interest or order”, against “national interest”, or 
“creates communal discord”. Print media stories in excess of 50 words must include a byline 
(Media Industry Development Decree, 2010, pp. 738–739).  
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Part Five, covering enforcement, empowers MIDA to investigate any media breaches and refer 
them to the Tribunal, as well as powers to enter, search and seize under warrant. On the basis of 
good cause, MIDA can procure an order from the Tribunal to force the disclosure of the sources of 
any published information, except in cases of State corruption. The Attorney General can be heard 
at Tribunal proceedings, where he can also table submissions in writing (Media Industry 
Development Decree, 2010, pp. 739–741).  
 
Part Six, covering registration, requires all media organisations to submit to MIDA sworn affidavits 
disclosing proprietors’ contact details and ownership interests. Broadcast media have to lodge 
location of stations, repeater stations, any relevant premises involved in broadcasting and all 
applicable frequencies. Newspapers and magazines are required to provide contact details of printers 
and publishers (p. 743). Part Seven, dealing with media ownership, is covered in detail later in this 
chapter.  
 
Part Eight establishes the single-member media Tribunal Chairperson – a qualified judge appointed 
by the President on the Attorney-General’s advice. The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to receive and 
adjudicate on all matters relating to alleged breaches of media codes. Part Nine establishes the 
complaints procedure, open to any person or entity against any media organisation deemed to have 
breached the decree. MIDA can proactively carry out an investigation and report to the Tribunal 
even if no complaint has been lodged (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010, pp. 747–752). 
 
Part 10 details the proceedings concerned with hearings before the Tribunal, which can fine 
offending media organisations up to FJD100,000; publishers or editors up to FJD25,000; and media 
workers up to FJD1,000. The Tribunal can also compel media companies to make written public 
apologies to wronged complainants and pay restitution of up to FJD100,000. Culpable publishers 
and editors are liable to pay compensation of up to FJD25,000 and journalists up to FJD1,000. 
These awards are enforceable through the High Court (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010, 
pp. 751–762). MIDA and the Tribunal have virtual protection from legal liabilities, civil or 
criminal, although the complainants or MIDA can challenge Tribunal decisions in the Fiji Court of 
Appeal. Media organisations can do likewise, but only if it involves payments in excess of 
FJD50,000 (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010, p. 755).  
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Part 11, Miscellaneous Provisions, outlines the powers of the Minister concerned. This includes the 
authority to impose pre-publication censorship and close down non-compliant media organisations 
in the event of an emergency (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010, pp. 749–755). The 
Minister may also direct the performance of the functions of the Authority, amend media codes as 
MIDA recommends, and issue policy and financial guidelines to the Tribunal (Media Industry 
Development Decree, 2010).  
 
Upon conviction for breaches of certain provisions, a media organisation can be fined up to 
FJD100,000; a publisher or editor up to FJD25,000 and/or two years’ imprisonment; and a 
journalist or media worker up to FJD1000 and/or two years’ imprisonment.  
 
Other significant legislation relating to the media includes: 
 
• the Television (Amendment) Decree 2012 (2012, p. 1439), which empowers the Minister to 
“revoke” or “vary” the licence of any broadcaster deemed to have breached the media code 
of ethics and practice  
• the State Proceedings (Amendment) Decree 2012 (2012), which shielded all government 
ministers from defamation lawsuits in both their official and unofficial capacities. The same 
immunity was extended to media organisations that reported any defamatory comments made 
by ministers (Government nullified this decree in July 2014)    
• Political Parties. . . (Amendment) Decree (2013) that barred media from reporting or 
representing political parties that had been deregistered from contesting the 2014 elections. 
Breaches could result in a maximum FJD50,000 fine and/or five years’ prison (Political 
parties . . ., 2013, p. 145). 
 
In September 2013 the government signed into law a new constitution, with elections announced for 
September in the following year. Chapter Two of the 2013 Constitution has a Bill of Rights that 
enshrines every individual’s right to “freedom of speech, expression, thought, opinion and 
publication”. It also guarantees “freedom of the press, including print, electronic and other media” 
(Constitution of the Republic of Fiji, 2013, p. 12). The State can limit these rights for reasons 
pertaining to national security, public safety and order, or the orderly conduct of elections. It can 
also suspend these rights to prevent hate speech and inaccurate and/or offensive media reports; avert 
ill will between ethnic or religious groups; and compel media to disclose information received in 
confidence; (Constitution of the Republic of Fiji, 2013, p. 13). Paradoxically, under 173(1), 
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Preservation of laws, the 2013 Constitution retains the interim government’s decrees (including the 
2010 Media decree and the POAD), which supersede the constitution in the event of any 
inconsistencies. Under 173(4), the decrees are exempt from any legal challenges (Constitution of 
the Republic Fiji, 2013, pp. 112-114). 
 
Synopsis of media legislation  
This section has addressed research Question Three: What are the genesis and nature of Fiji’s media 
laws? This research has shown that in all four of the country’s constitutions since independence, 
media freedom has been enshrined; however, the spectre of tighter legislation has also always hung 
threateningly over everything. This threat became reality after the 2006 coup.  
 
We now turn to the next section, media ownership patterns in Fiji.  
 
5.5 Document research – media ownership, reach and influence  
 
This section uses document review to address Research Question Four: What are the genesis and 
nature of media ownership in Fiji and the link with political and economic power?  
 
Overview 
The study of media ownership is integral to any analysis about conflict reporting, particularly in 
fragile, multi-ethnic societies, where governments, politicians and other powerful interests may own 
or control much of the media channels. Economically and/or politically powerful media owners have 
allegedly used their dominance of the public sphere to influence people and move them towards 
conflict, as in Kenya, Rwanda and Serbia (Frohardt & Temin, 2003; Nyanjom, 2012; M. Thompson, 
1999). The study takes a constructivist and instrumentalist theoretical approach to take into account 
both the processes and motives that may have influenced Fiji’s media ownership structure. This is 
in line with Deacon, Murdock and Golding’s (1999) recommendation that researchers determine 
trends and patterns of media ownership over time to gain a deeper understanding of a particular 
phenomenon. The authors also advocate identifying the dominant media owners and determining 
their market share and capitalisation to gauge the media company’s control, penetration, influence 
and dominance. All shareholders with over five per cent holdings should be identified, as well as 
any close ties – political or familial – between individual shareholders (Deacon, Murdock & 
Golding, 1999). 
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Fiji’s media ownership structure 
Fiji’s media ownership structure falls under three broad categories: State or public-owned, primarily 
in broadcasting; privately-owned, across print, broadcast and online media; and community media, 
run by non-profit civil society organisations, largely in broadcast. The two major commercial print 
media companies are owned by two large local conglomerates with vast investments in other sectors 
of the economy. In the field of television, Fiji Broadcasting Commission TV (FBC) is State-owned 
while Mai TV and Fiji TV Limited are privately owned, although a State-controlled investment 
company holds majority shares in the latter. All three television stations compete in the free-to-air 
market. Fiji TV also runs pay-tv channels. In all, television content is largely dominated by foreign 
productions, with some local programs (Pacific Media and Communications Facility, 2005; Robie, 
2014; Tacchi et al., 2013). Of the two major radio stations, FBC Radio is owned by the State while 
Communications Fiji Limited (CFM) radio group is owned by private interests. Radio remains the 
major mass medium in Fiji, particularly in rural areas and outlying islands (Tacchi et al., 2013). The 
commercial radio stations broadcast daily current affairs news on a regular basis, as well as robust 
talkback shows. 
 
Laws governing ownership 
The key laws governing media ownership are covered in Part Seven of the 2010 Media Decree. 
Section 38 limits foreign shareholding to 10 per cent, with 90 per cent of controlling interests to be 
held by Fiji citizens permanently resident in the country (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010, 
p. 743). Section 39 introduces cross-media ownership regulation. It stipulates that media owners and 
their immediate family and associates may own a further interest in only one other company of the 
same medium, restricted to 25 per cent of non-voting interest (Media Industry Development Decree, 
2010). Beneficial interests in a media organisation of a different medium are limited to five per cent 
of non-voting interest. The State, or any State-owned entity, or any media organisation in which the 
State owns majority shares, is exempt from these requirements (p. 746).  
 
The focus of this section is largely on the country’s major daily news providers – FBC, Fiji Times, 
Fiji Sun, Fiji TV, and CFM. These five organisations have the greatest reach and market penetration 
and they were the ones most affected by the Bainimarama Government’s 2010 Media Decree. The 
Fiji Daily Post, inactive since 2010, is also reviewed as it was, at one time, Fiji’s third major daily 
and the only paper in which the State bought shares. Smaller, privately-owned media organisations 
less affected by the decree are not covered in a detailed manner. The main ones include the Suva-
based news portal Fijilive.com; monthly print publications like Repúblika, Mai Life and The Jet; 
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and Fiji’s third television station, Mai TV. Except for Fijilive, none of these companies produce 
local news on a daily basis.  
 
Fiji Times 
Established in 1869, the Fiji Times is the country’s oldest and largest privately-owned newspaper. It 
changed hands several times before News Limited Australia – a subsidiary of Rupert Murdoch’s 
News Corporation Limited – bought it in 1987 as part of the group’s acquisition of The Herald & 
Weekly Times (Chessell, 2010). The Fiji Times claims an audited average readership of 72,993 from 
Monday to Friday; 114,024 on Saturday; and 68,115 on Sunday (Fiji Times top readership figures, 
2011). The company also produces the indigenous-language weekly Nai Lalakai, the Hindi-
language weekly Shanti Dut, and Kaila, an English weekly that focuses on youth (Tacchi et al., 
2013; also see the company website, http://www.fijitimes.com/). The Fiji Times was sold on 
September 2010 to a local conglomerate, the Motibhai Group, to comply with the new foreign 
ownership laws (Dutt, 2010). Motibhai’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Mahendra Motibhai 
Patel, was a long-time board member of paper (Robie, 2010). Motibhai’s other businesses and assets are 
outlined in the following chapter (Chapter 6) on discussion and analysis of results.  
 
Fiji Daily Post 
The Fiji Daily Post was the country’s third daily. Established in 1987 by Wame Waqanisanini, the 
Fiji Daily Post was a significant foray into the news media sector by local indigenous investors. It 
suspended operations in 2010, but any analysis on media ownership in Fiji would not be complete 
without including this newspaper through which three different governments tried to gain a hold in 
Fiji’s print media sector (Digitaki, 2000; Pacific Media and Communications Facility, 2005; Robie, 
2001) The Post’s key local individual and original publisher, Dan Bolea, had no major stake in 
other sectors of the Fiji economy. There are no available audited circulation figures for the paper 
but estimates ranged from 15,000 copies at its peak in the 1990s to about 5,000 prior to its closure 
(Moore, 2008). In an unprecedented move, the Rabuka Government purchased 44 per cent holding 
in the ailing paper just prior to the 1999 general election. Critics saw the purchase as a major threat 
to media independence (Digitaki, 2000; Fiji Government takeover . . ., 1999). Colonial Fiji Ltd and 
Unit Trust of Fiji also acquired shares in the paper before Australian publisher Alan Hickling 
eventually gained a controlling interest (Robie, 2004, 2014).  
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The Labour Party roundly criticised the Rabuka Government for buying into the Post. But after 
forming the People’s Coalition Government in 1999, it decided to retain the paper (Digitaki, 2000). 
After the coalition government’s ouster in the 2000 coup, the Qarase Government that eventually 
emerged announced in 2003 that it would sell off the newspaper to indigenous Fijian interests after 
nursing it back to financial health (Robie, 2003b, 2003c). In the year 2004–2005, the Fiji 
Government was the major shareholder, with a 44 per cent interest. Government-linked entities also 
started buying into other private media companies (Robie, 2001; T. R. Singh, 2011). The one-time 
acting editor of the Post, Mesake Koroi, was a cousin of then Prime Minister Qarase. Under Koroi’s 
editorship, the paper was accused of supporting the Qarase  administration. The Qarase Government 
gave Koroi a special appointment in Fiji’s Ministry of Information in 2002 (Koroi gets special job . 
. ., 2002). The Post struggled after the 2006 coup due to the harsh publishing climate. The new 
foreign ownership regulation disqualified Alan Hickling, an Australian, from holding a majority 
stake in the paper, which had effectively closed by 2010 (Freedom House, 2011).  
 
Communications Fiji Ltd 
Suva-based Communications Fiji Limited (CFM) was founded by local radio personality William 
Parkinson in 1985 (Pacific Media and Communications Facility, 2005, p. 141). CFM was among 
the first media ventures to involve a major local conglomerate, Hari Punja and Sons Limited. It 
listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange in 2001. It operates five radio stations in Fiji, and claims 
to have 60 per cent of the audience. It also owns the news portal Fijivillage.com; the Internet 
service provider, Unwired Fiji; Total Event Company Limited; and CinemaADs (see company 
website, http://www.cfl.com.fj/). CFM claims to be the largest radio company in the South Pacific, 
with daily airings to over three million people in four different languages. Offshore, its Papua New 
Guinea subsidiary, PNG FM, operates three radio stations. CFM also owns one-third of Papua New 
Guinea Paradise Cinemas (Wilson, 2013). In 2012, the Group returned a record after-tax profit of 
FJD2.2m on Group sales of FJD14.1m. This was an increase of 155 per cent on the previous year 
(Communications Fiji Ltd, 2013). Of this, Fiji accounted for FJD937,000 and Papua New Guinea 
for FJD1.3m. As a fully-owned local company, CFM was largely unaffected by the caps on foreign 
ownership. However, restrictions on cross-ownership led to the departure of Hari Punja and Sons (Punja 
sells . . ., 2012). Parkinson Holdings, which represented the interests of CFM managing director 
William Parkinson, acquired Punja’s shares, making it the largest shareholder at 55.48 per cent (Punja 
sells. . ., 2012).  
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The other major CFM shareholders as per the company’s 2011 annual report were: Unit Trust of 
Fiji Limited (10.72 per cent); BSP Investments Fiji Limited (7.11 per cent); Matt Wilson (3.17 per 
cent); and Kontiki Funds Limited (2.48 per cent) (Communications Fiji Limited, 2011, p. 38).  Unit 
Trust of Fiji is a government commercial company. Former journalist Matt Wilson is chairman and 
a founder of CFM (Communications Fiji Limited, 2013). Kontiki Funds Limited is an investment 
banker based in Suva (see the company website, http://www.kontiki.com.fj/pages.cfm/about/). 
 
Fiji Television Limited 
Television was introduced in Fiji in 1991 to air that year’s Rugby World Cup, morphing into Fiji 
Television Limited (Fiji TV) in 1994 as the country’s first national television network. It listed on 
the South Pacific Stock exchange in 1996 (Robie, 2009a, 2009b). As of early 2014, the Fiji TV 
Group comprised Fiji TV, Media Niugini Limited (Papua New Guinea) and Media Solomon Islands 
Limited (Solomon Islands) (About us, 2014; Fiji TV, 2014; History of Fiji TV, 2004). Fiji TV 
positions itself as the leading television broadcaster in Fiji and the Pacific. It claims to operate the 
most-watched free-to-air TV stations in Fiji and Papua New Guinea – Fiji One and EMTV 
respectively. SKY Pacific, launched in 2005, covers 10 other Pacific Island countries with 17 
channels to its name. Fiji TV claims transmission coverage of the majority of Fiji’s population 
(About us, 2014; Fiji TV, 2014; History of Fiji TV, 2004; Tacchi, et al., 2013). 
 
For the 2012/2013 financial year, the Fiji TV Group reported a net profit of FJD3.6m compared 
with FJD4.2m the previous year (Fiji TV, 2014, p. 2). Fiji TV’s top eight shareholders as per the 
2013 annual report were: FHL Media at 51.95 per cent; Punja and Sons at 26.16 per cent; Unit Trust 
of Fiji at 4.66 per cent; CJ Patel at 2.43 per cent; Dominion Insurance at 1.21 per cent; Kontiki 
Fund Limited at 0.77 per cent; and Fiji National Provident Fund at 0.42 per cent (Fiji TV, 2014, p. 
59). FHL Media Limited is a subsidiary of Fijian Holdings Limited (FHL), a State-funded local 
equity investment company set up in 1984 to help indigenous Fijians catch up with Indo-Fijian 
entrepreneurs (Fijian Holdings, 2013; Ratuva, 2013). 
 
As of 2013, FHL had an FJD$87 million investment portfolio spread across building, construction 
and property; tourism and financial services; and manufacturing and retail. The company recorded 
consolidated revenues of FJD233 million in 2013, reflecting a 27 per cent growth. This yielded a 
pre-tax profit of FJD9.8 million, a five per cent increase over the previous year. Of its total 
portfolio, media and telecommunications constituted just 2.1 per cent (Fijian Holdings, 2013, pp. 
26–27).  
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Fiji TV’s second largest shareholder, Hari Punja and Sons Limited, is a major player in the food 
manufacturing and distribution industry in Fiji and the Pacific through its six subsidiaries. The 
company surpassed the $200 million mark in earnings in 2011 (see the company website, 
http://www.fmf.com.fj/). In 2013, the group launched a $20-million hotel complex project in Fiji as 
part of a total $55 million expansion (Hari Punja’s $20m Palms Denarau . . ., 2013).  
 
Fiji Sun 
The Fiji Sun was relaunched under new ownership in September 1999. This new initiative was led 
by a consortium of major Fiji businesses, including CJ Patel & Company Limited; Vinod Patel & 
Company Limited; and FHL (which divested its holdings in September 2013 to comply with cross-
media ownership laws) (FHL divests Fiji Sun, 2013). Major shareholder CJ Patel is a multi-sector 
company with food procurement and distribution operations across Fiji and the Pacific (Narsey, 
2013b, 2013c). The bulk of CJ Patel’s revenue is derived from 20 companies based on ownership 
models ranging from joint venture to wholly-owned subsidiaries. These companies are involved in 
manufacturing, sales, marketing and distribution of goods and services in various industries (see CJ 
Patel website, http://cjp.com.fj/cjp/). In 2012 a CJ Patel subsidiary, Southern Cross Foods (Ltd), 
purchased the State monopoly, Rewa Dairy, for a reported price of FJD10 million (Narsey, 2013b, 
2013c). Another shareholder, Vinod Patel, proclaims itself the country’s “biggest name in 
hardware”. It also imports Chinese vehicles through a subsidiary, Wheels Pacific, and is involved in 
interior design work (see company website, http://www.vinodpatel.com.fj/). In 2011, Vinod Patel 
purchased the rival Suncourt Hardware Company Limited after the sale was approved by the State’s 
Commerce Commission (Vinod Patel buys . . ., 2011).  The Fiji Sun does not have independently 
audited sales figures, although in 2011 it won a Pacific Area Newspaper Publishers’ Association 
advertising award in the 25,000-circulation category (Fiji Sun shines . . ., 2011).  
 
Fiji Broadcasting Corporation 
Fiji’s oldest broadcaster, the State-owned FBC, first started operating in 1935 under licence from 
the Posts and Telegraphs Department (Fiji Broadcasting Corporation, 2012). It was corporatised in 
January 1998 and started operating under the name of Fiji Broadcasting Corporation Limited. FBC 
operates a network of six radio stations, two in each of the three major languages (I-Taukei, 
Hindustani and English), reaching most parts of the country (Fiji Broadcasting Corporation, 2012).  
In 2011, FBC received a FJD24 million government-guaranteed loan, enabling it to launch its free-
to-air television station in December 2011 to mark its 57th anniversary. 
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With the financial backing of the State, the FBC CEO Riyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, a former Fiji 
Television journalist, revamped and revitalised FBC, extending its nationwide coverage and the 
scope of free-to-air programs. But his appointment was controversial as the younger brother of 
Fiji’s Attorney General, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, even though he went through the standard selection 
criteria (see Narsey, 2013b, 2013c). 
 
Synopsis of media ownership section 
This section addressed research Question Four: What is the nature of media ownership, reach and 
influence in Fiji? Document research shows that since independence in 1970, media ownership 
patterns have moved towards increased corporatisation. The placing of restrictions on cross and 
foreign media ownership since 2010 has seen increased conglomeration of the print media.  
 
Next, we move to the final phase of this particular chapter, in-depth interviews. 
 
5.6 In-depth interviews 
 
This section presents the findings of the in-depth interviews, the fourth and final method used for 
this research. These interviews were conducted to supplement the previous three research methods 
by incorporating direct human interaction, experience and knowledge into the findings. 
 
Overview  
Since this thesis is primarily about understanding meaning making by journalists, the majority of 
the 19 interviewees were selected from the news media sector. They ranged across current and 
former journalists, including reporter, sub-editor, news editor, editor, and media industry executive 
roles. Three interviewees were from academia, one from community radio and another from 
talkback radio. The interviewees were purposively selected because of their specialist knowledge of 
media, politics and society in Fiji and due to their practical, professional and personal records. The 
material collected from the interviews has been organised thematically to provide a narrative about 
the state of the news media based on the interviewees’ experiences and perspectives, especially 
after the 2006 coup. Seven broad themes were identified: challenges journalists face and alleged 
faults in the media sector; the impact of State control mechanisms; journalists’ education, working 
conditions and attrition rates; pressure from owners and advertisers; media’s alleged political bias 
and conflict reporting; the viability of alternative conflict reporting frameworks; and media’s 
potential role in nation-building and the future of journalism. 
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Challenges faced by journalists and alleged faults in the media sector 
A major theme emanating from the interviews was the perennial pitfalls journalists face in a 
politically and ethnically divided country like Fiji. Reporting in this situation requires negotiating a 
host of social, cultural and political sensitivities rooted in the diversity of the country’s social fabric. 
These cross-cutting issues affect virtually all media industry workers in one form or another, be 
they reporters or CEOs. Predominantly, they include the seemingly racial outlook of Fiji’s different 
communities; leaders’ alleged hyper-sensitivity to criticism; an apparent perception among political 
parties and governments that certain media organisations are biased against them; and a culture of 
deference towards traditional leaders and people of rank.  
 
The following sentiments typify what interviewees see as some of the core problems:  
 
• No matter how much we try to be fair and balanced, in people’s eyes, we will always be 
seen as biased.  (Former Editor One, 25. 09. 12) 
• Government sees the media as an adversary. This has been the case with all governments. 
They see us as nosy parkers out to upset the balance of power. (Print Newsroom Manager, 
25. 09. 12)  
• The cultural challenge is very strong. Regardless of the culture you come from, you are not 
supposed to ask direct questions. We come from a leadership-led society. We are supposed 
to accept what the leaders say, be they national leaders, family leaders, community leaders 
or church leaders. The unique case in Fiji is that if you ask questions, you are seen to be 
rude. Breaking that mindset and saying ‘it is okay to ask questions’ is about the biggest 
challenge we face.  (Broadcast Executive One, 26. 09. 12) 
• The struggle of a young, female journalist starts in the newsroom when you are not assigned 
certain stories because you are the weaker gender. You have to fight against the newsroom 
hierarchy. Right now you see more females in the newsroom but males dominate the 
newsroom culture. They decide how stories get covered and who is assigned. It’s the same 
thing in the field where people make snide comments. As a young journalist fresh out of  
university, you are not taken seriously until you prove yourself.  (University-educated 
journalist, 01.10.12) 
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Virtually all interviewees stated that some issues and difficulties also emanate from weaknesses 
within the industry. The following comments exemplify such feelings: 
  
• We can’t say that we are perfect – open the papers or watch television and you see slanted 
and biased reporting every day. Glaring mistakes and sensationalism are common. How 
certain issues are portrayed is questionable.  (Broadcast Newsroom Manager One, 18. 09. 
12)  
 
One interviewee alleged that the newspaper that she once worked for habitually published one-sided 
stories to meet deadlines: 
 
• Often, there is not enough time and the paper, for the correct reason or not, runs with the 
story, just for the sake of making sure we have a front page. It was atrocious how the paper 
would report without any reasonable counter. I wonder if it was ever asked, ‘should we be 
even running this? How will this help us?’ Many times it was about getting the headlines 
and stealing the show rather than carrying out a public service.  (Former Print Journalist, 
26. 09. 12) 
 
Interviewees from outside the news media sector were also critical of what they regarded as 
questionable media standards. Two academics claimed that the media are too reliant on press 
releases and too fixated on politicians, thus marginalising other groups and voices. The community 
radio broadcaster alleged that at times media are overtly biased.  
 
• Lots of journalists rely on press releases, which they use verbatim. That’s not the way to do 
it. Back in the 1970s and 1980s, journalists worked very hard. The editors and subeditors 
kept them on their toes. I do not think this has been the case in recent years.  (Academic 
One, 20. 09. 12) 
• Media tend to parrot the views of what I call an elite coalition of the privileged few – 
politicians, business leaders and civil society activists. Media do not seek the views of 
academics and intellectuals often enough. They are more interested in sensational issues 
and political rhetoric. They only focus on what is happening at a particular point in time. 
(Academic Two, 29. 09. 12) 
• Journalists have various affiliations – political, religious and provincial. These show up in 
their reports, especially during coups.  (Community Radio Broadcaster, 03. 10. 12)  
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One interviewee from the news media industry stated that most journalists were doing their best in 
what was, socially and politically, an extremely tricky environment. Journalists, like the rest of the 
population, were not immune to ethnic biases. 
 
• I have an editorial staff member from the indigenous community who has some racial  
• issues. We are trying to deal with it. You really can’t blame him as he was born into this 
system.  (Broadcast Executive Two, 28. 09. 12) 
• We always have to be careful not to be swayed by political or racial rhetoric when talking to 
politicians. We have to check ourselves from time to time to ensure that we are sticking to 
the issues rather than getting caught up in the propaganda.  (Former Print Journalist, 26. 
09. 12)  
 
Another interviewee felt that there is no justification for ethnically-biased reporting and that 
journalists, of all people, should remain above racial stereotyping: 
 
• Your opinions are formed by your culture and by what you are taught. I would like to think 
that I was always taught to be fair. As a journalist you must have a sense of justice. You’ve 
got to be absolutely non-racial in your outlook and treat everyone equally. I know of 
instances where journalists were biased because of the racial background.  (Broadcast 
Executive One, 26. 09. 12)  
 
Alleged professional shortcomings in the media sector were one of the government’s central 
justifications for implementing stronger legislation. These State control mechanisms generated a lot 
of feelings among the interviewees. These are presented in the following section. 
 
Attitude towards the 2006 coup and the impact of State control mechanisms  
The interviews reveal that like the rest of Fiji’s population, journalists are divided over the 2006 
coup and subsequent media legislation such as the Public Emergency Regulation (PER) and the 
2010 Media Decree. Government maintains the decrees are needed to provide stability. However, 
most interviewees felt that it is more about control and curtailing criticism. Media company 
employees complained about the impracticalities of the decrees, although a few interviewees were 
more tolerant, and even supported, the government’s actions. The following comments represent the 
gist of the interviewees’ feelings:  
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• The censors stationed in newsrooms rejected stories that even remotely portrayed the 
government in poor light – standard stories dealing with declining health services, or 
deteriorating roads. Professionally, journalists found this hard to tolerate. It caused them to 
question the true motives about the coup.  (Former Editor One, 25. 09. 12) 
• During the PER State control was almost absolute. There was more pressure than ever before. 
Stories were constantly checked and rechecked, with heavy involvement from the legal section since 
anything could end up in court. (Print Newsroom Manager, 25. 09. 12)  
• The law was supposed to enforce balanced reporting but it was used to avoid media 
scrutiny. People we needed to interview to balance a story deliberately ignored our 
interview requests. The media decree meant that we just couldn’t run some stories. So the 
public had no knowledge of these issues.  (Television Journalist, 18. 09. 12)  
 
Such concerns apparently remained unaddressed in the absence of consultations between the media 
industry and the regulatory authority. One interviewee asserted that there had been virtually no 
meetings in the two years the media legislation had been in place: 
 
• A media law needs to be a breathing, living document and the body overseeing it needs to be 
functional.  (Broadcast Executive Three, 24. 09. 12)  
 
The tougher legislative environment appears to have exacerbated a longstanding staff turnover 
problem in some newsrooms. One interviewee stated that he lost five journalists in the space of 18 
months. Retaining his core editorial team became a major preoccupation: 
 
• Trying to keep people motivated in this environment is tough. I have lost quality people with 
10 or more years of experience. I could lose a lot more people before 2014.  (Broadcast 
Newsroom Manager One, 18. 09. 12)  
 
The interviews indicated that some media, having lived through the 1987 and 2000 coups, were 
adapting to the conditions in order to function and survive as best they could. One interviewee felt 
that some media companies erred in imposing news blackouts in protest over the PER as this only 
resulted in a tougher government crackdown. He stated that his company had built loyalty by 
providing round-the-clock coverage of coups and natural disasters. For his company, there was 
never any question of boycotting news reporting: 
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• Our response to the coup was based on the long-term interest of the whole company rather 
than just the news section, which forms a small part of the group. In our case 140-plus jobs 
were at stake. The newsroom could not operate in isolation. It had to consider the wider 
interests of the company. If [the editor] broadcasts anything that will harm the company or 
the workers, I will be the first to show him the door. (Broadcast Executive Two, 28. 09. 12) 
 
Yet another interviewee felt it was possible to work within the confines of the 2010 Media Decree 
and produce at least some good journalism. He stated that journalists could be functional in relative 
safety as long as they followed the standard journalistic codes of ethics. In this interviewee’s view, 
working within the boundaries of the 2010 Media Decree should not mean having to collaborate 
with the Bainimarama Government:  
 
• We have been working under the media decree. We have produced public interest stories. 
We have been critical of the Bainimarama Government. As long as you follow the code of 
ethics you can do your job safely.  (Broadcast Newsroom Manager Two, 28. 09. 12) 
 
A veteran of the Fiji media industry felt that in Fiji, a “softy-softly” approach in a politically-tense, 
multi-ethnic country like Fiji had its advantages, especially when faced with the realities of 
surviving a coup. This interviewee stated that a pragmatic approach not only allowed them to carry 
out useful journalistic functions, but also enabled the company to outlast and survive previous 
coups: 
 
• During the coups we were able to continue operating. A lot of jobs were saved. And we were 
still able to keep an eye on the government. We could comment on government decisions and 
we had some influence. Once we ran a piece on a shooting that occurred at a checkpoint. 
We suggested that the army should perhaps move further away from the road, closer to its 
barracks. And sure enough, the next day they had moved. That’s a minor example of the 
kind of positive impact persuasive articles could have even in a coup situation.  (Former 
Editor Two, 03. 09. 12) 
 
This interviewee was asked whether a softly-softly approach was consistent with media’s watchdog 
role and also whether the media were answerable to an illegal regime. The response was adamant: 
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• That’s a very important consideration. Any military coup is illegal. It puts the media in a 
very awkward position. You either resist or you work within the limited freedom that you 
have. The media has to face the reality. You can’t recognise it as a legal government and yet  
you can’t ignore the reality of its existence. It leaves the media between a rock and a hard 
place. But you don’t have to be shouting from the rooftops to hold leaders to account. 
Language is the most powerful tool in the world. There are many ways in which we can 
write and comment on public issues. (Former Editor Two, 03. 09. 12) 
 
At least two interviewees supported what they saw as the Bainimarama Government’s nation-
building policies, including rural development and a common name for all citizens, regardless of 
ethnicity. This is reflected in the following comments: 
 
• Government’s multiracial policies are forward-looking. They are changing people’s racial 
outlook and moving the country away from ethno-nationalism. I believe media should 
support this.  (Section Editor at a Daily, 27. 09. 12)  
• I never thought I would see the historic day when all citizens would be known as Fijians. Two 
things still freak me out – one, that this is happening in my lifetime; and two, that I am in a 
position to promote it, which is pretty fantastic. We should seize the window of opportunity to 
promote the message of a non-racial Fiji.  (Broadcast Executive One, 26. 09. 12) 
 
Broadcast Executive One did not seem to have any qualms about discarding media neutrality and 
taking a stance on such issues: 
 
• I agree we should report objectively. But I will not report fundamentally divisive things. 
Journalism is not practised the same in every country. Fiji is very unique. We still have a 
long way to go before we can practise free-for-all journalism. Let’s also be fair about 
development stories and about not doing stories that will harm the country. I believe the 
message of a common identity is a good one and media should support it. Time is of the 
essence. A new government could come into power and re-introduce the divisive policies of 
old.  (Broadcast Executive One, 26. 09. 12) 
 
However, one interviewee felt that media best serves the national interest by being neutral rather 
than showing any kind of partiality, regardless of the issue at stake. Another questioned the 
Bainimarama Government’s true motives. 
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• It is not the media’s job to promote government’s policy. Media should report the facts  
and leave it to the public to make up its own mind. The public is capable of making up its 
mind. We should concentrate on reporting the facts in an impartial manner.  (Broadcast 
Newsroom Manager Two, 28. 09. 12)  
• Is the Bainimarama Government genuine about multi-racialism or is it trying to hold on to 
power? Should we support an unelected government that is imposing top-down multi-racial 
policies? We need to ask whether such policies are working at the grassroots level rather 
than support them blindly.  (Former Editor One, 25. 09. 12)  
 
An academic summed up these discussions in the following way: 
 
• Media have a constructive role to play. Media can be critical and constructive, and also 
critical and destructive. Historically, there has been more destruction in our case. Some of 
what is happening is the [Qarase] Government’s fault, some of it is the fault of people who 
have usurped power. You don’t want the media to be a mouthpiece of government. But 
media have to look at themselves and ask ‘what have we done, what have we not done and 
what could we do to help Fiji’s recovery’.  (Academic One, 20. 09. 12)  
  
While there is broad acceptance about the need to improve media professionalism, there are some 
doubts about the Bainimarama Government’s legitimacy and its use of stronger legislation to lift 
standards. Most respondents felt that a better strategy is to focus on training and education. This is 
discussed next.  
 
Journalist education, working conditions and attrition  
One issue about which there was virtually total agreement among the interviewees was the need to 
boost training and educational opportunities for journalists. The following interviewee’s 
lamentation about the lack of opportunities and the absence of support from journalist organisations 
was typical of the sentiments expressed.  
 
• I have not received any kind of training from any regional or national journalist 
organisation. The only training I received was on the job or at university.  (Television 
Journalist,18. 09. 12)  
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Another interviewee enrolled in a postgraduate-level course spoke of a “knowledge gap” in her 
newsroom: 
 
• That depth of knowledge is missing because the seniors themselves do not have the theory or 
the educational grounding to make them think critically. I realise this now because of the 
readings I have been through as a postgraduate student. It is not just formal education, it is 
important for journalists to read. But we do not have a reading culture in most Fiji 
newsrooms. [In-house] training teaches you skills – we had subediting and management 
courses. But it was from an Australian perspective. It does not teach critical thinking. We 
need something tailored for the region. (Former Print Journalist, 26. 09. 12)  
 
A veteran journalist with no formal qualifications despite his many years in the industry perhaps 
best summed up how desperate the training and education opportunities are. He said: 
  
• We are stuck in here and just go through the mill with no time for creativity or thinking. 
There is no time to reflect. The newsroom environment is not conducive for reflective 
thinking. (Print Newsroom Manager, 25. 09. 12) 
 
This interviewee was a product of the cadet system. Yet another interviewee felt strongly that 
cadetships were no longer suitable because Fiji’s political, social and economic climate had become 
far more complicated since the coups: 
 
• Young cadets learning on the job are more susceptible to various inside and outside 
influences. Often they are thrown in the deep end to learn through trial and error. This is 
not enough in today’s Fiji.  (Television Journalist, 18. 09. 12)  
 
But one interviewee stated that in his experience, reporters with commitment and the right mind-set 
could perform better than university-trained journalists: 
 
• People from universities have the training but whether they have the right attributes to be 
journalists, I am not sure. You can’t really teach it; you either have it or you don’t.  (Print 
Newsroom Manager, 25. 09. 12) 
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All three media executives interviewed asserted that their companies were offering all the training 
support within their means. They felt that if that was insufficient, government and donor agencies 
could step in, provided the training schemes were well researched, transparent and unconditional:  
 
• Training programs should be provided and administered by impartial and independent  
sources with all media organisations benefitting equally. Anything else would be  
viewed with suspicion.  (Broadcast Executive One, 26. 09. 12) 
• Training of any sort is going to be welcomed by all. But you need to go back and see if there 
is a problem in the first place and what sort of problem. Any such study has to be inclusive – 
not just carried out by the State, or by the media, and certainly not by a parachute 
consultant. It can’t be a one-week or two-week study and it needs to address some key 
questions. What role do the media have? A reporting role or an educating role? Who are the 
funders of the training? What do they want? You can’t say there is a nice, simple answer to 
all of this. Anyone who even suggests that is being extremely naïve.  (Broadcast Executive 
Three, 24. 09. 12) 
• Training is a top priority. We have regular in-house training for all our staff. This includes 
technicians and newsroom staff. We regularly bring in experts from abroad. Over the years 
our organisation has trained many people who have since moved on and done really well in 
the industry. We do not mind government or any other organisation assisting with training. 
But we have to be consulted and there should be no strings attached. Otherwise our 
independence will come into question. (Broadcast Executive Two, 28. 09. 12) 
 
Related to education and media standards are the issues of working conditions and the apparent 
high attrition rate of journalists. There was a clear division on this topic. On one side, practising 
journalists and interviewees from outside the media sector allege that the low salaries in the sector 
are a weak link. On the other side, the three media company executives insist that their journalists 
are fairly compensated. The following responses are typical of the sentiments working journalists 
expressed when asked if they were adequately remunerated: 
 
• No. It is an issue that has been talked about for years with minimal results.  (Section Editor 
at a Daily, 27. 09. 12)  
• It is high time some sort of salary structure was put in place because most journalists and 
cameramen are underpaid. That’s why we lose really good personnel. (Television 
Journalist, 18. 09. 12)  
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• A transparent salary structure and promotion criteria were are needed so we know exactly 
where we stand at any given time rather than be subjected to the [whim] of the editors and 
publishers.  (Section Editor at a Daily, 27. 09. 12) 
• I have been in media for 28 years. I started on $1000 [per annum] and worked my way up to 
my current salary of $28,000. I live alone with no family commitments. For me it has never 
been about money. But if you ask some other journalists, they are not happy because there is 
no pay structure. (Print Newsroom Manager, 25. 09.12) 
 
A number of interviewees linked what they saw as a high rate of journalist attrition to the alleged 
low salaries offered in the industry. They contended that the punitive 2010 Media Decree had 
exacerbated the situation, with an increasing number of journalists taking up media-related jobs 
with civil society organisations, government departments and the private sector. The following 
comments provide further insights into this issue: 
 
• Our organisation lost five journalists in the space of 18 months. If I had my way, I would 
have invested in them [because] their experience is worth more to the company than the few 
extra thousand dollars they were getting from our rivals. But my employers do not share my 
position.  (Broadcast Newsroom Manager One, 18. 09. 12)  
• At one time, people we hired were leaving within a few weeks of joining to take up better-paid 
positions but the situation has stabilised. (Section Editor at a Daily, 27. 09. 12) 
 
One interviewee explained why after some time as a journalist, she took up an offer to work with a 
major international organisation: 
 
• My heart was in journalism but I realised that in my present job it would take me a very 
long time to get to the pay level I was being offered in public relations. It was almost four 
times more. Who could resist that?  (University-educated Journalist, 01. 10. 12) 
 
One newsroom leader affected by the trend pointed to the ongoing struggle they faced to fill the gap 
with new recruits. This was unfair on the new recruits because: 
  
• All of a sudden there is a lot of responsibility on their shoulders and they are required to 
deliver. For some it has worked; for others it hasn’t.  (Broadcast Newsroom Manager One, 
18. 09. 12) 
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An academic attributed the apparent high turnover of news staff to the alleged lack of career 
opportunities in the sector: 
 
• A person could be a journalist for the rest of his or her life and remain on a low salary. 
Paying low wages and expecting journalists to stay year-in, year-out, is not feasible for the 
sustainability of good quality media.  (Academic One, 20. 09. 12) 
 
However, the three media company executives felt that they were managing the situation well. They 
stated that they paid appropriate salaries and that they fought hard to retain their top staff. But they 
said they would not be able to compete on equal terms with the private sector or civil society 
organisations, particularly in a stagnant advertising market. The following comments give some 
indication of the executives’ overall feelings: 
 
• It’s a problem for all industries because Fiji is a great exporter of talent. Countries like 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States are always willing to take our 
people, who are very mobile. It’s not restricted to journalism; it’s across all sectors. In the 
media sector the advertising dollar has not been growing for five years. It is worth $25 
million. The return on investment is critical because it determines how much you reinvest in 
training and equipment. The small market size and limited returns can affect many things. 
The 20 per cent devaluation of the Fiji dollar and the 2.5 per cent increase in value-added 
tax had a huge impact on costs. But we look after our journalists. It is a case of us ensuring 
we have enough depth, succession planning and development to ensure that our news 
product does not suffer. (Broadcast Executive Three, 24. 09. 12) 
• Staff turnover has always been high. In the 1990s and early 2000 the movement was within 
the industry – from broadcast to print and vice-versa. Recently journalists have been 
leaving the industry altogether. Media organisations should recognise the good journalists, 
give them the salaries they deserve, constantly train them and make sure they stay in the 
industry. It is important to have mentors setting high standards. For a while we had this big 
hole in the industry because the experienced people were not there. We reward journalists 
who go through our training and improve themselves. Around 85–90 per cent of my staff 
received increments. But media organisations can’t compete with banks and other 
industries, so we have to look at it on a case-by-case basis.  (Broadcast Executive One, 26. 
09. 12) 
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• Demand for public relations officers has increased because every government department 
now has a media spokesperson. We fight hard to retain our top staff. All our staff are fairly 
paid. Over the years we have managed to hold on to our top staff. (Broadcast Executive 
Two, 28. 09. 12)  
 
Journalists’ education, salaries, working conditions and the high rate of journalist attrition are 
apparently caused by push factors such as a stagnant advertising market and the punitive media 
decree and pull factors such as increased demand and high salaries in the public relations and 
communication sectors. Besides these issues, interviewees also discussed the commercial pressures 
exerted on the national media corps. This is presented in the following section.  
 
Alleged pressure from owners and advertisers 
All the interviewees from a journalism background said they had witnessed or directly experienced 
attempts by media company owners and advertisers to influence the news. Media company 
executives, for their part, tended to deny such happenings. These contrasting discourses are 
presented below: 
  
• Since the 2006 coup life has been tough. We have to stay alive; there is no denying it. The 
government advertising dollar is not coming our way. We have been told by management 
that our future depends on getting back government advertising. We need them 
[government] to take the boot off our throats so we can breathe and stay above water.  
(Print Newsroom Manager, 25. 09. 12)  
• Interference from advertisers and company directors in editorial matters was common. We 
were a new company. Initially we did not attract a lot of advertising. There was a lot of 
interference from our publisher. He started micro-managing the newsroom to the extent of 
telling us what to write in the editorial column and banning anti-corporate stories. 
Controversial stories were often pulled out by the publisher at the request of major 
advertisers. (Former subeditor, 24. 09. 12) 
• I am aware of stories being dropped at the request of board members acting on behalf of 
advertisers. Sometimes, stories were covered based on advertisers’ request. The request was 
usually channelled into the newsroom through the company executive. (University-educated 
journalist, 01.10.12) 
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Revelations by an interviewee with a long and distinguished record in the Fiji media show that 
advertiser pressure was prevalent even in the 1970s and 1980s. The interviewee stated:  
 
• There was always pressure from the advertisers. One of the first front-page stories I did as a 
reporter was about [an international] jet catching fire after take-off from Nadi International 
Airport. The story made the front page. It upset the [airliner’s] general manager, who put 
pressure on our chief executive. But our editor would not have a bar of it.  (Former Editor 
Two, 03. 09. 12)  
 
The responses from the executive level were quite different: 
  
• The board does not interfere with the operations of the company. The board looks at strategic 
issues such as what the growth of the company needs to be. The board talks about the 
deployment of resources to enhance shareholder returns. They like to have an operational 
update but they do not interfere.  (Broadcast Executive Three, 24. 09. 12) 
• Our board is only concerned about the return to shareholders. They never came into the 
newsroom once to tell us how we should run the newsroom.  (Broadcast Executive Two, 28. 
09. 12) 
• Our owner is like any other owner. The owner wants us to do well, make profits and a 
decent return on investment. And that is where it ends. Does [the owner] come in here and 
tell us what to do? It does not.  (Broadcast Executive One, 26. 09. 12) 
 
Besides alleged commercial pressures on journalism, another major issue involved the alleged 
dearth of analysis and an apparent media fixation on politics and conflict. These are discussed next. 
 
Lack of analytical reporting, including fixation on politics and conflict  
Some interviewees felt that media are fixated on politics and emphasise conflict. The following 
comments encapsulate these sentiments: 
  
• We focus so much on the negativity that we forget the positive aspects, which could be just 
as important. But we have never turned our minds to it. It is the conditioning. It is human 
nature – we are drawn to the darker side. (Print Newsroom Manager, 25. 09. 12)  
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• If it bleeds it leads is living phrase. Politics is the top priority. Political reporters rank very 
high in the hierarchy since they fill the front pages.  (Former Print Journalist, 26. 09. 12)  
• Conflict and politics receive saturated coverage while poverty and rural development are 
neglected. Elections should be a time to force politicians to focus on social issues. But 
media’s emphasis is on tit-for-tat exchanges between politicians who create conflict as a 
distraction.  (Academic Three, 25. 09. 12)  
• There is a preoccupation with conflict and a reliance on prominent people. (Academic One, 
20. 09. 12) 
• Media have short memory since we have not been taught the importance of keeping records 
due to the pressure of churning out news stories daily and due to laziness. Politicians will 
say something new on a regular basis, contradicting completely what they might have said 
before. There is almost a zero practice of questioning this. (Broadcast Executive One, 26. 
09. 12) 
• Media are seen as organisations that can generate debate and shape public opinion. But 
sometimes they fail to do that. Journalists are easily swayed by politicians and report 
whatever they say – like a broken record. They are not asking the right questions to simulate 
thinking and discussion. They have not reached that stage yet. (Community Radio 
Broadcaster, 03. 10. 12)  
• The focus on politics disadvantages certain groups, such as youths, who feel they are not 
involved. They are saying, ‘we have got to get our voices in; we are sick and tired with the 
politics of old. Now is our time’. But they are not being heard. (Radio Talk Show Host, 27. 
09. 12) 
 
Two interviewees raised the issue about media allegedly ignoring positive developments.  
 
• We are more hung up about being negative rather than positive. Fiji has made more friends 
in the international community in the last four years than in the 30 years prior. That in itself 
merits a story. I am not saying we should never do negative stories – we have to bring the 
truth out. But at the same time we have to balance our stories with positive developments.  
(Broadcast Executive One, 26. 09. 12) 
• In a developing country like ours, a lot of people still rely on what they read, watch and 
hear. It influences their decision-making. Media could inspire people to look at things 
differently by being more positive.  (University-educated Journalist, 01. 10. 12) 
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One academic felt that while the Public Emergency Regulation was quite draconian, there had been 
some positive outcomes in terms of the ban on political reporting. The interviewee said: 
  
• Media’s job in a developing country is to inform people in a balanced way. People from all 
walks of life are doing newsworthy things, be they farmers, tourism workers, or people on 
construction sites. But historically they have not been given much prominence. The Fiji 
media were so used to publishing what politicians and bureaucrats had to say they did not 
know what to do when faced with a ban on political reporting. The ban forced media to 
focus on social issues, which is incredible. They would not have done it if not for the 2006 
coup because it’s easier to speak to a few prominent people rather than go to some rural 
area and talk to people about their issues. Since the coup, media have done a marvellous 
job reporting developmental issues. This type  of full range of reporting is the way to go.  
(Academic One, 20. 09. 12)  
 
The academic’s views about a disproportionate media focus on politics were supported by a 
journalist: 
 
• Journalists watched everything that the politicians did, including how they drank tea. Now 
they are focussed on human interest stories to retain a semblance of ownership since there 
is less censorship involved in such stories.  (Print Newsroom Manager, 25. 09. 12)  
 
However, a couple of interviewees did not begrudge the media focus on politics and conflict: 
 
• The problem is not the amount of time and space devoted to politics and conflict, but the 
amateur manner in which these issues are handled by inexperienced editors and reporters. 
We need a calibre of people who can provide newsroom leadership so that stories are 
moderated and the final product does not provoke a situation. (Former subeditor, 24. 09. 
12)  
 
One interviewee rejected the notion that politics and conflict reporting lacked depth:  
 
• How much in-depth is enough? Who draws that line? Who sets that standard? It’s one thing 
to talk about it, another thing to do something about it. We in the industry are actually doing 
it and evolving with it.  (Broadcast Executive Three, 24. 09. 12)  
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In sum, there was some concern about the alleged media emphasis on conflict and politics and feelings 
that coverage should be moderated with the reportage of some positive developments. This led on to 
discussions about alternative frames for reporting in conflict situations, presented in the following 
section.  
 
The viability of alternative news reporting frameworks  
On the issue of the viability of alternative reporting frames like peace journalism and development 
journalism, the interviewees were evenly mixed: some supported the idea, others were against it and 
some others seemed undecided, as the following comments indicate:  
 
• In a successful newspaper, there is always room for development news. We used to publish 
such news, which was readable and contributed to the paper’s good standing. (Former 
Editor Two, 03. 09. 12) 
• In the interest of nation-building, we have started reporting development issues more 
frequently while maintaining a focus on standard news. Development news has been moved 
to the more prominent news pages to maintain a national outlook. (Section Editor at a 
Daily, 27. 09. 12)  
• Fiji journalists are groomed in the western, confrontationist, approach, which at times is 
necessary. Equally necessary is a non-confrontational approach to tap into positive feelings 
in the country.  (Broadcast Executive One, 26. 09. 12)  
 
Interviewees from outside the news media sector expressed most strongly the need for development 
news and conflict-sensitive reporting frames. 
 
• What is newsworthy is a subjective call based on the editor’s whim. There are 
developmental and nation-building issues that could be talked about, but they are not. The 
appeal is for media to be more inclusive. It boils down to journalists being introspective and 
asking some fundamental questions of themselves: What is their duty as human beings? Why 
are they in this business? What is their role? Is it to create problems, or prolong a conflict?  
(Academic One, 20. 09. 12) 
 
Two interviewees indicated that their organisations were re-considering how they covered certain 
issues and that they were reprioritising the editorial focus. One of them stated that their organisation 
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had adopted government’s proclaimed non-racial ideology and stopped covering “divisive issues” 
because:  
 
• Fiji’s unique situation warrants a different approach. Everyone is affected if something goes 
wrong in the country, so media cannot operate in isolation. (Broadcast Executive One, 26. 
09. 12) 
• My organisation supports development journalism in line with the Bainimarama 
Government’s pro-Fiji policy.  (Section Editor at a Daily, 27. 09. 12)  
 
However, in one interviewee’s experience, development journalism initiatives can be cut short if 
they conflict with the media organisation’s commercial goals, or when it upsets advertisers. The 
interviewee recalled: 
  
• We introduced an in-depth segment on development issues in 2011, including consumer 
rights. But it was short-lived due to pressure from advertisers who did not like negative 
product reviews.  (Broadcast Newsroom Manager One, 18. 09. 12)  
 
One interviewee felt that media reports merely reflect the existing divisions in Fiji society, which are 
rooted in the country’s history. In his view, blaming the media was the old case of “shooting the 
messenger”: 
 
• For 25 years we have been stuck in confrontation – political, military, religious, racial. We 
have grown up in this culture. When we report it we are scape-goated and called racists.  
(Print Newsroom Manager, 25. 09. 12)  
 
Questions about the nature of reporting and media reform can perhaps be better addressed in the 
context of defining (or redefining) media’s role in Fijian society. This is the next issue for 
discussion. 
 
Media role in nation-building and the future of journalism 
Most interviewees stated that in a developing country like Fiji, media should have a nation-building 
role, although they differed on how this could best be fulfilled, as the discussion shows: 
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• Media should stick to their basic role based on neutrality. The code of ethics is the best 
guide. Media cannot assume a nation-building role without first covering the basics 
properly. Otherwise they will do more harm than good. (Broadcast Newsroom Manager 
Two, 28. 09. 12)  
 
Interviewees from outside the news media sector were more inclined to link news media’s role to 
what they saw as the needs of the country. Three of the interviewees stated that in charting a role for 
themselves, news media should consider the upheavals Fiji had gone through and based on this, 
determine the direction media needed to move: 
  
• Because of coups and political conflicts in the last 25 years, Fiji has achieved insufficient 
levels of social development. This has led to persistent and abject poverty in certain pockets 
across the country. Ongoing instability will simply make things harder. These are the issues 
media should consider in defining a future role. (Academic Three, 25. 09. 12) 
• Media’s role and conduct should be defined by a broader national framework. If media are 
to play a nation-building role, they have to learn from events that have taken place in the 
last 25 years and apply this knowledge to their work. Rather than just report events as they 
happen, media need to look back and then look forward. (Academic Two, 29. 09. 12)  
• In a developing country like Fiji, reporting frameworks should be underpinned by a nation-
building role. Journalists should be aware of the country’s history. They should seek to 
influence government policy by projecting the problems faced by society and drawing 
attention to them.  (Academic One, 20. 09. 12)  
 
With regard to the future of Fiji journalism, the interviewees felt that it is important to address 
difficulties relating to the 2010 Media Decree, boosting training and development and finding ways 
to arrest the apparent high rate of journalist attrition. Virtually all the interviewees who had 
operated under the Media Decree since 2010 felt that on the whole, it was too restrictive and needed 
to be reformed, as the following views indicate: 
 
• The decree is acceptable as a transitional law, but not as a permanent law with ironclad 
rules about how media should operate.  (Broadcast Executive Three, 24. 09. 12)  
• Something as critical as media regulation needs to be carefully considered rather than 
imposed arbitrarily. It should be based on negotiations between the media, government and 
civil society.  (University-educated journalist, 01. 10. 12)  
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For one interviewee, the high rate of journalist attrition is a most pressing issue. Unless it is 
addressed, journalism is “unlikely” to improve: 
 
• You cannot have a good future if you lose the quality of your core product – your content – 
through high staff turnover. Skills won’t come overnight and it is a major loss when your 
editorial staff leave after you have trained them for two or three years.  (Former subeditor, 
24. 09. 12) 
 
One interviewee emphasised that the State needs to focus on media development rather than just 
enforcement:  
 
• The State should provide resources to the development authority to deliver training, the key 
ingredient. At the present time, the Media Development Authority is just a penalising body 
rather than a development one. (Broadcast Executive Three, 24. 09. 12) 
 
This section concludes with a comment from an interviewee who stresses the crucial role of the 
media: 
 
• The media are enablers. They need to lead by example in terms of the issues they present 
and how they present them. In wild journalism freedom of speech means you can say just 
about anything. In the nation-building context, freedom of speech means much more. It is 
the responsibility of journalists to understand what freedom of speech means in their own 
contexts in terms of how it will affect them and the nation, not just for the present, but in 
future also.  (Radio Talkback Show host, 27 .09. 12)  
 
Synopsis of in-depth interviews  
On the whole, the in-depth interviews provide deeper insights into Fiji’s media landscape and the 
structural indicators that affect content. The interviews highlight the unique challenges of practising 
journalism in Fiji, based on journalists’ every-day experiences. These include State legislation, 
societal barriers, commercial and political pressures and apparent professional shortcomings partly 
due to lack of training opportunities.  
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5.7 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has presented the results of this research based on a four-pronged, complementary, 
methodological approach – content analysis, survey questionnaire, document research and in-depth 
interviews. The aim was to assess conflict reporting in a holistic manner by linking media content to 
the national media landscape, which encompassed journalists’ diversity and professionalism, the 
legal environment and the media ownership structure. The content analysis returned a peace 
journalism reading while the survey questionnaire showed a fairly diverse journalist corps with 
some gains in the areas of training and education. Available documents confirm that the legal 
environment has become more restrictive since the 2006 coup while the media ownership regime 
has become increasingly corporatised and ‘conglomerised’ over the 45 years since independence. In 
the main, these findings obtained by three differing qualitative methods were supported by the more 
probing in-depth interviews. 
 
The deeper implications of these results and findings are explored in the discussion and analysis 
presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX – DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the research results. This chapter analyses the results, starting with 
the content analysis of the print media’s coverage of Fiji’s 2006 general election. This is followed 
by an analysis of the questionnaire survey to gauge journalist diversity and professional capacity, 
views on conflict reporting and related issues. The chapter then moves on to the document review, 
which was undertaken to determine the nature of media legislation and media ownership in Fiji. 
Lastly, the chapter deliberates on the in-depth interview outcomes before summarising the 
discussions.  Where appropriate, the analysis uses triangulation by comparing the data generated by 
the different methods to increase the potency of the evaluation (Alexander et al., 2008). 
 
6.2 Content analysis  
 
Overview 
The preponderance of a peace journalism frame in the content analysis is somewhat surprising, both 
from national and international perspectives. Previous studies on Fiji media had alleged numerous 
cases of bias and misreporting, especially in relation to the coups (Devi, 1992; Duncan, 2002; C. 
Gounder, 2006; Obini, 2000; Robie, 2000, 2001, 2004; T. R Singh, 2011). These trends had raised 
the expectation of a war journalism framing.  Moreover, the content analysis focused on Fiji’s 2006 
general election. Elections can be contentious, even if not necessarily violent. The literature on 
Fiji’s ethnically-based political and electoral systems had also hinted at a war journalism reading, 
what with one observer describing the political race as a “zero-sum game pursued via a scorched-
earth policy” (Kant, 2012). This study’s peace journalism reading also contradicts some 
international studies of a similar nature. Such studies have largely returned war journalism readings, 
whether applied to intra-State or inter-State conflicts, in both the Asia–Pacific region and beyond, 
regardless of whether the coverage was by domestic or international media (see Fong, 2009; 
Galtung &  Ruge, 1965; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Obijiofor, 2011; Obonyo & Fackler, 2009; S. Lee, 
2010; S. Lee & Maslog, 2005; Shinar, 2009; Wilson & Devere, 2013).  
 
The similar findings in peace journalism–inspired content analysis conducted in different parts of 
the world appear to support claims that, although international media systems and journalistic 
cultures differ widely, they share some similar traits based on a dominant western-influenced 
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approach to news reporting  (see O’Sullivan, 2001; Rooney, Papoutsaki & Pamba, 2004). 
Nevertheless, there are some plausible reasons for this study’s departure from the frame. A partial 
explanation for the peace journalism reading could be rooted in the Fiji media’s 2000 coup 
experiences, when the media were roundly criticised for the allegedly racially-provocative nature of 
their reporting (C. Gounder, 2006; Obini, 2000; Robie, 2000, 2001, 2004; T. R Singh, 2011). It is 
possible that a chastened media moderated their coverage of the 2006 elections. This reasoning is 
supported by in-depth interviews. Some respondents indicated that since the 2000 coup, they are 
now more careful about how they handle certain topics surrounding ethnicity, religion, and politics. 
 
Another plausible reason for the peace journalism frame could lie in the involvement of the Fiji 
armed forces in the 2006 elections. During political campaigns, the military warned politicians not 
to inflame ethnic tensions. Military commander Bainimarama even told candidates they would be 
imprisoned should they “instill fear” (Vunileba, 2006, p. 1). Such warnings may have caused the 
candidates to tone down their rhetoric. Indeed, indicators like language, content creating undue fear 
or anxiety, consociationalism–majoritarianism and ethnicity–religion all returned peace journalism 
readings (see content analysis results section in Chapter 5).  
 
Domestic versus international media coverage 
Further insights into the content analysis can be gained through comparisons with Wilson and 
Devere’s (2013) work on Radio New Zealand’s coverage of four Pacific Islands countries during 
June and July 2012. They recorded an overall 74 per cent war journalism frame. The Fiji component 
of their study returned a fairly strong 72 per cent war journalism frame (pp. 140–142). A core 
difference between this particular study and Wilson and Devere’s (2013) work is that the former 
covered reporting by domestic media while the latter looked at coverage by foreign media. 
Notwithstanding the different time periods, it is likely the domestic media were more culturally 
sensitive, and perceptive about local tensions than international media. This could partly explain the 
stark difference between this study’s peace journalism reading (domestic media) and Wilson and 
Devere’s (2013) strong war journalism reading (overseas media).This analysis is further 
substantiated by the Papua New Guinea component of Wilson and Devere’s (2013) study. That 
study coincided with Papua New Guinea’s general election, and recorded a strong 91.2 per cent war 
journalism frame. The authors logically concluded that coverage of elections and politics is more 
likely to return a war journalism frame due to their contentious nature (pp. 140–141). However, this 
study’s analysis of Fiji’s 2006 elections defied such expectations. Again, aside from the 
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aforementioned variables, the key difference is that this Fiji study looked at coverage by local 
media whereas Wilson and Devere’s (2013) study looked at coverage by international media. 
The Fiji media were arguably better informed by experience and as such, more conscious and 
cautious about local sensitivities and tensions, especially after the 2000 coup. In Papua New 
Guinea’s case, the international media were less constrained by local issues, although this 
conclusion is limited by the absence of data on Papua New Guinea’s election coverage by the 
national media. However, it seems that journalists in conflict-stressed zones are more sensitive 
about local tensions than colleagues in established democracies, especially after a major  upheaval. 
This finding is supported by various research (Iroga, 2008; R. Howard, 2003, 2009; also see 
International Media Support, 2003).  
 
Research in Kenya shows that in the build-up to the 2007–2008 presidential election, media adopted 
a war journalism stance. But after the deadly post-election violence, media rallied behind 
government to promote peace messages (Obonyo & Fackler, 2009; Ojwang, 2009; Zenebe, 2012). 
Long (2013) interviewed more than 30 Kenyan media professionals as part of a project on conflict 
sensitive journalism and found a more contrite and reflective national media corps. Coverage of the 
2013 election in the ethnically-tense country was far more restrained than in 2007. Closer to Fiji, 
Iroga’s (2008) interviews with several leading Solomon Island journalists showed similar results. 
The interviewees stated that after witnessing the people’s suffering during the county’s internal 
conflict, they felt obliged to assist the State in peace-building. Similarly, Lee and Maslog (2005) 
recorded a peace journalism framing by Sri Lankan papers after the December 2001 ceasefire. They 
concluded that the change reflected a conscious effort by journalists to promote a culture of peace 
(p. 323). To some extent, this shows that conflict reporting can be approached and reported in 
various ways rather than highlight, or lead, with the tensions and violence. Journalists have at least 
some degree of freedom over what perspectives to emphasise or de-emphasise.   
 
Negative peace versus positive peace 
This study’s unusual results raise some interesting issues. A prominent question is whether the 
peace journalism frame represents a temporary phase or a sustainable, long-term, trend. The validity 
and longevity of peace journalism frames founded on government or military coercion would seem 
to be doubtful. It would be akin to what Galtung (1996) describes as negative peace. Such peace is 
enforced by repressive State apparatuses. It is typified by an absence of direct physical violence. 
Positive peace, conversely, is grounded in the constructive resolution of conflict based on universal 
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human rights principles (Galtung, 1996, pp. 31–31). This indicates that positive peace is 
harmonious and deeply-rooted whereas negative peace is superficial, acrimonious and fragile.  
If this study’s peace journalism reading was influenced by undue military pressure, it would be 
classified as negative peace rather than positive peace. Viewed from this perspective, the peace 
journalism reading is not entirely good news, at least not for the long term. As Albert Einstein said, 
‘Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding’ (http://www.notable 
quotes.com/e/einstein_albert.html).  
 
Salient indicators of peace and war journalism 
Other indications of peace journalism in this study such as language, nonpartisanship and 
consociation–majoritarianism look positive. However, they could reflect that the Fiji media were 
merely upholding the core principles of their professional code of practice, such as balance, fairness 
and objectivity, rather than actively promoting peace. In their study, S. T. Lee and Maslog (2005, p. 
324) had concluded that some peace journalism indicators, although important, were mere 
extensions of the objectivity credo of mainstream media. In the Fiji context, this means that by 
adhering to the established tenets of their profession, Fiji journalists were subconsciously achieving 
some peace journalism outcomes.  
 
This finding supports R. Howard’s contention (2003, 2009) that even if professional journalists do 
not set out to reduce conflict, they can achieve positive results by presenting accurate and impartial 
news. This Fiji study’s findings underscore the relevance and usefulness of instilling the basics of 
journalism in conflict reporting, something easily overlooked in the heated debate surrounding 
concepts like peace journalism (see the literature review in chapter 2). Journalism basics is often a 
weak area among journalists in developing countries due to various constraints in the media 
landscape, such as lack of training opportunities and poor working conditions. These shortcomings 
are also major issues in Fiji, as this research has shown. Turning to this study’s three salient 
indicators of war journalism – orientation, sources, and context – they denote a prevalence of 
single-source, elite-orientated stories that lacked depth. Both Wilson and Devere (2013, pp. 141–
143) and S. T, Lee and Maslog (2005, p. 311) also recorded war journalism readings for these 
indicators. These commonalities betray a certain predilection for single-sourced, elite-orientated 
stories that are focused on the present. This reinforces the earlier point about certain transcending 
traits in news media culture and practice, regardless of country or region. The strong preference for 
single sources and elite spokespersons contradicts professional journalistic norms of objectivity, 
fairness and balance. 
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This study’s strong war journalism reading for elite sources (72 per cent) is worth further 
discussion. This finding is common for other studies in this mould (Fong, 2009; Iroga, 2008; 
Obonyo & Fackler, 2009; Wilson & Devere, 2013). It would seem to support this study’s political 
economy theory, specifically Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) propaganda model, which highlights 
that media favour elite sources over non-elite ones, based on common and shared interests. It seems 
that media in developing countries like Fiji gravitate towards people of rank and authority rather 
than ordinary people, although the same could be said of media in developed countries (see Lynch 
& Galtung, 2010). In a sense, the preference for elite sources can be justified on the basis of their 
specialist knowledge, their powerful positions and their decision-making power. In Fiji, the elites 
are instrumental in shaping the country’s social, economic and political order (Boege, et al., 2013, 
p. 20), which explains why they dominate the news.  
 
However, allowing elite news sources to monopolise the discourse carries certain risks, especially 
in multi-ethnic societies that harbour extremist elements. From their vantage positions, such 
elements can use the media to exaggerate threats, inflame grievances, and hasten the escalation 
toward violent conflict (see Frohardt & Temin, 2003; J. Smith, 2006). In Fiji, the 2000 coup plotters 
allegedly handpicked George Speight as their front man because of his skills with the media. 
Speight adroitly exploited the media’s penchant for conflict to gain access to a national and 
international platform to propagate xenophobic views and fuel the crisis (Field, 2002, 2007; Media 
Councils . . ., 2004; Ofotalau, 2000; Robie, 2001). The Speight example suggests that when it 
comes to conflict reporting, media should also consider non-elite sources rather than rely only on 
elite sources who may have a vested interest in instigating and prolonging conflicts.  
 
Moreover, the war journalism frame for sources and context denotes a heavy media reliance on 
officialdom and the bureaucracy for news. Context was lacking partly because of the newspapers’ 
preference for shorter news stories. A similar issue was identified by Lee and Maslog (2005) and 
Wilson and Devere (2013). Indeed, during the course of the content analysis, it was noticed that 
most news items merely reported political rhetoric or they dealt with logistical matters concerning 
the elections. There seemed to be little critical or sustained reporting on public interest issues like 
health, education, employment and infrastructure. To get a more meaningful outcome from the data, 
a peace journalism rubric on its own was deemed insufficient. Subsequently, a new line of enquiry 
was opened to determine the level of print media coverage of some of the more critical issues 
affecting the country. This is discussed in the following section.  
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New line of enquiry 
Over the years, various reports have raised some perennial issues concerning Fiji society, such as 
land tenure, increasing poverty, unemployment and crime, urbanisation and housing, health and 
education and so forth (see Boege, et al., 2013; Naidu, 2005; 2013). These issues re-emerged during 
Fiji’s constitution review process in 2012, with the Ghai Commission receiving 7000 written and 
oral submissions from throughout the country (Draft constitution: the explanatory report, 2012). 
Such issues can be defined as the structural causes of conflict in Fiji and the Pacific (Henderson & 
Watson, 2005; Naidu, 2013). A simple count of the stories in the sample shows that the seven 
developmental issues yielded a total of 44 stories from the sample of 350 stories (13 per cent). The 
bulk of the stories ¬132 (38 per cent) – largely covered logistical and operational matters involving 
the election. The rest (49 per cent) largely consisted of statements and interviews from politicians 
and aspiring candidates. Stories about logistical matters were mostly sourced from the bureaucracy. 
This included government ministries, the national elections office, police, military, political 
organisations and so forth. These organisations utilised press releases, press conferences, media 
statements and interviews to secure media space.  
 
There were numerous examples of inconsequential logistical matters taking priority over national 
issues. On the eve of the election, on May 5, 2006, the Fiji Times devoted page three – a prime 
news page – to stories dealing with theft of FJD6000 in allowances for polling clerks; transportation 
of ballot boxes; police checks on poll facilities; the observer mission; and military warnings against 
bullying tactics. Some coverage of logistical matters is necessary but questions arise when such 
stories are so numerous they crowd out developmental issues. For instance, a national debate 
involving all major political leaders just three days before the election was given less prominence 
by all three papers in the study. Some developmental issues were addressed in feature articles, 
question and answer interviews and columns. These were not part of the sample, which focused on 
news stories. But these longer pieces made up only 10 per cent of all articles in the period chosen 
for the study. In general, both features and news items lacked depth. Political comments and 
campaign messages were reported without much probing.  
 
One example is an address by the then Minister of Works and Energy, the late Savenaca 
Draunidalo, published in the Fiji Times on May 2, 2006. The six-paragraph story merely quoted 
Draunidalo thanking workers and asking them to keep up their good work. The reporter missed the 
opportunity to question the minister about some major problems with the national infrastructure.  
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A rare example of a story that addressed some national issues appeared in the April 29, 2006, issue 
of the Fiji Daily Post. At a Fiji Labour Party rally in Suva, speakers raised concerns about Fiji’s 
90,000 slum dwellers, the country’s low growth rate, its FJD2.6 billion debt and the 15,000 school 
leavers for the year who would struggle to find jobs. However, these issues were not sufficiently 
followed up or covered in any great detail. Indeed, a newsroom manager spoken with in the in-
depth interviews had commented that important stories were often left unattended. This study set 
out to prove or disprove that media may be exacerbating conflict through the use of inflammatory 
language. But it found something seemingly more significant – the under-reporting of critical socio-
economic issues, which are at the heart of most conflicts.  
 
These findings could be a manifestation of Fiji’s young, inexperienced and underqualified 
journalists, as revealed in this study’s survey questionnaire and in Robie (2003a). Such journalists  
seem to shy away from covering complex issues, in favour of handouts from the bureaucracy. 
Indeed, the crucial land tenure issue received less coverage than the international election observers, 
which some would consider a journalistic travesty. The research was seeking evidence of journalist 
manipulation by politicians and other elite actors with privileged access to the media. It found this, 
and perhaps more. The manipulation seems to be a two-way rather than a one-way process. 
Journalists are ‘willing victims’ in that they readily use elite sources and the bureaucracy, who 
provide a ready supply of news. This arrangement also holds potential, all-round benefits – 
journalists are able to meet story quotas and production deadlines due to a steady stream of stories 
from easily accessible sources; politicians, bureaucrats, and other elites are able to secure sustained 
media coverage; media organisations are able to optimise operating costs. 
 
This situation suggests a symbiotic relationship between Fiji’s print media and the political elite and 
their functionaries. It appears to resonate with elements of Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda 
theory, which states that journalists are drawn to powerful sources of information by economic 
necessity and reciprocity of interests (1988, p. 18).  This trend seems to validate Larson’s claim that 
Fiji has a “bureaucratically-orientated” media existing as part of the country’s larger political 
structure (2008, pp. 14–27). This would be reminiscent of institutionalism, or what makes for a 
“controlled society” (Keeble, Tulloch & Zollmann, cited in Robie, 2010, p. 223). However, the 
apparent shortcomings in the content are not solely due to lack of journalist proficiency. They could 
be partly attributed to the lack of time and space given for journalistic endeavour because of the 
tyranny of tight production schedules underpinned by cost considerations.   
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Synopsis of content analysis 
The content analysis was used to address Research Question One: Are the Fiji print media 
inflammatory, as is often alleged?  The overall peace journalism framing suggests that the print 
media were not inflammatory in their coverage of the 2006 elections in that they used moderate 
language and exercised some balance. However, war journalism readings for some individual 
indicators like context and orientation indicate that stories lacked background and relied heavily on 
elite sources and the bureaucracy for news. Of further concern is the scant coverage of crucial 
developmental issues like land, as revealed by a new line of enquiry.   
 
In the next section, we analyse the findings of the survey questionnaire. 
 
 
6.3 Questionnaire survey analysis 
 
Overview 
The survey questionnaire part of the research design was meant to assess the media landscape – in 
this case the working journalists’ diversity, professional capacity and views and attitudes toward 
conflict reporting. The aim was to identify any links between the nature of the content and the 
media infrastructure, which includes journalists. The results have been grouped according to the 
various themes that emerged from the analysis. These are outlined and discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
Media platforms – traditional versus new   
The preponderance of print (52 per cent) and broadcast (34 per cent) media workers shows the 
dominance of traditional media formats in Fiji. In contrast, the newspaper industry in some parts of 
the world, including Australia and New Zealand, has been scaling down or closing operations in the 
face of increasing competition from the Internet (Wunsch-Vincent & Vickery, 2010). However, 
online and digital media are gaining ground in Fiji, accounting for some 14 per cent of the total 
journalist workforce compared to two per cent in Robie’s (2003a) survey a decade earlier. Fiji’s 
Iinternet connectivity had increased to 37 per cent by June 2014, which suggests increased 
migration to online platforms in future. Indeed, all major Fiji news companies have their own well-
established websites, with some incorporating multimedia and also utilising social media like 
Facebook.  
	   170	  
 
 
Journalist age, experience, qualifications, career satisfaction  
As mentioned, the recorded mean journalist age of 31 is lower than the global mean age, which 
ranges from a low 33–36 years for countries like Australia, Chile, China, Malaysia, and Singapore, 
to a high of 45–53 years for Denmark and Japan (Willnat, Weaver & Choi, 2013; Weaver & 
Willnat, 2012). Fiji journalists’ mean experience is higher than Robie’s recorded mean experience 
of 3.5 years a decade earlier (2003a). However, the largest cluster, 31.8 percent, had between zero 
to three years experience only, with a significant 54.5 per cent boasting less than six years 
experience. A handful of journalists aged 45 years and over were largely involved in managing 
newsrooms rather than writing or reporting.  
 
The age and experience components betray a high journalist turnover rate, a finding confirmed by 
the in-depth interviews. This could be linked to journalists’ career progression and remuneration, 
for which satisfaction levels ranked at 61 per cent and 39 per cent respectively, possibly indicating 
that while a majority of journalists are satisfied with their career progression, they are not 
necessarily content with their remuneration. This could be one cause of the apparent high turnover 
rate. This survey, in conjunction with Robie’s survey (2003a) and other relevant literature, shows 
that over the last decade or more, Fiji has had a relatively young and inexperienced journalist corps 
left to deal with some weighty issues. For example, the average age of journalists covering the May 
2000 coup d`état was only 24 years (Robie, 2003a, 2003b). Looking at the research results, one 
cannot avoid concluding that journalist attrition is an ongoing problem and one of the major 
structural weaknesses in the Fiji media landscape.  
 
The lack of depth in reporting, conspicuous in the content analysis, may well be attributable, at least 
in part, to this cause. The high rate of attrition is usually blamed on low salaries (Fiji Media Watch 
head calls . . ., 2003; Padarath, 2003; Yaya, 2002). However, various other factors are also at play. 
These need to be understood if the issue is to be properly assessed and addressed. Fiji’s coup culture 
has also contributed to journalist attrition; the media sector never fully recovered from the exodus 
caused by the political upheavals in 1987 and 2000 (Herman, Siwatibau & Sweetman, 2009; 
Morgan & Thomas, 1996).  According to the in-depth interviews, the situation was compounded by 
the 2006 coup, with staff leaving at higher-than-normal levels. This is plausible. The coup caused a 
major economic downturn, resulting in the devaluation of the Fijian currency in 2009 and an 
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increase in sales tax in 2011. This was worsened by unfavourable global economic conditions such 
as the 2007–2009 global food and fuel price crisis (United Nations, 2012).  
These inflationary pressures saw journalists’ salaries become caught in the doldrums. The 
drastically reduced the purchasing power of the local dollar could be explanation enough for 
journalists’ predominant response in the questionnaire survey that they were satisfied with their 
careers but not so much with their remuneration. These conditions dovetailed with the punitive 
media decree, which was yet another push factor for journalists. These variables conceivably 
combined to create the ‘perfect storm’ for journalist flight from the media sector. Indeed, in terms 
of career satisfaction, Robie’s (2003a) survey recorded a relatively more content group than the one 
in this present study.  
 
Fiji’s journalist turnover problem is similar to that in other Asia–Pacific countries, even if it was 
exacerbated by the country’s coup culture. In Papua New Guinea, new recruits are routinely asked 
to fill in for departing experienced journalists (Kanekane, 2006). In China, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, two in five journalists have less than five years of work experience whereas in European 
countries like Belgium, Denmark and Finland, the average journalist spends more than 15 years on 
the job (Kanekane, 2006; Willnat, Weaver & Choi, 2013; Weaver & Willnat, 2012). While 
inexperience within Fiji’s journalist corps is a concern, the survey recorded some progress in the area of 
training and qualifications, with 49 per cent of the respondents having achieved some level of formal 
accreditation. This represents a 23 per cent increase over Robie’s (2003a) figure of 26 per cent a decade 
ago. This growth is partly attributable to the increased availability of journalism courses in Fiji and the 
region through recently-established tertiary and vocations training institutes (see Skuse, 2012). 
 
In terms of journalist qualifications, Fiji has yet to reach the level Papua New Guinea had achieved 
over a decade ago, when 81 per cent of journalists Robie had surveyed held either a degree or a 
diploma (2003a, p. 338). In Papua New Guinea, university-based journalism education started in 
1975, 21 years before it did in Fiji (Robie, 2003a; 2004, 2014). Moreover, the Papua New Guinea 
media industry still seems more receptive to journalism education than Fiji’s does. The late Fiji 
journalist Robert Keith-Reid once claimed that journalism graduates suffered from “academic 
anaemia” (2000). The global trend is for more journalists to enter the profession via school, 
department or institute for journalism education (Deuze, 2006).  However, one of the downsides of 
academically-qualified journalism graduates in Fiji, as far as the news media sector is concerned, is 
that they usually take up better-paid positions in other industries (see Robie, 2003a, 2014).  
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Newsroom diversity  
Numerically, male journalists slightly outnumbered females by 56 per cent to 44. However, nearly 
twice as many males (16) as females (nine) held managerial positions (editor, chief-of-staff, etc.), 
though representation in the junior ranks is somewhat more even. According to various international 
studies, gender imbalance in newsrooms fosters male-centric work cultures. This could lead to scant 
and stereotypical media coverage of women (Byerly & Walker, 2007; Cotter, 2011; J. McGregor & 
Comrie, 2002; Nicholl, 2006; Norris, 1997; North, 2012; Ragodoo, 2012). In Fiji’s case, Usman’s 
(2012) content analysis of the portrayal of female candidates in the 1999 and 2006 national 
elections found that the women received negligible and clichéd coverage. In the course of in-depth 
interviews for this study, one relatively young female respondent spoke about her struggles to be 
taken seriously in a male-dominated newsroom.  
 
The literature on how far gender-balanced newsrooms actually help the cause of women seems 
inconclusive (Byerly & Walker, 2007; Cotter, 2011; J. McGregor & Comrie, 2002; Nicholl, 2006; 
Norris, 1997; North, 2012; Ragodoo, 2012). But some Pacific Island campaigners insist that gender-
balanced newsrooms could help promote equality and fairness in coverage (Bhagwan-Rolls, 2007). 
From a conflict reporting perspective, strategies to promote gender equality in newsrooms and 
women’s visibility in the media make sense given research showing women’s positive impact in 
conflict resolution in places like Kenya and Nepal (Klein, 2011). In the Pacific, women have been 
credited with pacifying tensions and facilitating conflict resolution in Fiji, Solomon Islands and 
Bougainville (Bhagwan-Rolls, 2006).  
 
Effect of journalists’ political beliefs, ethnicity and religion on their work 
Aside from gender balance, other important variables of newsroom diversity in multi-ethnic 
societies such as Fiji include religion, ethnicity and political affiliation. This survey shows that in 
the decade since Robie’s 2001 survey, indigenous Fijian representation in Fiji’s national journalist 
corps has increased to 49 per cent, followed by Indo-Fijians (39 per cent), and others (10 per cent). 
This is roughly reflective of the country’s overall demographics (Bureau of Statistics, 2007). In 
Robie’s (2003) survey, indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian journalists were split at 42 per cent each, 
with seven per cent Rotuman and the rest being other races.  
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Since the 2000 coup, the ethnic, religious and political makeup of Fiji newsrooms has become an 
increasingly important issue. In his MA study, T. R. Singh (2011) claimed that the dominance of 
ethnic Fijian journalists in the Fiji Times newsroom contributed to the paper’s alleged racially-
biased coverage of the country’s first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, in 1999 (for 
rebuttals, see Hunter, 2009; Rika, 2009).  
 
Newsroom diversity is an issue in other troubled Pacific Islands countries also. In Solomon Islands, 
former local journalist Duran Angiki claimed controversially that ethnic Malaitan dominance of the 
country’s news media during the conflict disadvantaged the Guadalcanal community in terms of 
coverage (Pacific media gatekeepers . . ., 2002; also see Iroga, 2008). This survey showed that more 
respondents (34 per cent) felt that their work was affected by their ethnicity and/or religion than by 
their political views (20 per cent). This indicates that journalists’ religion and/or ethnicity has a 
stronger effect on them than their political beliefs. This is not surprising. In Fiji, some 
commentators have noted, people mobilise more along ethnic and religious lines and less along 
ideological lines (Sutherland, 1992).  
 
Given the country’s historical ethnic, religious and political divisions, it is perhaps surprising that most 
respondents in this survey indicated that their work is not affected by the aforementioned variables. This 
outcome contradicts studies that claim that the national media place a distinct emphasis on indigenous 
Fijian customs, rituals and way of life, side-lining other cultures (Kaplan, 1995; Norton, 2000; Rutz, 
1995). While there are no specific studies on how the Fiji media cover religion, the subject has been 
broached indirectly by Connell (2007) and Newland (2009), who suggest that Christianity is given 
deferential treatment by the media. This is plausible given the relative dominance of indigenous 
Fijian journalists over the past decade, as established in Robie (2003a) and also in this survey.  
 
The claimed preponderance of Christian messages is also conceivable given that the Methodist 
Church, the dominant denomination with close to 300,000 members, is a fairly powerful spiritual, 
cultural and political influence among indigenous Fijians (Connell, 2007; Fiji Islands Bureau of 
Statistics, 2008; Halapua, 2003; Newland, 2009). From a conflict reporting viewpoint, this issue is 
worth further discussion. As former editor-at-large at Time Inc., Daniel Okrent says, religious 
diversity in the newsroom is important for providing different perspectives and to safeguard a 
functioning democracy (see Religious diversity in the newsroom, 2009).  
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To understand the Church’s influence in indigenous society, a brief look at the background of 
Christianity in the region is necessary. Just as in Africa, Asia and the Americas, Christianity helped 
accelerate colonisation in the Pacific by banishing indigenous beliefs and herding the natives under 
the new, monotheistic order (Comaroff, 1986; Horton, 1971; Newland, 2009). The Christian 
doctrine was instrumental in ending tribal bloodshed and cannibalism. It was also an effective form 
of social and political control to subjugate the masses and get them to conform and comply (Fer, 
2011; also see Helen Ellerbe’s book, The Dark Side of Christian History). In Fiji, Wesleyan 
missionaries were the first to proselytise Christianity in the 1830s, so Methodism became the most 
firmly rooted Christian belief system, with the lever of control eventually passing on to the 
indigenous clergy (Newland, 2009). They reinforced this power system by infusing it with 
indigenous social, cultural, political and economic institutions.  
 
Garrett (1982, p. 114) writes that the Church (lotu) became intertwined with two other core 
indigenous Fijian values – vanua (country) and matanitu (chiefly authority). This represented an 
almost “Trinitarian solemnity in the inner lives of Fijians”. Robie (2009a) describes the indigenous 
Fijian political, chiefly and clerical establishment as the fifth estate – a traditional cultural pillar that 
is a counterbalance to all other forms of power, including the news media. Once courted by the 
colonial establishment, the Methodist Church, in particular, remains a major force. Today it is 
wooed by chiefs, prime ministers, coup makers and military dictators alike (see Halapua, 2003). For 
an indigenous Fijian government, looking after the church is both a cultural and a religious 
obligation. It also makes political sense in that it keeps the core electorate satisfied (see the Bishop 
of Polynesia, Dr Winston Halapua’s (2003) book, Tradition, Lotu, and Militarism in Fiji).  
 
The Church and the State may be separate on paper but historically, the Methodist Church has 
enjoyed a cosy relationship with all indigenous Fijian governments. The problem arises when a 
secular party takes power, as in 1987 and 2000. The Church feels threatened and often falls in with 
coup plotters. The planning of the 1987 coup took place in the Bible Society of Fiji headquarters in 
Suva (see Naidu, 2005; Newland, 2009; Robertson & Sutherland, 2001; Robie, 2003a, 2014; 
Sharpham, 2000). It should be pointed out that the Methodist Church does have a small Indian 
Division and within the church’s indigenous followers there are some dissidents and reformers. 
This includes two former Church presidents, Reverend Josateki Koroi and Reverend Ilaitia Tuwere, 
who condemned the coups. In addition, some laity are concerned about the politicisation of the 
Church. But they are in the minority and the Church is often associated with ethno-religious 
nationalism (see Garrett, 1990; Newland, 2009).  
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Notwithstanding the questionnaire survey results, the literature suggests that religious beliefs pose a 
quandary for indigenous journalists caught between their professional calling and their community 
values. This is reflected in how the media simultaneously criticise and exalt the Methodist Church at 
the same time. For instance, a Fiji Times editorial reproached the Methodist Church for its strong 
opposition to the 2006 military coup but at the same time urged it to work with government 
(Newland, 2009). The elevated status that the country’s most prominent newspaper accorded to the 
Church appears similar to the esteem that indigenous Fijians have for the institution, reflected in calls 
from some quarters for Fiji to be declared a Christian state (Halapua, 2003). Journalistically, the issue 
can be further conceptualised through this study’s normative media, political economy and conflict 
reporting frameworks. For instance, the Committee of Concerned Journalists think tank holds that 
media’s “first loyalty is to citizens” (Pew Research Journalism Project, 2014). This means that 
media must show ultimate commitment to citizens’ interests, not just the interests of the political or 
economic system. Media should also portray a representative picture of all constituent groups in 
society. Ignoring certain citizens was akin to disenfranchising them (Pew Research Journalism 
Project, 2014).  
 
Towards this end, the Fiji Times’s editorial stance shows that it feels that the Methodist Church 
should have a say in how the country is governed. It promoted this line without bestowing the same 
privilege on the country’s other major religions, Hinduism and Islam, or the other Christian 
denominations. From a media perspective, it can sometimes be difficult determining whose interests 
the Methodist Church represents – the people or successive indigenous Fijian governments – since 
the church is seen to be close to both. The interests of the government and that of the people are not 
by any means always the same.  Another journalistic issue involves determining who the Methodist 
Church regards as ‘the people’ – only its members or all citizens, regardless of ethnicity and/or 
religion? This is a moot point given the Methodist Church’s support for the 1987 and 2000 
nationalistic coups (Halapua, 2003). At the heart of such arguments is the politicisation of the 
Methodist Church due to its closeness to the centre of power.  
 
By contrast, the Catholic Church and Hindu and Muslim religious organisations had remained on 
the political periphery. However, this is not to say that they are not prone to getting involved in 
politics should the opportunity arise. The Catholic Church supported the Bainimarama coup on the 
grounds of multiracialism and social justice (Newland, 2009).  
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Fiji’s largest Hindu organisation, the Sanatan Dharam Pratinidhi Sabha, also lent its support to the 
Bainimarama Government but some prominent Sabha members criticised the decision. Another 
major Hindu organisation, the Then India Sanmarga Ikya Sangam, unequivocally condemned the 
Bainimarama coup (Shyyam, 2013; R. Prasad, 2009). The issue for the Fiji media is that religious 
organisations are, in some respects, part of the political landscape involving various power 
dynamics and vested interests. This needs to be taken into consideration before putting religious 
bodies on a pedestal. 
 
Language issues 
The finding that English was not the first language of most respondents and yet the language of 
work for the majority of respondents is no surprise. English has been Fiji’s official common 
language, taught at all schools. Moreover, the English language media have always been dominant 
– especially print and television – as part of the British colonial legacy (Geraghty, 2001). But first 
language literacy is an important issue in the Pacific Islands. Vanuatu government minister Ralph 
Regenvanu points out that this region is one of the world’s richest in languages and insists that the 
way to maintain that is to increase usage of vernacular (Sergel & Scott, 2013). Geraghty emphasises 
that 95 per cent of Fiji’s population have either Fijian or Fiji Hindi as their first language, yet 
English language media proliferate. He calls this a “tyranny by the minority” (2001, p. 164). A 
decade after Geraghty published his paper, the Bainimarama Government implemented a landmark 
policy requiring all schools to teach conversational Fijian and Hindi (Ministry of Education, 2011). 
From a conflict reporting perspective, this could be an important development: in Geraghty’s 
words, “the obvious way for people of different cultures to get along is to learn about and respect 
each other’s language and culture, not attempt to communicate through a language which is foreign 
to both communities” (2001, p. 166). In the past, vernacular media has been targeted by coup 
makers and extremists to mobilise group support (Ewins, 1998). The government’s bilingual policy 
and promotion of vernacular in schools present the media sector with some new opportunities and 
challenges with regards to the development of vernacular media as a means of promoting cross-
cultural understanding.  
 
Views on standards, media law and ethics and public regard for media   
Journalists’ self-evaluation of their performance and their views on how they are perceived by the 
public are indicators of their self-awareness and confidence about their profession. It also reflects 
their perceptivity and consciousness of public moods and attitudes toward media.   
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Interestingly, virtually half the survey respondents approved the standard of journalism and almost 
as many felt that the public has a positive view of the profession. This is reflective of some research 
internationally that has shown that journalists view media reporting more positively than the general 
public does (see Wimmer & Dominick, 2014).  However, more than half the respondents in this 
survey were less confident about journalists’ grasp of media law and ethics. With a punitive media 
decree in place, a strong understanding of media law and ethics is more crucial in Fiji than ever 
before. But the survey shows that two years after the promulgation of the decree, a fairly significant 
proportion of Fiji’s media corps still appeared to be on unsure grounds about these issues.  
 
This could be a symptom of the overall lack of experience and qualifications in the news media 
sector, as earlier discussed. It could also indicate journalists’ difficulty and confusion in keeping 
abreast of the plethora of decrees passed by government since the 2006 coup, as seen in the 
document review in chapter five.  Fiji media companies have asserted that they provide in-house 
and on the job training. However, the survey findings question the efficacy of such training, 
especially with regards to media law, with the Fiji Times twice cited for contempt of court, 
attracting a USD170,000 fine in 2013 (Tough week . . ., 2013). Earlier, Fiji’s Director of Public 
Prosecutions Christopher Pryde had written to the Fiji Sun to complain about “another” court story 
riddled with “errors of fact” and “missing salient points” (Court report contains errors, 2012). These 
examples underlie the uncertainty regarding media law and ethics among the survey respondents,. 
They accord with the in-depth interviews, in which one respondent stated how journalists felt 
swamped by the high volume of media-related laws passed by government.  
 
Journalist perceptions of media ownership and advertiser pressure  
Up to 86 per cent of the respondents reported appreciable levels of owner and advertiser influence 
in the editorial process. This result is a revelation of sorts: unlike State pressure, ownership and 
advertiser pressure in Fiji is more subtle and hardly makes the news. One exception is the reported 
resignation of the Fiji Sun editorial board in 2000 due to alleged owner interference in editorial 
matters (Fiji Sun editorial board resigns, 2000). Owner and advertiser pressure is better understood 
by triangulating the research results. The document research shows that the punitive 2010 Media 
Decree represents increased financial risks for news media organisations. Both the in-depth 
interview testimonies and survey questionnaire results indicate what would seem to be an 
uncomfortably high level of owner involvement in the editorial process.  
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It is conceivable that in light of the 2010 Media Decree, media owners would take on a more 
cautious, hands-on, approach to mediate the danger of breaching the decree and incurring heavy 
fines for the company. Yet another reason for media owner involvement could be to avoid the 
potential risk of losing State advertising because of criticism or challenge of the government. 
Viewed holistically, the questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews and document research findings 
illuminate government’s effective ‘carrot and stick’ approach to bring the media to heel: State 
advertising along with favourable policies and concessions could act as rewards and the punitive 
media decree as a punishment. The Fiji Times reportedly lost out on millions of dollars in State 
advertising because of its apparent anti-regime stance. The allegedly pro-regime Fiji Sun garnered 
most State advertising (Lagan, 2013; Woods, 2010).  
 
Signs of the Fiji Times caving in to commercial pressures came immediately after the ownership 
change in 2010. Two successive publishers indicated that they wanted to mend relations with 
government (see Robie, 2010; C. Walsh, 2013). One interviewee in the in-depth interviews 
indicated that they had been informed from “the top” about the need to regain government 
advertising to ensure their company’s survival and the continuation of their own employment 
prospects. This could be taken as further evidence of increased owner involvement since the 2006 
coup.  
 
Conflict reporting and fixation on elite sources 
In terms of conflict reporting, analysis of the responses indicate a mixed and somewhat confused 
result. On the question of whether media focus too much on conflict and amplify tensions through 
their coverage, the responses were evenly mixed between those who agreed and those who did not. 
On the coverage of ethnicity, conflict and positive developments, a significant majority felt the 
media was doing a good enough job. Yet, 79 per cent still agreed that specialist training in conflict 
theory would be useful for Fiji journalists because of the nature of the terrain they covered. Linked 
to the issue of conflict reporting is that of the elite monopolisation of news channels (see Lynch & 
Galtung, 2010). Most questionnaire survey respondents (86 per cent) felt that elites and non-elites 
should get equal treatment by the media. However, the content analysis showed that this did not 
translate into practice; elite sources dominated the discourse insofar as the print media coverage of 
the 2006 election was concerned. On this matter, there is a clear disconnect between journalists’ 
personal feelings and their professional calling. Most journalists seem to sense that elite and non-
elite sources should get equal treatment. But their training tells them that elites are prime and valued 
sources of news and this is reflected in the coverage, as indicated in the content analysis.  
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From a conflict reporting perspective, this is an important issue: in divided societies with weak 
media capacity, the risk of media manipulation by political elites is said to be greater (Frohardt & 
Temin, 2003; R. Howard, 2003; 2009). Presumably, this apparent risk could be amplified in 
societies where traditional values hold strong, such as Fiji, where chiefs and other authority figures 
command much respect and following. The heavy-reliance on elite sources reveals a major 
contradiction in news media ethos: in terms of newsworthiness, elite sources might make sense but 
from an ethical viewpoint, such lopsided coverage contradicts the principles of media balance and 
objectivity. 
 
Media objectivity and advocacy 
The survey respondents showed strong support for the objectivity ethic but it seems to be a fluid 
concept. When asked if social cohesion should supersede media objectivity, most respondents (45 
per cent) agreed. In the in-depth interviews, at least two respondents stated that their media 
companies were advocates of what they regarded as the Bainimarama Government’s “multi-racial” 
and “nation-building” policies. This is hardly an objective stance.  By the same token, neither is 
being stubbornly opposed to government policies, as in the case of some media in Fiji. 
Interestingly, the Fiji media initially opposed the 2006 coup. Fiji TV One attempted to boycott the 
news, the Fiji Times left blank spaces on some pages from which stories had been pulled by censors 
and the Fiji Daily Post resorted to satire (Greenslade, 2009). These examples denote a departure 
from objectivity to radicalism (see Christians et al., 2009). Indeed, Pacific Islands journalism is said 
to have a tradition of advocacy, as in Papua New Guinea, where media campaigned against guns 
and declared a ‘war against corruption’ (Kanekane, 2006; Matbob, 2007). This supports Robie’s 
(1995) view that countries with persistent development problems are likely to compel journalists 
and media organisations to take up education and nation building roles. Triangulation of the 
different results shows that theoretically, there is a strong belief in the objectivity credo but in 
practice Pacific journalism seems to be more flexible than some in the survey would care to admit.  
 
Synopsis of questionnaire survey discussion 
The questionnaire survey was used to address Research Question Two: What is the level of 
diversity and professional capacity of Fiji’s news media corps? The analysis shows a fair amount of 
newsroom diversity, notwithstanding some concerns about the apparent hegemonisation of the 
dominant indigenous culture and institutions in media discourse. With regard to professional 
capacity, gains have been recorded in academic qualifications but the journalist corps is still 
relatively young and inexperienced due to apparently high journalist attrition rates.  
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In the next section we analyse the findings of the document review of Fiji’s legislative environment 
as it relates to the media. 
 
6.4 Document Review – legislative environment analysis 
  
The analysis of Fiji’s media law is partly guided by Frohardt and Temin’s (2003) conflict reporting 
framework, which calls for a healthy balance between two types of legislation: 
  
I. Legislation protecting media from abuse and guaranteeing their freedom to operate without 
excessive government interference. 
II. Legislation, such as privacy, libel, slander and hate speech laws, protecting private 
individuals from unjustified and inaccurate reporting. 
 
Not only does the appropriate legislation have to be in place, it needs to be enforced sincerely to 
safeguard journalists from unwarranted prosecution and the public from media transgressions 
(Frohardt & Temin, 2003, p. 5). The major focus of the analysis is on the core media law, the  
Media Industry Development Decree 2010, and other related legislation. The aim is to understand 
the impact the legislation has on journalism, including conflict reporting. 
 
Overview  
The results show clearly that besides economic factors such as deregulation, three highly significant 
variables influenced the course of media legislation in Fiji: political motives, cultural traditions, and 
State and community perceptions about the media acting as a catalyst in social and political conflict.    
Although freedom of speech was constitutionally enshrined, media freedom has always been 
fragile. This is partly because some fourth estate traditions conflict with Fiji’s ‘hybrid’ democracy, 
which is based on a combination of western and indigenous systems of governance (Boege et al., 
2013). Some indigenous values call for deference to chiefs and authority figures, shying from open 
criticism, not questioning leaders’ actions and avoiding conflict (Madraiwiwi, 2014; Williams, 
1999). In Fiji, each incoming government since independence has threatened to institute stronger 
legislation to curb what they portrayed as an irresponsible, impertinent, culturally-insensitive media, 
even though critics charged that authorities’ real intention was to curtail media scrutiny  (Hunter, 
2009; Rika, 2009; Robie, 2001).  
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The document research does show that allegations of a possible media role in provoking societal 
tensions have been a concern since the birth of the press in Fiji (see Gaunder, 2008). Such concerns 
peaked after the 2000 coup, with some media controversially accused of waging a deliberate 
destabilisation campaign against the ousted Labour–Coalition Government (see Robie, 2001). The 
punitive 2010 Media Decree, implemented in the name of social stability, was a radical departure 
from the freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights in the abrogated 1997 Constitution (Constitution 
of the Republic, 1997; Dutt, 2010). Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum (2010) portrayed the 
decree in terms of media responsibility and accountability. Prime Minister Bainimarama (2012) 
linked it to societal progress and national stability.  
 
The most relevant sections of the decree are analysed to see how far the aims stated for its 
implementation are achievable.  
 
Powers of the President and relevant Ministers 
The document research shows that the government practically controls various aspects of the 
operations of the two bodies’ that are overseeing the implementation of the decree – the Media 
Industry Development Authority (MIDA) and the Media Tribunal. This is by virtue of the powers 
vested in three central officials of State: the President, the Minister concerned and the Attorney 
General (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010). The various powers given to the State officials 
constitute a strong government presence and both direct and indirect involvement in the major 
facets of the operations of MIDA and the Tribunal. These include making appointments, regulating 
content, conducting hearings and adjudicating complaints. Through this arrangement, government 
control and leverage are enhanced while media freedom and independence are diminished.  
 
This was also pointed out by the International Senior Lawyers Project, which concluded that the 
decree failed to “distinguish between the executive, legislative and judicial functions in regulating 
the media” (2013. p. 2). This oversight breaches the “separation of powers” principle, the basis of 
the media’s fourth estate role in a democracy. This role is conditional upon media’s independence 
from State and corporate institutions (Christians et al., 2009).  
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Lack of clarity 
Another issue is the general and sweeping nature of some provisions, such as section 22, which bars 
any content that is “against public interest or order; against the national interest; or creates 
communal discord”, without adequately specifying the meaning of these terms (Media Industry 
Development Decree, 2010, p. 739). As this researcher has pointed out elsewhere (S. Singh, 2010), 
what is for or against the public interest can be a contentious and debatable issue, with the 
government, the opposition, the media and the public all having their own different views on these 
matters. For instance, in the 1990s, the Rabuka Government depicted media coverage of the 
National Bank of Fiji loans scandal as being anti-indigenous government while the media saw it as 
a legitimate part of their watchdog role (see Boxhill, 1997; Grynberg, Munro, & White, 2002).  This 
raises the issue of whether publishing an editorial opposing the government view on a matter 
concerning the national interest could constitute an offence. The answer to this question is as 
uncertain as the law itself. Given the broad nature of the law, any miscalculations could be costly 
for the media due to the fairly hefty fines and jail terms stipulated in the decree.  
 
The complaints procedure 
The decree’s complaints procedure is also stacked against the media. Previously, the self-regulating 
Fiji Media Council acted only after receiving a complaint. Section 54 of the media decree gives the 
MIDA the broad discretion not only to consider complaints received but also to investigate 
presumed breaches on its own accord (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010). This provision 
has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, a proactive regulatory approach could 
counteract situations such as that which arose over the coverage of the Speight coup. Despite 
numerous alleged ethical breaches, the Fiji Media Council adjudicated only two complaints in the 
following two years (Robie, 2003c; 2009b). On the other hand, this provision leaves media 
organisations vulnerable to government-orchestrated inquisitions that could end up being 
financially, operationally and psychologically draining. Another major change is the powers 
bestowed on the Tribunal to order media companies to pay a maximum of FJD100,000 in 
compensation to aggrieved parties. Editors are personally liable for maximum payments of 
FJD25,000 and reporters, of FJD1,000. There is a risk of media organisations becoming the target 
of frivolous complaints by people seeking to win payouts. This threat had not materialised in the 
first four years of the decree but there is nothing to stop someone from setting a precedent.  
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Media organisations can challenge decisions of the Tribunal in the Court of Appeal but only for 
awards in excess of $50,000. Editors and reporters have no such recourse (Media Industry 
Development Decree, 2010). This is even though the sums involved appear to be quite high in 
proportion to journalist salaries and the size of the media sector (for journalist salary levels, see 
Yaya, 2002; Robie, 2003a). The payment of further restitution is debatable, especially since 
defamation laws are still intact.  
 
Media ownership 
Measures adopted to localise and pluralise media ownership are detailed in sections 38–39 of the 
decree. These will be reviewed in the next section, which specifically deals with this issue.  
 
Emergency powers 
Another critical area in the 2010 Media Decree is section 80, which gives the Minister “power to make 
orders in emergency” (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010; pp. 749–755). Emergency powers 
are sometimes justified in an ethnically and politically tense country like Fiji during a crisis, such as a 
coup. The International Senior Lawyers Project (2013) concedes that even in democratic societies, 
certain narrowly-defined State interests, such as the prevention of imminent violence, justify some 
restrictions on speech. However, the precedence in Fiji shows that emergency rule could be open to 
misuse. The Public Emergency Regulations (PER) that imposed pre-publication censorship on media 
was promulgated in April 2009. It was continuously renewed on the grounds of national stability. By the 
time it was lifted in January 2012, almost three years had passed, which seems quite lengthy for an 
emergency law. Moreover, the PER was lifted only to be replaced by the Public Order Decree, which 
also curbed some civil rights (Lauder, 2012).  
 
However, some provisions in the PER and the 2010 Media Decree are deemed to have had a 
positive impact in that they forced journalists to stop fixating on politics and pay more attention to 
people-orientated news (Naidu, 2013). Some in-depth interview participants stated that the tighter 
legislation had forced them to cover “safer” development-related topics. This finding is reinforced 
by the fact that in the first four years of the decree, no journalist or media organisation was 
prosecuted for any violations. This is indicative of the media’s cautionary, risk-averse, reporting 
approach. Some may see this a healthy sign, while others may regard it as an ominous symptom. 
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The apparent change in reporting focus would signal a major paradigm shift in Fiji journalism that 
can be further conceptualised by reference to the four roles of the media developed by Christians et 
al. This holds that media may collaborate with the State to avoid retribution, or because it may be 
instrumentally beneficial, or they feel it to be the proper thing to do (Christians et al., 2009). Fiji’s 
situation, however, is quite distinctive: ironically, some media were collaborating in order to 
maintain some semblance of independence. As one subject in the in-depth interview revealed, there 
was less State interference in development-related stories, so focusing on such angles gave the 
media a greater measure of editorial freedom and control. However, the focus on people-orientated 
news could have come at a cost. Various analysts hold the media decree responsible for what they 
see as a culture of self-censorship in the media sector, even though by 2013, media were carrying a 
little more criticism of government policies (see Fraenkel, 2014; Hooper, 2013).  
 
Radical underground media 
One of the dangers of censorship is that mainstream media channels no longer act as a reliable 
sounding board for the public mood. Societal frictions and anti-government feelings can remain 
concealed, with the government lulled into a false sense of security (see Hackett, 2013). Moreover, 
in the Internet age, it is virtually impossible for the government to exercise full control over the 
media. Stringent restrictions could see opposition views migrate to online media platforms. In Fiji, 
the media crackdown seems to have driven dissenting views into the blogosphere, where they re-
emerged in more virulent forms (Foster, 2007; Hammond-Thrasher, 2007; Harborow, 2008; C. 
Walsh, 2010).  
 
Research has shown that at its peak, around 72 blogs were expressing opposition to the 
Bainimarama Government: a “heady mix of rumours, misinformation, incitement to racial violence, 
calls for revolution, hate crime and even terrorism” (Hammond-Thrasher, 2007; also see C. Walsh, 
2010). One post urged government opponents to attack tourist buses with Molotov cocktails. This 
was juxtaposed with another post “fanning the decades-old flame of racial hatred” (Hammond-
Thrasher, 2007). This indicates the existence of an underground culture of extreme radical social 
media. Such media do not stop at espousing violence to fight what they regard as injustice 
(Christians et al., 2009).  
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These developments defy Bainimarama’s (2012) claims that tougher legislation would deter “self-
interested individuals” who “fan the flames of prejudice and intolerance”. It is no wonder peace 
journalism researcher Hackett describes the “‘solution’ of censorship as worse than the cure” (2013, p. 
36). The Fiji situation suggest that an enabling national regulatory framework for journalism may be 
better founded on a certain level of openness. As media commentator Simon O’Connor states, 
media’s first role in nation-building is to critique the style of the nation being created. To reverse 
this situation can lead to facts and serious questions being left out to facilitate only one group’s 
vision of the nation (Fiji Media Watch, 2003).  
 
Threat to whistle-blowing culture 
O’Connor’s perspective brings us to another significant provision in the 2010 Media Decree: 
section 25. This enforces media disclosure of documents or information, although confidential 
sources that expose State corruption are exempt. However, this protection is somewhat weakened 
given that the MIDA can obtain a Magistrate’s warrant to search premises and confiscate any 
documents deemed relevant (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010). In any such swoops, the 
identity of confidential sources could be at risk. This risk factor could be a deterrent to a 
whistleblowing culture in a region where journalists routinely rely on “judicious leaks” (Larmour, 
2006). It could help hide corruption, a major problem in Fiji and the South Pacific (Barcham, 2007). 
This is another example of how the 2010 Media Decree could work against the very objectives on 
which Bainimarama staked his coup: control corruption and enhance social stability (Bainimarama, 
2011; 2013).  
 
From a conflict reporting perspective, any laws that could help mask corruption could be 
disadvantageous: research has highlighted how corruption and instability feed off each other and 
stunt overall growth (Fredriksson & Svensson, 2003; Hodge, Shankar, Prasada, & Duhs, 2011). In 
the Pacific, the 1998 Port Vila riots, the 2006 Honiara and Nuku’alofa disturbances and the four Fiji 
coups are all linkable to corruption (see FBI report says, 2003; Iroga, 2008; Latu, 2010; Warning 
that Vanuatu, 2011). Alleged corruption on the part of the Qarase Government was used to justify 
Fiji’s 2006 military takeover, dubbed a “clean-up campaign” (Larmour, 2008). 
 
Duplication and over-regulation 
Further insights into Fiji’s media law can be gained through an independent review of the Fiji 
Media Council published in 2009, a year before the 2010 Media Decree was promulgated. The 
report, Free and Responsible: Towards a more Effective Fiji Media Council, had rejected statutory 
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regulation, arguing that it would undermine press freedom by, among other things, replicating the 
legal system’s “delays, costs and complexities” (J. Herman et al., 2009, pp. 5–40). This warning 
may be valid. Possible duplications in laws include section eight of the 2010 Media Decree, which 
prohibits publication of material likely to “create communal discord” (Media Industry Development 
Decree, 2010, p. 739). This provision has parallels with the comprehensive Public Order Act, which 
covers racial and religious vilification, hate speech and economic sabotage (Crimes Decree, 2009).  
 
Further perspectives can be drawn from Fiji’s Draft Constitution, designed by the Ghai Commission 
(Fiji youth group rejects, 2013). The Ghai Commission proposed to repeal those provisions of the 
2010 Media Decree deemed inconsistent with the Draft Constitution’s Bill of Rights section (Draft 
constitution: the explanatory report, 2012). However, the Bainimarama Government rejected the 
Draft Constitution and drew up its own version (Fiji youth group rejects, 2013). Concerns about 
over-regulation implicit in the media council review and the 2012 Draft Constitution have some merit. 
The 2010 Media Decree notwithstanding, Fiji’s defamation laws are still intact. Moreover, government 
has been vigorously enforcing any media breaches under pre-existing sub judice legislation, with two 
successive contempt of court prosecutions against the Fiji Times in 2011 and 2013. The latter incurred a 
FJD300,000 fine for the paper and a suspended six-month jail sentence for editor Fred Wesley (Tough 
week and times, 2013).  
 
Another example of over-regulation is the 2010 Media Decree’s code of practice requiring all news 
stories to be balanced (Media Industry Development Decree, 2010). This requirement became a 
loophole for parties wanting to prevent potentially embarrassing stories from being published. They 
simply did not respond to media questions, thus making it impossible to fulfil the decree’s requirement 
for balance. A journalist who took part in the in-depth interviews stated that stories that would have 
been ordinarily reported in the public interest had to be dropped since they were deemed unbalanced by 
the law. It is alleged that if a story was positive towards the government, the legal requirement for 
balance was ignored (see United States Department of State, 2013). If true, this is an example of 
how the State can selectively apply such laws in its favour.  
 
Legislative reform 
Despite the apparent faults in the legal environment, whether future governments would relax the 
controls is open to question. Normally, the trend is not to surrender hard-won power over the media, 
especially in countries transiting from authoritarian to democratic rule. Singapore, which served as 
a model for Fiji’s 2010 Media Decree (Dutt, 2010) serves as a valuable example. 
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There, media legislation was first imposed in the name of social stability and economic 
development. Over the decades, even as Singapore became an economic powerhouse, government 
used various tactics to tighten its hold on the media progressively. The more sophisticated and 
subtler controls included harnessing market forces to bring the media to heel (for a detailed analysis 
of Singapore’s media law, see two well-received books by Francis T. Seow, 1998 and Cherian 
George, 2012). In Fiji, government continued to pass laws to strengthen its hold over the media. 
One example is the Television (Amendment) Decree 2012. This not only empowers the Minister to 
“revoke” or “vary” the licence of any broadcaster deemed to be in breach of the decree, it also stops 
aggrieved parties from challenging the decision through the courts (Television (Amendment) 
Decree, 2012).  
 
The decree was used against Fiji TV following the expiry of its 12-year broadcasting licence in May 
2012, with Attorney General Sayed-Khaiyum opting to approve six-month temporary renewals only 
instead of a full renewal (No word on renewal . . ., 2012). Respondents in the in-depth interviews 
revealed how uncertainty over licensing lowered staff confidence and affected business plans.  
Fiji’s example shows that given the power, government, unsurprisingly, is prone to pass legislation to 
its own advantage. An example is the State Proceedings (Amendment) Decree 2012, which grants 
government ministers immunity from defamation. The same protection is extended to media outlets 
that report the Ministers’ defamatory statements (State Proceedings (Amendment) Decree, 2012). 
This would have put the opposition, still bound by defamation laws, at a distinct disadvantage, 
particularly in the build-up to the 2014 elections (This legislation was annulled by Attorney General 
Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum in July 2014).  
 
At this juncture, it is worth looking again at the 2009 Fiji Media Council review discussed earlier. 
The review favoured self-regulation subject to reforming the Fiji Media Council to address some 
long-standing criticisms (J. Herman et al., 2009, p. 35). These include alleged ineffectiveness, lack 
of credibility in the public eye, failure to address ethical breaches by media, and perceived by the 
public to be part of the media industry establishment rather than an independent regulator (Fiji 
Human Rights Commission, 2008, pp. 43–51; J. Herman et al., 2009; Robie, 2003c). The review 
called for proper financing of the council and a restructuring of its complaints processes to provide 
an aura of independence (J. Herman et al., 2009, p. 35).  
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Previously, the Fiji Media Council and the media industry fiercely guarded their independence. In 
2003 they mounted a successful “No Media Bill” campaign to oppose a draft media law that proposed 
partial government regulation (Reporters Without Borders, 2004). In recent years, however, self-
regulation has lost some ground worldwide, particularly after the News of the World phone hacking 
scandal in the United Kingdom, with strong calls from various quarters for stronger regulation and 
greater government intervention (see Leveson, 2012). In some countries, the media industry has come 
to recognise the need for reforms to protect self-regulation (see Hasan, 2011; Sabbagh, 2011; D. 
Smith, 2011). In 2014, the New Zealand Press Council was to to be granted relatively tougher powers 
for dealing with complaints, including the right to censure a magazine, newspaper or website (Press 
council to offer . . ., 2014).  
 
Analysts such as Robie (2009b) believe that in Fiji, an element of “hypocrisy” exists about media 
freedom, with little industry acknowledgment that the country’s media do have shortcomings. Robie 
points out that controversial as it was, the Anthony Report echoed media weaknesses identified by 
the Thomson Foundation review more than a decade earlier (2009b, pp. 109–111). Towards this 
end, an international report on self-regulation prepared by the US-based Centre for International 
Media Assistance insists that any government disengagement from media regulation must be met 
with increased media accountability and vice-versa, especially for countries in political transition 
(Centre for International Media Assistance, 2009, p. 5). These developments suggest the need for 
recognising the potential value of greater consultation between government and the media industry 
on the complex but crucial issue of future media legislation in Fiji. The media sector needs to 
acknowledge its weaknesses and where possible, take corrective action. Government needs to 
consult the media industry and address the various grievances concerning this issue. Such 
negotiations can be fraught with difficulties, not least because of differences in opinion between the 
government and the media sector about the ‘proper’ role and function of the media, as demonstrated 
by research.  
 
Synopsis of legislative environment  
Part one of the document review addressed Research Question Three: What is the genesis and 
nature of media legislation in Fiji? The analysis used Frohardt and Temin’s (2003) framework, 
which calls for harmonisation between legislation that allows media to operate without excessive 
restrictions and legislation that protects society from inaccurate and hateful reporting.  
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Post–2006 coup Fiji appears to suffer from over-regulation, with insufficient space for the media to 
carry out their monitorial role. In addition, the application of some sections of the law is 
inconsistent. This may not be conducive to responsible conflict reporting.  
 
Next, we look at media ownership and its potential impact on conflict reporting. 
 
6.5 Document research – media ownership, reach & influence analysis  
 
This section analyses the findings of the results on the genesis of media ownership in Fiji. It uses 
Frohardt and Temin’s (2008) conflict reporting framework as a guideline, as well as drawing from 
the political economy and normative media theory frameworks (Christians et al., 2009; Herman & 
Chomsky, 1998, 2008). From a conflict reporting perspective, it is important to be proactive in 
monitoring and reporting changes in a country’s media ownership structure. A study looking into 
media’s role in Kenya’s 2007 election violence revealed extensive connections between politicians, 
media ownership and evidence of corruption (Nyanjom, 2012). Towards this end, media plurality is 
an important variable in conflict reporting. Frohardt and Temin (2003) argue that the greater the 
competition, the less the likelihood that one or a small number of media outlets can influence 
people and move them towards violence. A critical variable is whether State-owned or private 
outlets dominate the media scene. Equally important is the share of mainstream news media owned 
by companies with interests in other non-media sectors of the economy (see 2013 edition of the 
Press Freedom Index: http://rsf.org/index/qEN.html). 
 
Overview  
On the whole, the results reveal some salient features of media ownership trends in Fiji: 
 
• Following independence in 1970, State media in the form of the national (radio) broadcaster 
was in government hands. The major private media, the Fiji Times, was in foreign hands, 
with a clear demarcation between State and private ownership. 
• Economic liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s triggered major changes in Fiji’s media 
landscape, increasing the corporate penetration of the sector. 
• Curiously, the State started to acquire interests in private media indirectly through its 
proxies, blurring the once clear division between State and private media ownership. 
• The next major phase came with the State restrictions imposed on foreign and cross media 
ownership through the promulgation of the 2010 Media Decree. This was marked by 
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increased conglomeration of media ownership, with a large local company such as Motibhai 
taking ownership of the Fiji Times. 
 
In some ways, the impact of deregulation on Fiji’s media sector was similar to that of some other 
countries, but in other ways it was different. In the United States and other developed countries, 
deregulation facilitated government’s retreat from the media sector and allowed private interests to 
increase their presence (Bagdikian, 2000, 2004). In Fiji, deregulation also saw private interests 
increase their stake. But the government not only maintained its hold on the national broadcaster, it 
also diversified into private media through shares purchased by some State-funded entities. 
Contrary to the trend in some countries, deregulation in Fiji actually increased the State’s presence 
in the media sector (see Pacific Media and Communications Facility, 2005; Tacchi, et al., 2013).  
 
Impact of media ownership reforms 
Usually, ownership limits are instituted to prevent media concentration, but in Fiji the placing of 
limits on foreign and cross ownership seems to have exacerbated the situation, at least in some 
respects. The forced sale of the Fiji Times by News Limited to the Motibhai Group was a significant 
development. Fiji’s only other daily newspaper, the Fiji Sun, was owned by another major local 
business entity, CJ Patel. The sale of the Fiji Times meant that both newspapers were now in the 
hands of local conglomerates with vast interests in other sectors of the Fiji economy (see Narsey, 
2013b, 2013c). This indicates that localisation of ownership was achieved at the cost of 
conglomeration. 
 
This situation gives rise to major political economy concerns given the State’s powers to enact 
economic policies that could impact on the profitability of businesses owned by media company 
owners in both the media and non-media sectors.  Narsey (2013b) sums up the situation well:  
  
The real weakness in Fiji’s media industry currently is that Fiji’s media owners are not 
dedicated independent media companies, but corporate entities with much wider business 
interests which are far more valuable to the media owners than profits from their media 
assets. This is exacerbated by the reality that the media owners’ other investments are 
extremely vulnerable to discretionary government policies, which can cause greater 
financial harm than the media profits are worth.  
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Ownership of media by politically-connected businesses that control large segments of the economy 
betrays signs of the emergence of an oligarchic media system in Fiji. Such a media system thrives 
on links between the corporate and the political class (Matuszak, 2012). One sign of an oligarchic 
system is the presence of “filters” for weeding out dissenting journalists. Singham (2011) states that 
it is not so much that journalists write stories that are then censored by their bosses on the orders of 
politicians, as a crude propaganda model would suggest, but the system weeding out dissenting 
journalists and retaining only compliant ones who eventually become heads of news divisions. 
 
Singham’s point is well illustrated by the resignation of the Fiji Times editors Netani Rika and 
Sophie Foster after the newspaper changed hands in 2010. The new publisher, Australian Dallas 
Swinstead, suggested that the resignations were voluntary. He related that Rika, in particular, left 
following a series of discussions about his future in the paper. Rika’s resignation letter stated “our 
conversations over the past week have made it evident to us that you (Swinstead) see my continued 
tenure at the newspaper as a major obstacle to its progress” (Fiji Times former editor . . ., 2010). 
Clearly, Rika was considered a liability because of his perceived anti-government tendencies and he 
was made to feel that the only option was to leave the company. 
  
Examples in the Philippines, the United States, Russia and Ukraine indicate that the long-term 
consequences of an oligarchic media system are dire. It fosters corruption, leads to the formation of 
powerful, exploitative networks, marginalises the people’s voice, and threatens democracy 
(Bowman, 2001; Chua, 2003; Legaspi, 2011; Schechter, 2014). Further insights into the apparent 
politico-corporate connections in Fiji’s media ownership structure can be examined through 
Deacon, Murdock and Golding’s (1999) framework. This calls for identifying the dominant owners 
and determining their market share and capitalisation, to give an idea about the particular media 
company’s control, penetration, influence and dominance. All shareholders with over five per cent 
holdings should be identified, as also should any close ties – political or familial – between 
individual shareholders. In the following sections we use the five major news companies as case 
studies to gain deeper insights into the media ownership situation. 
 
Fiji Times 
The present parent company of the Fiji Times, the Motibhai Group, established in 1931, is one of 
the biggest firms in Fiji, with six subsidiaries: Motibhai and Company Limited, Stinson Pearce 
Limited, Waqavuka Development Company Limited, Suva Central Limited, Fiji Foods Limited, 
and PET Technology Limited (see company website, http://www.motibhai.com/About-
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Motibhai.aspx). The company is involved in import, wholesaling, retailing, manufacturing, real 
estate and hospitality, with franchising and distribution rights for over 50 international food and 
luxury brands. Its airport duty-free and fine retailing ranges include brand names such as Sony, 
Chanel, Seiko, Rolex, LVMH perfumes and watches, Nikon, Pentax, Samsonite and others. 
Through its parent company, Becharbhai Holdings Limited, Motibhai owns over 50 commercial and 
residential properties. Its 1300-strong workforce makes Motibhai one of the largest private 
employers in Fiji (see company website, http://www.motibhai.com/About-Motibhai.aspx). 
 
As a privately-owned family company, Motibhai is not obliged to make its financial details 
available publicly. However, as Narsey points out, the company’s investments in the non-media 
sector, and the profits derived from them, far exceed the returns from the newspaper business. As 
such,there is every incentive for Motibhai, as publishers of the Fiji Times, to minimise content 
critical of government (Narsey, 2013b, 2013c). Indeed, as the paper’s ownership changed hands, 
Motibhai Group chairman Mahendra Patel signalled a willingness to work with the Bainimarama 
Government (Patel ready . . ., 2010). The pressure on the Fiji Times management to mend ties with 
the government became starkly clear when Swinstead’s successor, fellow Australian Hank Arts, made 
the surprising admission that “The PM and I get on well. He’s great company. And our wives are 
friendly” (see C. Walsh, 2013). This remark was quite telling in the context of the State’s crackdown 
on the Times,  including a ban on State advertising, which was reportedly costing the paper millions 
(Narsey, 2013b, 2013c). In the in-depth interviews, one respondent had stated that management had 
made it clear that recovering State advertising was a priority.  
 
Arts’s comments about the friendship between his family and the Bainimarama family harken back 
to the close ties between the British political establishment and the Murdoch press, exposed in the 
wake of the News of the World phone hacking scandal in the UK (Hasan, 2011; also see Leveson, 
2012). In Fiji, some viewed Arts’s overtures suspiciously, while others saw it as a pragmatic move 
to rid the paper of the former owner’s “anti-government baggage” (C. Walsh, 2013). In a sense, 
these developments reveal the newspaper’s vulnerabilities as part of a larger, local, conglomerate. 
By definition, conglomerates are composed of distinct business entities (subsidiaries) working as a 
whole to achieve common organisational goals (Skorski, 2013). They form on the basis of 
synergies, whereby dissimilar segments of the business leverage each other as they work side-by-
side to promote related products (Skorski, 2013). As a member of the Motibhai Group, the Fiji 
Times is now a small part of a larger whole. This could require the paper to sacrifice some editorial 
independence for the common good of the entire group, if it came to the point. 
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Fiji Sun 
The major owners of the Fiji Sun, CJ Patel, also have considerable business interests in other 
sectors of the Fiji economy through 20 subsidiaries. In addition, CJ Patel’s financial manager Mr 
Ajith Kodagoda is the chairman of several leading State entities: the Fiji National Provident Fund, 
Fiji Revenue and Customs Authority, Amalgamated Telecom Holdings and Vodafone Fiji Limited; 
and also serves as a director of Home Finance Company. In 2011 he was appointed the Chairperson 
of FINTEL (Fiji Revenue and Customs Authority, 2012; Sirimanna, 2013). This raises potential 
concerns about interlocking directorates, that is, the links created by a director who is on the board 
of more than one company or organisation (G. Murray, 2000). Bagdikian (2000) has addressed 
interlocking in relation to news media ownership and the threat to editorial independence due to 
various conflict of interest situations, often undetected by the public. It can involve sharing insider 
information, imposition of the parent firm’s policies on the media organisation and political 
interference. These interventions are usually designed to enhance profits.  
 
This brings us back to the question of why local corporations with vast and profitable interests in 
other sectors of the economy would want to invest in the news media sector. In Kenya, businesses 
saw the media as an avenue for profits while politicians saw the sector as an efficient means of 
increasing their political influence (Nyanjom, 2012). But for the Fiji corporations, the profits are 
negligible relative to their non-media investments. Interlocking directorates could partly explain 
why local corporations would invest in the media sector when the returns, compared to the 
corporations’ overall assets, are small. Moreover, there is the risk of the media arm of the business 
arousing the government’s ire, which could be bad for group profitability. On the other hand, there 
is the opportunity for forming mutually beneficial arrangements: as media owners, the corporations 
would be well-positioned to enter into a partnership with governments and promote their initiatives. 
Government could reciprocate through favourable policies, grants and concessions to benefit the 
media company owners’ larger business assets.   
 
There are some apparent signs of such an arrangement in Fiji. In 2012, CJ Patel purchased the State 
monopoly Rewa Dairy on what some described as favourable conditions (Narsey, 2013b, 2013c). 
The parent company’s newspaper reported Prime Minister Bainimarama’s comments linking the 
sale to modernising a dairy industry riddled with mismanagement, inefficiency, and out-dated 
infrastructure (PM signs dairy deal, 2012). However, the ACP–EU website, Agritrade, raised 
various producer concerns over the sale, linked to low farm-gate prices and “important information 
gaps” between policy makers, farmers, and the company (Privatisation raises hopes…, 2013). 
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Narsey (2013b) claimed that the substantial discriminatory tariff assistance that clinched the deal 
succeeded most visibly in raising the price of milk and milk products for local consumers.  
 
These developments betray signs of what Habermas (1964) describes as the “re-feudalisation” of 
the public sphere. This is when large organisations strive for “political (and commercial) 
compromises” with the State and with each other, excluding the public sphere whenever possible (p. 
49). Re-feudalisation is often a product of globalisation and deregulation leading to corporate 
consolidation, conglomeration and hyper-commercialism (see McChesney, 1999; Owen, 2010). 
Fiji’s example indicates that the possibility of re-feudalisation is enhanced when media owners have 
major business interests in other sectors of the economy and commercial ties with the State. The 
Rewa Dairy deal, a significant transaction, apparently took place with little or no public discussion. 
This resonates with McChesney’s (1998, p. 25) warning that because of their relationship with big 
business (which may include “sister companies”) the media may become “less vigilant to corporate 
bureaucracy”.  
 
Several writers allege that the Fiji Sun enjoys a favoured status with the Bainimarama Government 
due to an ostensible allegiance to the Bainimarama Government, rewarded by a monopoly on State 
advertising (print) and other business concessions  (Dorney, 2011; Narsey, 2013b, 2013c; United 
States Department of State, 2013; Woods, 2010). The Fiji Sun’s business editor Rachna Lal has 
rejected such accusations, describing the publication instead as “proudly independent” and “Pro-
Fiji”, adding: 
 
What we are as a newspaper, and we make no apologies for this, is broadly supportive of the 
Bainimarama government’s policies. We believe these policies are building a better Fiji. We 
know these policies have strong, broad, public support.  (University of the South Pacific 
(Producer), 2014) 
 
In line with Christians and co-authors’ (2009) conceptualisation of media roles, Lal’s assertions 
suggest that the Fiji Sun has settled into a collaborative role partly based on acceptance and partly 
based on acquiescence. In the former, given what is known about a situation, media judge 
cooperation with the State to be the proper thing to do. In the latter, cooperation is deemed 
necessary to avoid retribution but it could also be instrumentally useful. 
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Communications Fiji Limited 
As discussed, the local company Communications Fiji Limited (CFM) was affected by limits in cross 
media ownership introduced in 2010. Its second-largest shareholder, Hari Punja and Sons Limited, 
sold its 27.82 per cent stake in the company, subsequently increasing its share in Fiji TV Limited to 
26.16 per cent to become its second largest shareholder. Punja’s CFM shares were bought by CFM’s 
holding company, Parkinson Holdings, to increase its majority shareholding to 55.48 per cent (Punja 
sells, 2012). These developments show that in some respects, the impact of new cross media 
ownership laws implemented to address media concentration was at best limited. The law put 
restrictions on horizontal concentration in terms of ownership across different types and modes of 
media companies. But it spurred vertical concentration in terms of increased holdings within 
individual companies. CFM shareholders do not, for the most part, appear to have large or direct 
commercial involvement in other sectors of the economy on the same scale as the owners of the Fiji 
Times and the Fiji Sun. Neither is CFM’s majority shareholding in the hands of an organisation with 
financial ties to government, as in the case of Fiji TV. While CFM’s third largest shareholder, Unit 
Trust of Fiji, is a government commercial entity, it holds less than 11 per cent shares in the 
company  (Communications Fiji Limited, 2011, p. 38).  
 
In this regard, CFM is probably less exposed to government pressure than are the four other major Fiji 
news media companies. However, like any publicly-listed company, CFM would be under constant 
pressure to maximise its main source of revenue, advertising, to boost shareholder returns. Like any 
media company in Fiji, CFM would be cautious about how the news media arm of the company deals 
with issues relating to the government. Granted that the State is not a major advertiser in CFM, which 
relies on the corporate sector as its major source of advertising revenue, but the government could 
apply indirect pressure on CFM through the corporate sector in the form of policy decisions. 
Moreover, some private firms which are major advertisers supply goods and services to the State. For 
example, motor vehicle companies count government as a major customer. Such companies would be 
wary of advertising in a media company that is critical of government over the fear of losing lucrative 
government contracts and purchase orders.  
 
Fiji Television Limited 
Fiji TV’s largest shareholder, FHL Media (57.26 per cent), is a subsidiary of the indigenous Fijian 
equity company FHL, which has close financial ties with the State. In 1989, FHL received a 
$FJD20 million interest-free loan from the State to buy shares in successful companies as part of 
government’s affirmative action plan for the advancement indigenous Fijians. In 2001, the Qarase 
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Government converted the loan into a grant (Ratuva, 2013). In September 2013, FHL Group chief 
executive Nouzab Fareed announced a medium-term goal to double revenue to $500 million on 
consolidated total assets of $421 million (R. Lal, 2013). The media arm of FHL’s business is 
comparatively minuscule at 2.1 per cent of its total investment portfolio of around $87 million 
(Fijian Holdings, 2013). These facts imply extreme reluctance on the part of FHL to put the 
company’s greater profitability at risk by getting on the wrong side of government through allowing 
Fiji TV to play any kind of genuine watchdog role (see Narsey, 2013b, 2013c).  
 
From a news media perspective, having FHL as a major shareholder could be challenging for Fiji 
TV. The major political economy considerations lie in relation to not only the State but also the 
corporate sector, with FHL’s $87 million investment portfolio spread across 22 companies in 
several sectors of the Fiji economy (Fijian Holdings, 2013). As a major benefactor and seeing FHL 
as one of the pillars of its affirmative action programme for indigenous Fijians, the State (through 
government) appoints both the FHL board and the chairman (Fijian Holdings, 2013; Ratuva, 2013; 
United States Department of State, 2013).  In 2013, FHL and three other government-linked entities 
– Unit Trust of Fiji, the i-Taukei Affairs Board and the Fiji National Provident Fund – collectively 
held a 64.8 per cent stake in Fiji TV (Fiji TV, 2014; Fijian Holdings, 2013). This gives the State 
considerable traction within the television company. Fiji Television’s second-largest shareholder, Hari 
Punja and Sons, operates six subsidiaries under the banner of Flour Mills of Fiji Foods Limited, with 
earnings surpassing the $200 million mark in 2011. In comparison, Hari Punja’s earnings from its media 
holdings in Fiji TV would be insignificant (see the company website, http://www.fmf.com.fj/). In 2013, 
the group launched a $20 million tourism complex project as part of a total $55 million expansion 
plan (Hari Punja’s $20m Palms Denarau . . ., 2013). This demonstrates the vastness of the business 
interests of Fiji TV’s second largest shareholder in other sectors of the economy with exposure to 
government policies.  
 
A moot question is how the uppermost Fiji TV hierarchy would react if they felt their commercial 
interests were under threat should Fiji TV carry out its watchdog functions scrupulously. The 
company’s ostensible summary dismissals of journalists deemed to have incurred the Bainimarama 
Government’s indignation are cases in point. In 2014, news veteran Anish Chand was, it is alleged, 
sacked for reportedly calling for balanced coverage of the 2014 elections (PFF concerned over Fiji 
TV…, 2014). In 2013, Fiji TV sports editor Satish Narayan was reportedly forced to resign after he 
criticised the Fiji Sports Council, headed at the time by Bainimarama’s daughter (Sports 
commentator resigns, 2013). 
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Fiji TV management began to strike a noticeably conciliatory note after government started its 
practice of renewing the company’s licences on a six-monthly basis only, allegedly in response to 
the TV coverage given to two former prime ministers (No word on renewal, 2012; United States 
Department of State, 2013). Company chairman Padam Lala gave an undertaking that the board and 
management would work closely with regulatory authorities to secure a long-term licence (Fiji TV, 
2013, p. 7). Lala’s comments raise questions about the level of board and management involvement in 
editorial matters. In this study’s questionnaire survey, 87 per cent of the respondents indicated varying 
levels of management pressure on the newsroom. This was supported by some journalists who took part 
in the in-depth interviews, although respondents who held executive positions in news media companies 
insisted that the newsroom was autonomous.  
 
Hermanson’s (2007) in-depth interviews with several Fiji TV reporters and managers indicated that 
the corporate sector, particularly advertisers, sought to influence news content. Moreover, in 2000, 
commercial pressures were said to be behind Fiji TV’s controversial refusal to screen an award-
winning documentary, In the Name of Growth (Robie, 2002). The movie alleges exploitation of 
indigenous female workers by the State-owned Pacific Fishing Company and its American partner 
Bumble Bee International. The local maker of the documentary, former Fiji Senator `Atu 
Emberson-Bain, blamed Fiji TV’s stance on the “big (private sector) boys with their vested 
interests” (see Robie, 2002, pp. 148–149). Hermanson had concluded that “corporate influence is 
potentially a larger threat to the independence and credibility of television news than government 
influence” (2007, pp. 80–81). But the 2006 coup and media ownership reforms implemented in the 
2010 media decree have changed the situation: the government’s presence, power and influence in 
the media sector have increased. One could say that media such as Fiji TV face a government–
corporate nexus when it comes to attempts to influence the outcome of news, rather than just a 
corporate threat on its own, as suggested by Hermanson.  
 
Besides being a prominent media owner in its own right, the government plays a central role in the 
economy through policy-making. Moreover, it is a major advertiser and a big customer of some 
local firms. State interests and media company owner interests are intertwined as perhaps never 
before, partly as a result of the ownership reforms implemented through the 2010 Media Decree, 
although the process had begun with deregulation in the 1990s, when the government-linked 
enterprises started buying shares in private media.    
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Fiji Broadcasting Corporation 
Besides increasing its presence in the private media through proxy organisations, the Bainimarama 
Government has been investing in the national broadcaster to strengthen its capacity. The FJD24 
million government-guaranteed loan to FBC was reportedly one of the largest single investments in 
media technology in Fiji’s history, facilitating a major revamp of the studios and financing the 
launch of its free-to-air television for extended coverage (TV for families in remote areas, 2011). In 
marking the opening of the refurbished studio, PM Bainimarama articulated that as a State-owned 
medium, FBC was expected to support government’s plans to modernise the nation and foster unity 
(Bainimarama, 2011). Bainimarama’s comments indicate that government expects FBC to play a 
primarily collaborative role based on acceptance. This identifies with the tradition of development 
journalism based on a partnership with the government. Such a partnership is premised on a 
commitment by media to play a positive role in the process of development. Journalists “can 
question, even challenge, the state, but not to the point where they undermine government’s basic 
plans for progress and prosperity” (Christians et al., 2009, p. 200).  
 
This FBC stance was reflected in media comments made by its chief executive officer, Riyaz 
Sayed-Khaiyum. He stated that Fiji’s social and political conditions require “solutions-orientated 
development journalism” without abandoning the watchdog role (Vandhana, 2012). FBC’s 
relationship with the State would be a formal one defined in State documents like the Roadmap for 
Democracy and Sustainable Socio-economic Development. Such plans see the media as vital for 
facilitating government policies for economic development and national unity (Ministry of National 
Planning, 2009, p. 51). The concern is that government funds and controls the State-owned 
broadcaster, and political economy realities mean criticism of the government will be limited, if not 
muted. Narsey alleges that FBC virtually stopped critical analysis of the Bainimarama Government 
that it had done regularly before the 2009 abrogation of the 1997 Constitution (Narsey, 2013c). 
 
Moreover, the FBC competes for advertising with the commercial broadcasters. The government loan 
has given it a distinct advantage in the market in terms of the recruitment of talent, the purchase of 
programs, and its outreach. As a government entity, FBC is exempt from cross-media restrictions. 
Unlike its competitors, it is able to run both a commercial radio station and television station. This gives 
FBC yet another major advantage in that it is able to cross-promote and air programs on both radio and 
television. A possible consequence of all this is the dominance of the market and the airwaves by a State 
broadcaster funded in large part by government to promote its policies. Aside from stunting the 
development of Fiji TV and CFM, FBC could become the lone, dominant broadcaster in the market. 
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This outcome would be the opposite of what government’s anti media concentration reforms were 
expected to achieve.    
 
Synopsis of media ownership analysis 
This section addressed Research Question Four: What is the genesis and nature of media ownership 
in Fiji and its link with political and economic power? The analysis shows that since independence 
in 1970 and the implementation of liberal economic reforms in the 1990s, media ownership has 
moved toward increased corporatisation. This trend continued under the ownership reforms 
implemented in 2010. The reforms left government, a major media owner in its own right, well-
placed to use punitive legislation on the one hand, and favourable incentives and subsidies on the 
other hand, to coerce and/or induce media into a collaborative role. The high level of State power 
and increased corporatisation of media ownership has led to various conflict of interest situations. 
This could be a negative trend for the development of journalism, including responsible conflict 
reporting.  
 
6.6 In-depth Interviews analysis 
 
Overview 
The in-depth interviews reveal a beleaguered media sector struggling to cope with a litany of issues, 
both recent and protracted, that have an impact on journalism, including conflict reporting. This 
includes a multitude of pressures emanating from the government, media owners, advertisers, 
politicians and the community at large. The interviews show that in a small, closely-knit, pluralistic 
society with strong traditional elements, journalists have to cope with an exceptional level of social, 
cultural, political and commercial stresses. Some interviewees felt that tougher legislation 
introduced since the 2006 coup has resulted in a claustrophobic atmosphere, even while 
acknowledging that a history of professional lapses and ethical breaches might have exposed media 
to just such legislation.  
 
In the following sections we analyse the in-depth interviews under various themes. 
 
Shoot the messenger  
The interviews indicate that playing the classical watchdog role in Fiji is quite challenging, partly 
because of the country’s cultural norms of deference to authority and partly because of its ethnic 
and political fractionalisation. These realities hold true even when Fiji is under democratic rule. 
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Besides the authoritarian predisposition of the leadership and the government, some interviewees 
spoke about a “shoot the messenger” attitude among the public. This is no doubt largely attributable 
to Fiji’s mixed demography and racially-based electoral system. Construction of political 
mobilisation and partisan support based on ethnic lines (Ewins, 2008) increases the probability that 
people will reject media criticism of their political parties or leaders and turn on the hapless 
messenger instead. Sometimes politicians actively cultivate such attitudes by resorting to racial 
politics. When the National Bank of Fiji (NBF) loans scandal broke in 1995, the Rabuka 
Government portrayed the fiasco as an “Indian” attempt to malign a “Fijian” government — an 
“orchestrated” attack against “Fijian businessmen and companies” (B. Lal, 2010, p. 449).  
 
Government depicted the media as an anti-indigenous entity, a stance designed to ferment a siege 
mentality among indigenous Fijians by creating the impression that indigenous rule was under 
threat because of the media coverage of the banking scandal. The Fiji Times was forced to go on the 
defensive, stating in an editorial: “Let us get some things straight. The media is not trying to topple 
the government. Criticism of the NBF debacle has nothing to do with race” (see B. Lal, 2010, p. 
449). The Fiji public’s apparent “shoot-the-messenger” mentality is reminiscent of a negative view 
of “oppositionism” seen in some other plural societies such as Malaysia, where even healthy 
criticism of the ethnic Malay-dominated government is reportedly greeted with disdain by sections 
of the indigenous Malay community (Fong, 2009, p. 28). This response resonates with what is 
described as a “hostile media phenomenon” (Dalton, Beck & Huckfeldt, 1998; Peffley, Avery & 
Glass, 2001). The term derives from a 1992 study of the US presidential election, which identified a 
strong tendency among partisan supporters to regard even balanced news coverage of their political 
side as biased (see Dalton, Beck & Huckfeldt, 1998).  
 
In Fiji, a sign of the ‘shoot the messenger’ mentality was apparent in a Lowy Institute poll in which 
most respondents (43 per cent) stated that since the 2006 coup, the media had become more reliable. 
This was against 31 per cent who stated that there had been no change, and 24 per cent who stated 
that the media had become was less reliable (Lowy Institute, 2011). Interestingly, the Lowy poll 
indicated 96 per cent “strong” or “partial” preference for a censorship-free media environment 
(Lowy Institute, 2011, pp. 12–13). Taken together, the results indicate fragile public confidence in 
journalists, yet fairly strong support for a free media. In other words, the Fiji public’s desire for a 
free press is not necessarily a measure of its confidence in the local media corps. From a conflict 
reporting perspective, the issue of public support for the media is crucial: the lower the level of 
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public support, the higher the risk of exposure to government control.  This was a central message 
in the Hutchins report on “A Free and Responsible Press” in the United States. The report warned 
that media risked compromising their own freedom and independence if they lost public confidence 
due to a decline in their professional standards (Hutchins Commission, 1947). This message applies 
equally today to Fiji and other Pacific Islands countries, where the danger of State control is 
amplified due to authoritarian-minded governments (see Perrottet & Robie, 2011; Robie, 2009b). 
 
Lack of professionalism 
The reported lack of public support for Fiji’s media could also be attributed to a perception about 
the lack of professionalism in the sector. This is an old concern reflected in various studies, 
including three reports on media self-regulation: the Thomson Foundation Report (Morgan & 
Thomas, 1996), the controversial James Anthony Report (Fiji Human Rights Commission, 2008) 
and the Fiji Media Council Report (J. Herman, Siwatibau, & Sweetman, 2009). Concerns about 
professional standards culminated over the coverage of the 2000 Speight coup and the 2001 high-
profile murders of former Fiji Red Cross director John Scott and his partner Greg Scrivener (Cass, 
2002; Field, 2002; Robie, 2003c). Alleged shortcomings in the coverage of the Speight coup have 
already been covered elsewhere in this thesis.  
 
The apparent journalistic failures associated with the Scott and Scrivener murders are explicitly 
documented in a compelling book, Deep Beyond the Reef: A True Story of Madness and Murder in 
the South Pacific, authored by John Scott’s younger brother, Owen Scott (2004). The self-regulating 
Fiji Media Council was allegedly unable to deal effectively with a litany of media transgressions 
associated with the coup and the murders (Robie, 2003c, pp. 106–107; 2004, p. 54; Scott, 2004). 
These reported media faults could have resulted in a public backlash, as was reflected in a Tebbutt 
opinion poll released after the 2000 coup and the double murder. The poll showed 71 per cent 
public support for stronger media laws. The Qarase Government used the poll as justification for a 
proposed media bill (Support for media control, 2002). These developments indicate a link between 
a decline in professional standards – whether real or perceived – and a loss of public confidence in 
the media sector. The lack of public support would put the media in a more vulnerable position with 
regards to government intervention. However, the media industry is not solely to blame for the 
alleged decline in standards. Fiji’s coup culture, which stunted economic development, is also partly 
culpable. The coups are partly responsible for a persistently stagnant economy. This would have 
affected media companies’ finances, and their ability to pay competitive salaries, and re-invest 
adequately in staff development.  
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This came through clearly in the in-depth interviews, and was also evident in the annual reports of 
companies such as Fiji TV and CFM as part of document review. The coup culture and punitive 
legislation caused journalist flight, reflected in the high rate of journalist attrition, as detected in the 
questionnaire survey. Journalism attrition could be partly responsible for the lack of in-depth 
reporting uncovered in the content analysis. In other words, the Rabuka and Bainimarama 
Governments who denounced the media sector for the alleged lack of professionalism are 
themselves to be blamed. They are the instigators of the coup culture that caused journalist attrition 
and damaged the media sector as a whole. This issue is discussed further in the next section.   
 
Journalist attrition and training  
Some interviewees raised the high rate of journalist attrition as a major concern. This was also 
detected in the survey questionnaire, which indicated a relatively young and inexperienced cohort. 
The survey questionnaire gave some indication about the overall scale of the problem while the in-
depth interviews gave insights into its impact on day-to-day journalism practise. While journalists 
leaving the industry for better-paid jobs is not new (see Fiji Media Council, 2009; Robie, 2014; 
Yaya, 2002), the in-depth interviews coupled with the questionnaire survey findings indicate that 
the rate of attrition may have worsened since the 2006 coup, causing major challenges in the 
newsroom. The 2010 Media Decree was an apparent contributing factor – the introduction of 
punitive fines and jail terms could have caused journalist fright and flight due to the heightened 
risks. As one interviewee stated, previously journalists moved from one news media company to 
another. Now they were leaving the media industry altogether. 
  
This finding is consistent with Foster’s (2010) survey of Fiji journalists: 100 per cent of the 
respondents stated that they did not feel free to report the news as they found it. The survey had a 
low 13.6 per cent response rate (Foster, 2010, p. 25). But the results, if accurate, are quite revealing 
when juxtaposed with the high journalist attrition rate evident in this study. Some interviewees 
spoke of the tough local business environment. This would have had an impact on media 
companies’ ability to pay and retain editorial staff already unhappy with working conditions. There 
is some evidence of this in the document review of Fiji TV. The company’s annual report for 2013 
shows an increase in programming costs and a decrease in staffing costs across the group by as 
much as 18.8 per cent over the previous two years (Fiji TV, 2014). This suggests cuts to staffing to 
cover for increasing costs in other areas, such as programming. Another strong theme that emerged 
from the in-depth interviews was the lack of training and educational opportunities in the media 
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sector, as well as career progression. This could be another variable linked to journalist attrition and 
the apparent decline in standards. Journalist attrition is common in some other developing Pacific 
Islands countries (Pacific Media and Communications Facility, 2005; Tacchi et al., 2013). But in 
Fiji it seems to have been exacerbated by successive coups (Fiji Human Rights Commission, 2008; 
Foster, 2010; Morgan & Thomas, 1996; Tacchi et al., 2013; Pacific Media and Communications 
Facility, 2005).  
 
Elite orientation and indiscriminate use of press releases 
Some interviewees, particularly those from outside the media sector, spoke of the media’s alleged 
reliance on press releases and the tendency to “parrot” the views of elite sources rather than report 
in a critical manner. These findings were supported by the content analysis through war journalism 
readings for both elite orientation and context. It was also established by a new line of enquiry into 
the content analysis that found that a fairly high proportion of stories in the sample were based on 
press releases or press conferences. Notwithstanding the conventional news media wisdom that 
treats prominence as a core news value, the strong elite leaning and apparent lack of critical 
reporting could partly be attributed to a culture of deference for authority. Pacific traditions of 
respect and humility sometimes make it hard to ask tough questions or openly challenge leaders 
(Latu, 2010; Madraiwiwi, 2014; Tuafuti, 2010).  
 
While the region’s media are by no means totally cowed by culture and tradition, the alleged lack of 
critical reporting was raised at a major Pacific Islands News Association conference in Noumea, New 
Caledonia, in 2014. Two prominent speakers – Roch Wamytam, then President of the Congress of New 
Caledonia, and Dr Colin Tukuitonga, then Director General, Secretariat to the Pacific Community 
(SPC) – were in agreement that Pacific journalists avoid asking the hard questions, are less inquisitive 
than their foreign counterparts and rely too much on press releases (Pacific journalists challenged . . ., 
2014). In Fiji, the apparent passive nature of the reporting could also be a reflection of Fiji’s 
youthful and inexperienced journalist corps. Such a young cohort would conceivably be more prone 
to elite influence and manipulation than a more experienced, qualified cohort. One interviewee was 
specific about the vulnerability of young trainees recruited as cadets to various forms of pressure. 
She insisted that cadetships on their own are inadequate for training new recruits. This makes sense 
given Fiji’s ever-more complicated political environment and news reporting terrain.  
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Yet another cause of the elite disposition could be business-related. Media can rely on a ready 
supply of stories from politicians, the corporate sector and other State and non-State authorities. 
Such sources would have established bureaucracies to churn out press releases and to organise press 
conferences. For the elite who control the bureaucracy, this means greater coverage. For the media, 
it means a regular supply of stories and cost savings. This seems consistent with Herman and 
Chomsky’s (1988) propaganda theory, which holds that institutional and organisational profit-
focussed imperatives limit journalists to producing news for the benefit of an established elite with 
whom media owners often have common interests. Deeper insights into this scenario can be gained 
through Christians and colleagues’ media framework of four roles (2009). The in-depth interviews 
reveal various forms of the dependency and collaborative role of the media at different levels. The 
heavy reliance on press releases suggests that at the journalist level, collaboration appears to be 
based on apathy, indifference and/or ignorance, as well as instrumentalism, that is, some type of 
useful trade-off. At the media owner level, such collaboration appears to be largely based on 
instrumentalism (see Christians et al., 2009, p. 199).  
  
A divided media  
Another major in-depth interview finding was the apparent division in the Fiji media fraternity over 
the 2006 coup and subsequent Bainimarama Government policies, such as the 2010 Media Decree. 
Some interviewees were opposed to the decree, some were quite supportive, while some others gave 
qualified support only. Those in the former group felt the coup was illegal and the media decree was 
debilitating, unworkable and designed to stop the scrutiny of government. Those in the latter group 
felt the decree was a “wake-up” call for an errant media. It had compelled media to de-emphasise 
political rhetoric and to focus more on people-oriented stories. For them, the Bainimarama 
Government stood for oneness rather than divisiveness, which should be supported.  
 
These interviewees did not regard discarding media’s classical neutral stance as a problem since 
they felt they were supporting a greater national cause. This demonstrates the apparent fluidity of 
the objectivity ethos within sections of the Fiji media corps, something that was also picked up in 
the questionnaire survey. Conceptualising this situation through the four roles of the media 
framework (Christians et al., 2009) shows that media collaboration with the Bainimarama 
Government was not entirely based on coercion or pragmatism; acceptance also played a part. The 
latter occurs  when media share the State’s philosophical beliefs and enthusiastically support 
government policy, which may or may not also reap financial spinoffs (Christians et al., 2009, pp. 
199–200). 
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The contrasting roles that sections of the media adopted in response to the Bainimarama 
Government implied that the split within the Fiji journalist fraternity was based on both political 
ideology and ethnicity, which is not surprising since the two variables are closely related in Fiji. 
The divisions in Fiji’s journalist fraternity, which reflect the divisions in Fijian society at large (see 
B. Lal, 2008; Ewins, 1998; Naidu, 2013), are alluded to in the Fiji State of the Media and 
Communications Report 2013 (Tacchi et al., 2013). The report speaks of an “an undercurrent of 
mistrust” among media colleagues based on “pro-” or “anti-government” alignments. This had 
polarised journalists along political and provincial lines, which could hinder efforts to form a media 
association to represent media workers’ interests (p. 3). 
 
From a conflict reporting viewpoint, ethnic or political divisions within the journalist community 
could be damaging, especially if they thwart the formation of a national journalist network since 
such networks could be crucial for organising support groups within the profession to help combat 
media abuse in vulnerable societies (see Frohardt & Temin, 2003, p. 11). Networks can also be 
useful in collective bargaining with employers. Moreover, a local journalist network is often the 
precursor for forming international networks. In East-Timor, for example, journalists formed a 
national Press Union with the intention of affiliating with the Brussels-based International 
Federation of Journalists to oppose a draft media law (East Timor journalists form press union, 
2014). Fiji has lacked a domestic journalist network for some time, which may have deterred the 
formation of a broader, regional and international network, as well as a local lobby group. 
 
Future strategies for journalism and conflict reporting 
In terms of future strategies for strengthening journalism, interviewees generally felt that the 2010 
Media Decree was a hindrance rather than a help, especially in the long run, as the legislation was 
proving too restrictive and too costly. It clearly emerges from the interviews that the sweeping and 
punitive nature of some provisions stopped media from functioning properly. Even those who were 
usually supportive of government policies felt that the decree was suited for the short-term, post-
coup period only, and that it had outlived its purpose. On the most, the feeling was that long-term, 
sustainable solutions should be based on training and development. Interviewees from both the 
media and non-media sectors felt that media should have a developmental role to assist nation-
building although there were some differences on how any such role should be defined and applied. 
A minority, mostly with a journalism background, felt such a task was best achieved by media 
sticking to their traditional watchdog role based on neutrality. Others felt that this was not sufficient 
in a developing country like Fiji.  
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For them, the media’s role and conduct should be defined by a broader national framework 
inclusive of Fiji’s troubled history. The journalists’ reactions indicate their dilemma when trying to 
reconcile what they see as their professional duties with ill-defined nation-building roles that could 
be used by the government to justify censorship and deflect legitimate criticism. This disjuncture is 
seen in other developing countries also. Skjerdal (2011) conducted a series of in-depth interviews 
with Ethiopian media professionals to investigate conflicting journalism identities. The overall 
conclusion was that journalists were favourable towards development journalism but they were 
challenged when they tried to convert the framework into actual media practice (p. 58).  
 
Similar contradictions were seen in this study’s in-depth interviews over the question of conflict 
reporting. Some respondents felt that the Fiji media bear some responsibility for conflict. They 
accepted the idea of specialist training in conflict reporting. Some others stated that since the 2006 
coup, they had been focussing more on positive developments and paying less attention to divisive 
politics. However, there were some interviewees who insisted that media should be guided by their 
professional code of ethics and practice and stick to neutrality. This attitude is reflected in the 
content analysis of the 2006 national election, with the indicator “balance” returning a peace 
journalism frame, showing that journalists are attempting to uphold balance.  
 
But the content analysis also showed lack of context and negligible coverage of critical issues. 
These shortcomings negate the overall value of the peace journalism reading. What emanates from 
the in-depth interviews and content analysis is the premium value that some Fiji journalists attach to 
professional norms such as balance and neutrality. The content analysis indicates that similar 
attention also needs to be paid to context and relevance, which were found to be lacking. This 
argument was most strongly put forward by interviewees with a non-journalism background. They 
felt that journalism lacks context and every-day relevance. The irony is that despite journalists’ 
strong insistence on balance, neutrality and objectivity, the Fiji Media Council code of ethics allows 
media organisations to take a politically partisan stance (Media Council (Fiji) Ltd, 2005). It is also 
interesting that some journalists refuse to be strait-jacketed into the classical, western news 
reporting format and are trying to break out of it. This was evident in one media executive’s 
insistence that while he believed in objectivity, he would not report fundamentally divisive things in 
the name of  “free-for-all journalism”. He would rather privilege development stories than stories 
that could harm the country.  
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Leaving the complexities of the costs, benefits and practicalities of development journalism aside 
for the moment, the media executive’s comments show that some Fiji journalists are questioning the 
established ways of reporting. Indeed, somewhat similar sentiments were expressed in the 
questionnaire survey, in which most respondents prioritised social stability over media objectivity.  
This perhaps shows that Fiji journalists’ experiences of reporting conflicts are causing them to ask 
whether there is a better way of approaching and covering certain issues in the country. The latest 
soul-searching has apparently been caused by the 2006 coup (see Pareti, 2009). This underlines the 
point that while conflicts can be damaging, they can also provide an opportunity for reflection, not 
to mention the chance to question, challenge and change the status quo (see Naidu, 2013).  
 
Synopsis of the in-depth interviews  
In-depth interviews were conducted to gain deeper insights into the problems being investigated. 
The analysis reveals a media landscape made challenging by Fiji’s ethnic make-up, racially-based 
political system and cultural respect for authority. A coup culture and tough media legislation have 
added to the problems, among other things by compounding economic challenges and causing 
journalist flight. The in-depth interview analysis illuminates the link between professional media 
standards, public confidence in media, and freedom of speech.  Divisions are apparent in the Fiji 
journalism fraternity over the Bainimarama Government’s policies. But there is broad agreement 
that media development should be centred on training and education rather than on punitive 
legislation alone.    
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6.7 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has analysed the research results. Content analysis of the 2006 elections finds elements 
of balanced, considered reporting. But the lack of context and heavy reliance on elite sources 
diminishes the value of the overall peace journalism findings. Analysis of the questionnaire survey 
reveals a relatively young, inexperienced and under-qualified journalist corps, which could explain 
some of the weaknesses discovered in the content analysis. The shortcomings could also be blamed 
on tight, cost-efficient production schedules that leave little room for journalistic enterprise. 
Document research of the legislative environment suggests over-regulation and duplication of laws 
since the implementation of the 2010 Media Industry Development Decree. Document research into 
media ownership shows an increasingly corporatised set-up dominated by local conglomerates.  In-
depth interviews give an insight into journalists’ everyday struggles in Fiji’s challenging political 
and social landscape, exposing apparent stresses for the journalism fraternity. The next chapter – 
which is the final chapter – draws together the major findings of the thesis by revisiting the research 
questions. It outlines this study’s major contributions to knowledge, as well as its limitations, 
followed by recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This final chapter draws the thesis together by synthesising the major themes that emerged from this 
study to reach conclusions, offer recommendations and outline the research implications. To recap, 
conventional journalism is said to place a premium on conflict as a news value, while eschewing 
complex explanations (Wolfsfeld, 1997). This study investigated such claims in Fiji, where the 
national media stands accused of ill-serving the country by allegedly misreporting social and 
political conflicts. Conflict is a critical issue, with analysts linking latent social and political 
tensions to the country’s coup culture and a vicious cycle of prolonged instability and stagnant 
growth. This has stopped the country from reaching its full potential (Naidu, 2005, 2008, 2013). 
 
This research was partly inspired by a growing recognition among policymakers that an empowered 
media could contribute to conflict prevention in society (R. Howard, 2003, 2009), and encroaches into 
the field of peace studies, an important area of research internationally, but lagging behind in the 
Pacific. In approaching the problem from a global perspective, a review of the media coverage of 
the major conflicts in the turbulent post-Cold War era was undertaken, including ethnic conflicts in 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the US War on Terror and the troubles in Kenya (Gottschalk, 1992; 
Kellner, 2002). Closer to home, the unprecedented political riots in Tonga, the ethnic conflict in 
Solomon Islands, the civil war in Bougainville and the Fiji coups were examined (Moala, 2008; 
Robie, 2007). 
 
The literature review revealed a common thread – an apparent media attraction to elite sources, lack 
of contextual reporting and the use of media by certain powerful elements to mobilise groups and 
flare up war hysteria. Specific to Fiji, the literature suggested that the country’s major, long-running 
conflicts with strong primordial overtones were actually underpinned by instrumentalist and 
constructivist causes rooted in the capitalist policies of the colonial government. The colonial 
system, which thrived on an ethnically-constructed social, economic and political framework, was 
partly retained after independence in 1970, resulting in an ethnically-divided parliament. Over time 
and space, this led to the formation of political and economic cartels and the steady politicisation of 
the ethnic Fijian military, fueling a coup syndrome. However, colonialism should not become the 
perpetual excuse. Leadership failures have also plagued Fiji, as discussed in Chapter 3.     
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On the media’s part, an evident tendency to focus on the primordial angle of conflicts could have 
caused them lose sight of the underlying causes of these conflicts. Similarly, a formulaic tendency 
to use elites as news sources could be a partial cause of the media’s misrepresentation of sensitive 
issues such as demographical trends, the share of economic wealth and matters concerning land 
(Chung, 1999; Gaunder, 2008). This brings into question the wisdom of the unmitigated and 
wholesome application of the inherited western news reporting model in non-western, non-
homogenous societies. My research suggests that the premium value placed on conflict and elites as 
news sources, and the focus on the immediate, violent effects of conflict, could be harmful in tense, 
multi-ethnic societies, where elites with vested political and economic interests often hold sway.  
 
One academic who took part in my study’s in-depth interviews complained that the media discourse 
in Fiji was dominated by the political elites, and that intellectuals received comparatively less 
coverage. To some extent, this was borne out by the study’s content analysis. This suggests that 
media need to consider a more broad-based approach when it comes to sourcing news. In terms of 
conflict reporting, the literature showed an apparently strong research focus on Western news 
organisations, with domestic media receiving comparatively less attention; an emphasis on the 
journalist and media organisations without considering the larger political, social and economic forces 
at play; and failure to fully consider the link between media content and the national media 
infrastructure. The gaps in the literature informed my study’s multi-faceted methodological 
approach, which included content analysis, questionnaire survey, document research and in-depth 
interviews. This strategy was used in the attempt to address an apparent disconnect between content 
creation and the media landscape by identifying the links between content and some other key 
variables, such as the professional capacity and diversity of the national media corps, the national 
media ownership structure and the national legislative environment.  
 
The following sections organise the outlining of the conclusions around the four research questions. 
 
7.2 Research Question One: Is the Fiji media inflammatory, as is often alleged?  
 
As a starting point, a modified peace journalism content analysis framework was applied to the print 
media’s coverage of the 2006 national elections to address Question One. Literature on other peace 
journalism-inspired studies and on Fiji’s ethnically-based political system had hinted at a war 
journalism reading, as did an apparent media tendency to narrowly define conflicts on the basis of 
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primordialism.  But the analysis returned a peace journalism reading, indicating that the print media 
coverage of Fiji’s 2006 election was not inflammatory.  
 
However, the validity of this finding was questionable as it was likely affected by the military’s 
political involvement in the 2006 elections. Moreover, the finding was overshadowed by war 
journalism readings for individual indicators like context and sources, suggesting that most election 
stories lacked background and focused on elite sources only. In addition, a new line of enquiry 
showed that stories on logistical issues and political rhetoric vastly outnumbered those dealing with 
critical national matters. These results lead to the conclusion that if a peace journalism reading is 
meant to denote a positive outcome, it does not really apply equally in every context or setting. In 
Fiji’s case, the peace journalism reading could be deceiving, founded as it was on apparent military 
coercion. This cast doubts on the validity and longevity of the induced peace journalism frame.  
 
Taken at face-value, the peace journalism reading could even mask some deeper problems, such as 
the apparent lack of critical media coverage given to issues such as poverty, land, corruption, 
unemployment and infrastructural development, variables that often underpin long-term conflicts in 
Fiji.  So in the Fiji context, the peace journalism reading is not necessarily a positive outcome. In 
other words, coverage of the 2006 election indicates the Fiji print media were not inflammatory. 
But that does not mean that conflict reporting is not a problem since the structural causes of conflict 
are not given adequate coverage, as per the content analysis. At this juncture, it is worth noting that 
the Bainimarama coup, reasonably blamed for many problems in Fiji’s media sector, took place 
months after the 2006 election, and cannot be held liable for all the shortcomings apparent in the 2006 
election coverage.  
 
The weak coverage could possibly be symptomatic of the decades of decline apparent in the media 
sector, partly as a result of Fiji’s coup culture and partly as a result of inaction by the media sector to 
take corrective measures. The 2006 coup simply exacerbated the situation (see Herman, Siwatibau, & 
Sweetman, 2009; Morgan & Thomas, 1996). 
 
Next, we look at the media content in relation to the media infrastructure, specifically journalist 
professional capacity and diversity.  
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7.3 Research Question Two: What is the level of journalist professional capacity &  
 diversity in Fiji?  
 
The questionnaire survey found that virtually half the respondents boasted some form of recognised 
credentials, but this was undermined by the detection of a relatively young and inexperienced journalist 
corps. It betrayed signs of a fairly high rate of journalist attrition, which could partly explain the lack of 
critical reporting apparent in the content analysis. The current findings coupled with the literature 
review indicate that journalist attrition is a long-standing problem whose effects may have been 
overlooked and underestimated. The research suggests that attrition is likely caused by a 
combination of factors, including Fiji’s coup culture and more recently,  the punitive 2010 Media 
Decree.  The high level of journalist attrition implies that improvements in journalist education and 
on-the-job experience, once proffered as a panacea, are not after all sufficient on their own. For the 
media industry, the first priority must be to find ways and means of breaking the debilitating 
journalist attrition cycle, that is look at strategies for retaining matured journalists in the media 
sector.  
 
A passion for journalism can only go so far. There is a need to improve incentives in terms of 
working conditions, remuneration, career progression and opportunities for training and 
development to stem the outward flow, build newsroom capacity and improve the quality of the 
content. Otherwise, as the in-depth interviews suggest, Fiji’s media sector is doomed to act as a 
nursery for corporate companies, civil society organisations, tertiary institutions and government 
departments. With reference to academic qualifications, only two journalists out of the 63 in the 
sample held postgraduate degrees. Negative implications of this situation include lack of local 
capacity to conduct research into Pacific media. At the moment, such research is not only infrequent 
but largely carried out by non-Pacific Islanders, thus lacking an insider lens (see Latu, 2010).  
 
Developing academic research capacity in Pacific media is on its own a strong incentive for 
boosting journalism education, not just at the undergraduate level but also at the postgraduate level. 
While non-media academics, scholars and research institutions have the capacity to conduct 
research into Pacific media, research by graduate journalists with professional experience can 
provide unique insider perspectives and add depth and new knowledge to the literature. These 
discussions raise one of the great fallacies and ironies of journalism in Fiji. Governments, including 
those headed by prime ministers Rabuka, Chaudhry and Bainimarama, habitually blame the media 
sector for an alleged lack of professional standards. This thesis, however, has argued that a major 
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cause of the various problems in the media sector is Fiji’s pervading coup culture, a legacy dating 
from Rabuka’s first coup in 1987, reinforced by the Speight putsch in 2000, and perpetuated by 
Bainimarama in his 2006 takeover, which was initially supported by Chaudhry (Firth & Fraenkel, 
2009; Green, 2009).  
 
In the pursuit of answers, an honest acknowledgement of all the factors that hamper the media 
sector, and the sharing of responsibility equally and fairly, could lead to a better understanding of 
the issues at stake. Apportioning blame on the media sector alone will only obscure the full extent 
of problem and hinder the search for solutions. A key conclusion is that while some profitable 
media companies may be held responsible for not paying a fair wage and not re-investing enough in 
training and education, the biggest and most enduring negative impact on media standards is from 
successive coups, global and local economic downturns and punitive legislation. These variables – 
previously overlooked, if not underestimated – deal a double blow to media companies by 
increasing operating costs and lowering profit margins, leaving little funds for reinvestment and 
redevelopment.  
 
These problems are not of the media sector’s making. Indeed, they are beyond the media sector’s 
control. Furthermore, punitive media legislation cannot do anything to address the shortage of 
academically-qualified journalists, the apparent lack of work incentives in the media sector, or 
journalist attrition.  In fact, evidence uncovered by this research indicates that hardnosed legislation 
could aggravate these problems, especially journalist attrition. Turning to journalist diversity, the 
survey found a proportionate balance in terms of ethnicity and religion, but there were some 
concerns about media prioritising indigenous traditions and institutions over those of other 
communities. 
 
To a certain extent, the prevalence of indigenous traditions could be justified on the basis of 
indigenous Fijians’ first nation status. But concerns arise during coups, when the phenomenon tends 
to take on strong primordial overtones, with appeals made on the basis of ethnicity, religion and 
cultural affiliation (see Mishra, 2008; Robie, 2000, 2001). Given that the indigenous population is 
forecast to increase its majority (Bureau of Statistics, 2007), this issue needs to be monitored so that 
the media does not marginalise other groups that make up Fiji’s multi-ethnic society. 
Marginalisation of women would be another concern. In numerical terms, gender representation in 
the journalist corps is fairly evenly mixed but female journalists are disadvantaged when it comes to 
seniority. The literature on gender in journalism suggests female journalists perceive and report 
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issues differently from male journalists (Bhagwan-Rolls, 2006, 2007). Perhaps if there were more 
female journalists in senior newsroom positions, it is conceivable that they might adopt a more 
peace-oriented style of journalism practice. 
 
One news executive said during the in-depth interviews that his organisation recruited journalists on 
the basis of ability alone and still managed to maintain a balanced newsroom. That may well be the 
case. However, the findings of this research suggest that there are justifications for monitoring the 
political, ethnic, religious and regional composition of Fiji’s journalist corps to safeguard against 
dominant groups exerting disproportionate control over content, more so in a multi-ethnic country 
such as Fiji. These findings reaffirm that it will take more than just the 2010 Media Decree to 
address the inherent structural weaknesses in Fiji’s media sector.  
 
Indeed, the survey finding that a fairly large segment of the respondents seemed less than confident 
about journalists’ grasp of media law and ethics is rather disconcerting. Such a lack of assurance is 
another signal of a weak national journalist corps that is not only a danger to itself but also in a 
compromised position when it comes to scrutinising people in authority, the more so with the State 
vigorously pursuing any legal and ethical breaches through the courts. The Fiji Times was cited 
twice for sub judice contempt, incurring a FJD300,000 fine in 2013 (Tough week and times ahead, 
2013). Despite being one of the larger and more profitable companies, the Times, let alone Fiji’s 
smaller news media organisations, surely cannot sustain fines of this nature. This indicates that the 
Fiji media sector must make media law and ethics a high educational priority as it could mean the 
difference between the survival or the demise of some news organisations. The next section looks at 
the conclusions reached with reference to the third research question relating to the media 
infrastructure, namely the legal environment.  
 
7.4 What are the genesis and nature of Fiji’s media laws?  
 
For a media sector that has, historically, operated under the British legal framework, the punitive 
2010 Media Decree marked a major paradigm shift as self-regulation gave way to State regulation 
and ethical breaches were criminalised (see Dutt, 2010). Moreover, the Bainimarama Government 
promulgated additional decrees that impacted on the operations of the media sector, with the 
research identifying some clear cases of over-regulation and duplication. Government instituted 
stronger laws to curb alleged inflammatory journalism, citing social, political and economic stability as 
the primary goals. The content analysis suggests that inflammatory reporting is not as much a problem 
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as the lack of in-depth, contextual reporting. However, as the document research shows, the bulk of the 
Media Industry Development Authority’s (MIDA) strategy to date has focused on media regulation 
rather than media development, leading one to conclude that the general thrust of government’s media 
policy could be seriously flawed. Also evident was a power imbalance between the State as the 
regulating authority and the media as the fourth estate. Data suggests that the punitive legislation 
fostered a culture of self-censorship, possibly contributing to journalist fright (Hooper, 2013). 
 
However, the western concept of media watchdoggism can be problematic in Fiji’s ‘hybrid’ 
democracy, which is based on a not-altogether harmonious amalgamation of Western and 
indigenous systems (Boege et al., 2013). Media has to contend with indigenous respect for 
traditional authority on the one hand, and the general population’s ethnic-based, partisan political 
affiliations on the other. The means that in Fiji’s political and cultural contexts, an overly-
aggressive watchdog approach could actually be counter-productive. It could turn the public against 
the fourth estate, which in turn could strengthen government’s case for tighter regulation. In other 
words, the media not only face autocratic-minded governments, but at times a cagey and untrusting 
public. This resembles, in the Fiji context, what Dalton and others (1998) describe as “hostile media 
phenomenon”. Indeed, while on paper Fiji has looked good regarding freedom of speech, the reality 
is different. While Fiji’s constitutions enshrined media freedom, the spectre of tighter legislation 
has been a constant threat due to the country’s  history, culture, tradition and ethnic politics. 
Stronger regulation was delayed by independence in 1970, deregulation in the 1990s and ironically, 
by the 2000 and 2006 coups. But the respite was only temporary. Regulation is now a reality – the 
consequence of both good and bad journalism. The result is too much power with the State and too 
little space for media, not the least because of selective, opportunistic application of the media law. 
  
In addition, legal provisions compelling the disclosure of confidential sources and search and confiscate 
powers could discourage a whistleblowing culture and impede investigative journalism, already a weak 
link in Fiji (see S. Singh, 2012). This provision contradicts the Bainimarama Government’s professed 
stand against corruption and declared support for good governance (see Bainimarama, 2009, 2011, 
2013). Another contradiction is that tougher media legislation was introduced with the stated aim of 
stopping media from fanning ethnic tensions.  However, overly restrictive laws could have caused 
opposition views to migrate from mainstream media to the uncontrolled realm of social media to 
resurface in more extreme forms.  
 
	   216	  
Moreover, where the Fiji Media Council was seen to be too close to the media industry in the days 
of media self-regulation, some critics have come to regard MIDA, tasked with enforcing compliance 
with the media codes, as a government stooge (J. Herman et al., 2009; Narsey, 2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 
2013c). The literature also indicates that weaknesses within the media sector may have made it more 
vulnerable to government designs and motives to impose harsher legislation. To some extent, one 
cannot but agree with critics such as Professor Crosbie Walsh, the founder of the development 
studies program at the University of the South Pacific, who stated that the restrictions on the Fiji 
media stem from a backdrop of unfair reporting and lack of background, and that in Fiji, issues of 
press freedom cannot be isolated from ethical reporting (see Yamo, 2012). 
 
Journalists in the in-depth interviews admitted that mistakes and ethical breaches were 
commonplace, with one former newspaper employee even stating that running one-sided, single-
sourced stories had become routine. One wonders if this trend inspired the provision in the 2010 
Media Decree criminalising the publication or broadcast of one-sided stories. In essence, Fiji’s 
legislative environment fails Frohardt and Temin’s (2003) requirements for a proper balance 
between legislation that allows media to operate without excessive restrictions and legislation 
designed to enforce responsible reporting.  
 
The next section looks at the conclusions in relation to the fourth and final research question 
concerning the implications of the media ownership structure. 
 
7.5 Research Question Four: What is the genesis and nature of media ownership in  
 Fiji and its link with political & economic power? 
 
The move towards corporatisation since independence in 1970 accelerated under new laws implemented 
in 2010, with the sector effectively dominated by local conglomerates. Government emerged as a major 
media owner, with sole proprietorship of the State broadcaster, FBC, and majority holdings in Fiji TV 
via several State-linked entities. Even as far back as the 1970s, scholars like Melody (1978) had 
noticed the global shift towards increased corporatisation in media ownership. Melody had in fact 
warned that legislation would be necessary to counter the entrepreneurial tendency to monopolise 
the marketplace of ideas for power and profit, usually under the guise of economic efficiency.  
 
Fiji’s example shows that ill-conceived media ownership laws can do more harm than good. The 
litany of ironies relating to Fiji’s media sector includes the fact that new ownership laws 
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implemented in the name of media de-concentration seem to have had the opposite impact, giving 
rise to increased conglomeration. These developments are indicative of major political economy 
and conflict of interest concerns. As McChesney (2013) argues, a social system dominated by 
economic elites will see them prioritise their capitalist interests, with a fixation on the stock market 
rather than poverty, business rather than labour, and celebrity news and gossip, rather than pressing 
social problems. During the content analysis, it was noticed that lifestyle, sports and celebrity 
features from Hollywood and Bollywood featured prominently in the local dailies. Corporate news 
in the expanding business news sections of the dailies and advertising features were also 
conspicuous. This leads one to the conclusion that the lack of depth in elections coverage was not 
just due to lack of journalist capacity, but also due to the lack of time and space for journalistic 
endeavor to flourish.   
 
Moreover, limits on foreign ownership that forced the sale of the Rupert Murdoch–owned Fiji 
Times to a major local company put both the country’s dailies into the hands of local 
conglomerates.  Arguably, Fiji might have been better off if at least one of the two national 
newspapers had remained under foreign owners with no other business ventures in the local 
economy. To some extent, this would mean being less beholden to government’s business and 
economic policies, although there is no guarantee that a foreign media organisation would not give 
in to government demands and threats, or inducements for that matter. Moreover, a foreign 
company would still be beholden to local advertisers, who in the case of Fiji, can be very sensitive 
to government policies. However, this research indicates the Fiji Times was apparently more critical 
of government while under foreign ownership than under local ownership. The next section 
discusses some suggestions to address the problems identified. 
 
7.6 Recommendations  
 
In Fiji, it is apparent that media have to deal with censorship, and a lack of trained, qualified and 
experienced journalists. Salaries in the media sector are comparatively low as is evident from the 
high staff turnover. Providing training and educational opportunities, and changing entrenched 
newsroom cultures and mindsets, will be difficult tasks to achieve. These recommendations are 
based on the premise that if Fiji is going to make a successful transition to democracy following the 
September 2014 general election, the media need to be given sufficient freedom to be able to hold 
power to account and keep the public informed. For their part, media need to lift professional 
standards, address salary issues and demonstrate accountability through contextual, culturally-
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sensitive and responsible journalism.  In keeping with Frohardt and Temin’s (2003) guidelines, the 
recommendations fall into two categories: content-specific interventions and structural 
interventions. The former are based on studying media content and identifying ways to strengthen 
it, including ascertaining areas where issue-oriented training might be warranted. The latter involve 
an audit of the national media structure, identifying fault lines and making recommendations for 
improvements. 
 
Content-specific interventions  
Media content can shape and influence an individual’s view of the world (Frohardt & Temin, 2003). 
This study revealed an apparent lack of critical reporting and some possible cases of misreporting 
with regard to developmental issues and contentious matters. The study indicates a media with a 
fairly heavy reliance on elite sources and a young, inexperienced and under-educated journalist 
corps. This combination increases the risk of journalist control and manipulation by politicians and 
other leaders, especially given Fiji’s culture of deference towards authority figures (see Boydell, 
2014; Hartsell, 2010; Kurer, 2001; Naidu, 2013; Sutherland, 1992). The historical misreporting of 
some polarising matters, such as land ownership and usage, demographic trends, and 
constitutionalism and coups, has been claimed, with allegations of media over-emphasis of the 
ethnic angle (Cottrell & Ghai, 2004; Chung, 1999; Ewins, 1998; Sutherland, 1992). The key point is 
that the issues discussed are crucial matters that form the national news package on a regular basis, 
both from the perspective of the government of the day and the political opposition.  
 
However, this thesis argues that media content is inextricably tied to the national media 
infrastructure, which includes journalists. Too often, policy-makers ignore this link, and focus on 
the content. This can lead to misguided legislation that is often punitive in nature. This is at best a 
makeshift measure that does nothing to improve the quality of journalsts. This limited approach is a 
major shortcoming given that journalists with poor professional skills can be a potential security 
threat. They can inflame grievances and promote stereotypes even if that is not the intention 
(Frohardt and Temin, 2003). 
  
It is recommended that journalists receive specialised training to in reporting sensitive issues,  as 
part of the curriculum, or by means of specific workshops and seminars, particularly nearer to an 
election. A basic course in conflict reporting theory should be included in university curricula 
generically, incorporating peace journalism principles. This could provide a framework for 
journalists to produce content is inclusive of all conceivable angles concerning an issue, rather than 
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just the ethnic element. It could enable grassroots people to express their views about events and 
issues that affect them directly, especially if they are in the front lines of conflict. It would also 
require paying more attention, and giving more space, to people who condemn violence and offer 
solutions. 
 
The recommendation is made on the premise that specific demands on media systems vary from 
country to country. In multi-cultural societies such as Fiji, journalists deal with political differences, 
ethnic tensions, social conflicts, cultural sensitivities, autocratic governments, and military coups. 
Journalists covering these complex issues need not only practical skills but also philosophical and 
contextual knowledge taught in university curricula (see Deuze, 2006). Besides improving the 
curriculum content of the training programs in universities, providing affordable and accessible 
university education for journalists should be a priority. To overcome a lack of resources, the media 
sector could tap into the expertise and knowledge available in universities and civil society 
organisations, which conduct research and hold lectures, seminars, conferences and workshops on 
critical issues facing the nation. Regularly participating in such events could help journalists 
become more critical thinkers and produce improved content. The private sector has a major stake 
in a stable political environment. It is recommended that it participate in sponsoring training 
programs for journalists and university students. 
 
The next section addresses structural interventions. 
 
Structural interventions  
The media structure is the foundation on which news is produced. Based on the research results and 
outcomes, this study concludes that media content cannot be improved sustainably without first 
addressing the structural weaknesses in the system. This study recommends the following 
strategies:  
 
Training and Development: Training and education opportunities need to be expanded to cater for 
the many untrained journalists found in the survey and for future recruits. Training is indispensable 
for empowering journalists to operate competently in a rapidly transforming media landscape 
dealing with fast-changing social, political, technological and economic paradigms, as is Fiji. The 
government, the private sector and donor agencies should consider specific scholarships in journalism 
and media to attract a greater pool of interested applicants to achieve the critical mass.  
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Journalist Attrition: Unless journalist attrition is brought to manageable levels, training and 
development will have little impact simply because skilled journalists will leave the sector once they 
have become more experienced and marketable. Challenging as this issue is, attempts should be made 
to stem the outward flow. In terms of salaries, media companies may not be able to compete equally 
with other sectors, such as banking. However, donor agencies, the private sector and governments 
could assist by providing other incentives. These include fellowships and scholarships to mid-career 
candidates for part-time or full-time study in exchange for a reasonable bond period to stay in the 
journalism profession. Moreover, there are now a number of universities, vocational training 
institutions and research centres in the region that could offer positions for journalists-in-residence. 
This could be a stepping stone for journalism teaching positions at regional institutions for 
individuals who have spent the requisite amount of time as a journalist. It would also boost capacity 
for research in Pacific media. Outlining such career paths and creating positions to be filled by 
professional, academically qualified journalists would be a boost for the sector.  
 
Awards and Citations: The Fiji Awards for Media Excellence should be revived as another 
incentive to recognise and reward excellence and commitment in journalism, doubling as a measure 
for slowing the rate of journalist attrition. The awards could be sweetened with the offer of local or 
overseas fellowships for the winners.  
 
National Media Associations: The formation of a journalist association for collective bargaining is 
also recommended. Such associations could defend journalists’ rights and freedoms, provide legal 
counsel and advocate for employers to implement a transparent salary structure (see Frohardt & 
Temin, 2003). 
 
Community Education: A culture of ‘hostile media phenomenon’ identified in the in-depth 
interviews indicates that, apart from educating journalists, there is a case for educating the 
community about the important and challenging role of media in society. In this regard, media 
literacy could be included in the school curriculum, in the interest of a better-informed public. In 
time, such a public may show greater appreciation for the media. This could be crucial for putting 
public pressure on government to relax some of the more punitive laws governing the Fiji media.  
 
Media Law: On the part of the State, greater clarity is needed regarding the media decree’s 
ambiguous provisions. Some of the more punitive measures need to be reconsidered and the law 
needs to be streamlined to eradicate duplication. Consistent enforcement of pre-existing defamation, 
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sub judice and hate speech laws should be sufficient. Government’s updated media strategy should 
focus more on journalist development and less on journalist regulation as a way of improving media 
content. For its part, the media sector needs to acknowledge and address apparent professional 
shortcomings, rather than dismiss them out of hand as a case of shooting the messenger. Should Fiji 
adopt a democratic framework after the 2014 election, a return to self-regulation should be 
considered. This would be under a properly constituted, reformed, strengthened and well-resourced 
independent media council that is given more powers after consultations with the relevant parties. 
Any such body should include government representatives.  
 
Media Ownership: Fiji’s media ownership structure has emerged as a major concern because of the 
blatant State–corporate nexus. It has given rise to various political economy and conflict of interest 
scenarios in relation to conglomeration, interlocking directorships and re-feudalisation, as outlined 
in Chapter 6. A matter of concern is the fact that Fiji’s major media owners have significant stakes 
in other sectors of the economy, which makes them beholden to government policies that could 
affect their profits (see Narsey, 2013b, 2013c). This research used Christians and others’ (2009) 
concept of the four roles of the media to show how pressure from owners may have forced some 
media into a collaborative role with the State in return for pecuniary gains or to avoid retributive 
actions. While one analyst (Narsey, 2013b, 2013c) has called for a reversal of Fiji’s media laws to 
re-divest ownership from Fiji’s corporate giants and revert it to dedicated media operators, this 
seems unrealisable, at least in the near future. In the immediate to mid terms, there are alternate 
ways of countering the strong corporate influence in media ownership. These include: 
 
Public Service Broadcasting (PSB): The State-broadcaster, FBC, quite possibly the country’s most 
influential medium, could take on a stronger public service broadcasting (PSB) role. The Pacific 
Media and Communications Facility study (2005) on Fiji and the region states that while national 
PSB services are government-owned, they are uniquely placed to cover programming gaps in a 
profit-focused broadcasting environment. It would require government to grant greater autonomy to 
the State broadcaster to allow it to operate under a similar charter to that of Radio Australia, for 
instance. 
 
Alternative Media: These media forms are not bound by State and commercial ownership-related 
constraints. This means they are better positioned to provide independent analysis on media. These 
could take the form of independent bloggers, such as David Robie’s Café Pacific blog: 
(http://cafepacific.blogspot.com.au/) and Wadan Narsey on Fiji – for fairness and freedom: 
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(http://narseyonfiji.wordpress.com/). Narsey (2013b, 2013c) provides critical analysis of media 
ownership and other related issues. Alternative media includes community media, such as the 
femLink initiative, which seeks to address imbalances inherent in traditional decision-making 
communication structures (Bhagwan-Rolls, 2006, 2007). 
 
Media Watch Groups: Watch groups can be critical for providing an independent assessment of 
media reporting and the influence of media owners. The Suva-based Fiji Media Watch, a civil 
society organisation, carries out limited research, media monitoring and media literacy programs. 
The group’s aim is to raise awareness about mass media power in today’s Fiji (see website, 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Fiji-Media-Watch-Media-Watch-Group/453871711359883). The 
Consumer Council of Fiji as an independent statutory body has the mandate and resources to add a 
media watch role to its list of responsibilities. The Council describes itself as a consumer 
“watchdog” that conducts rigorous research and policy analysis on key consumer issues, with power 
to influence decision-makers (see the Council’s website, http://www.consumersfiji.org/about-
us/consumer-council-of-fiji).  
 
Independent Research: Research can be critical for creating awareness, stimulating debate and 
building a case to influence policy about relevant media ownership regulation in Fiji. The only 
research publication fully dedicated to media and communications in the Pacific is the peer-
reviewed Pacific Journalism Review, based at Auckland University of Technology, Auckland (see 
website, http://www.pjreview.info/). Other journals that could publish research on media ownership 
and political economy of the media include: the University of the South Pacific–based Journal of 
Pacific Studies, which covers a range of disciplines (see website, 
http://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=3015) and Fijian Studies, published by the Fiji Institute of 
Applied Studies, with a focus on scholarly articles in humanities and social sciences  (see website, 
http://search.informit.com.au/browseJournalTitle;res=IELHSS;issn=1728-7456). In 2008, Fijian 
Studies published a special edition on media and democracy in Fiji.  
 
Annual State of the Media Report: This could take the form of a research article that keeps a check 
on ownership patterns and the impact on journalism. The Pacific Media Assistance Program 
released its PACMAS State of the Media and Communication Regional Report 2013 (Tacchi et al., 
2013). On the whole, such investigations are irregular and do not necessarily focus on ownership 
issues.  
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Networking and collaborating:  In terms of responsible conflict reporting, which requires greater 
resources, economic realties could be a major deterrent. However, the Pacific Islands, including 
Fiji, appear to have a comparative advantage: the proliferation of community-based organisations, 
which form a vital part of life in the islands (see Swain, 2000). These range across religious 
organisations, women’s groups, community radio, media watch groups, educational institutions, and 
local and international non-government organisations. Media could share the ‘burden’ by pooling 
resources with these like-minded civic institutions when it comes to peace-building. Some areas of 
cooperation could include creating or sharing content, providing specialist training, collaborating on 
research and so forth. This is already happening. To cite but one example, in Fiji a major post–2006 
coup study, Voices of the People: Perceptions and Preconditions for Democratic Development in 
Fiji, was carried out under the auspices of the Pacific Theological College in Suva (Boege et al., 
2013). Fiji-based media personality and peace journalism advocate James Bhagwan was part of the 
project team. The Suva-based non-governmental organisation, Citizens’ Constitutional Forum 
Limited (CCF), which promotes human rights, has an active media advocacy program through 
which it has hosted speakers like peace journalism advocate, Professor Jake Lynch, to conduct 
workshops (see website, http://news.ccf.org.fj/about-ccf/) 
 
The chapter now turns to the implications of the study. 
 
7.7 Contributions and implications of the research 
 
The significance of this study spans theory, practice and policy nationally, regionally, and 
internationally. Surprising as it may seem for a turbulent region like the Pacific, conflict reporting is 
rarely discussed, debated or researched in a systematic manner. To the best of this researcher’s 
knowledge, conflict reporting has not featured as a major topic at the bi-annual conference of the 
Pacific Islands News Association, the major media organisation in the region. This study seeks to 
help position conflict reporting as one of the top priorities for media development in the region to 
meet both current and future challenges in research and professional practice. 
 
Regional and national policy significance  
In terms of the formulation and pursuit of policy, this study strives to contribute to the apparently 
sparse research in this region into conflict prevention, especially from a news media perspective. 
The study is consciously consistent with expert recommendations for a holistic, proactive, multi-
sector approach to conflict resolution, since post-conflict interventions can be both protracted and 
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costly (Henderson & Watson, 2005). For example, the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) achieved some impressive results but it laboured for over a decade 
and cost AUD2.6 billion, a “massive and disproportionate investment” (Lowy Institute, 2014, p.1).  
 
Fiji is located in the relatively volatile sub-region of Melanesia, which which has been labelled with 
controversial tags such as “arc of instability” and “failed states” (Dibb, 2007; Dobell, 2003). 
Internal conflict is considered a predominant threat to regional progress and to The Pacific Plan, the 
region’s blueprint for sustainable development, good governance and security (Henderson & 
Watson, 2005; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2007). This research has implications for 
Australia, which considers the Pacific as a major priority, with one quarter of its total AUD4.8 
billion in aid directed to the region in 2011/12 (Lowy Institute, 2014). The aid program could be 
undermined by violent conflict. Indeed, a failed coup in Papua New Guinea in January 2012 stands 
as a reminder of the region’s volatility and the importance of conflict prevention strategies, 
preferably founded on research. Papua New Guinea is the major recipient of Australian aid in the 
region (Failed coup in PNG, 2012; Lowy Institute, 2014).  
 
Implications for national, regional and international research 
The Australian Government, recognising the media’s potential in the area of peace and conflict, 
allocated AUD11 million over four years (2011–15) to the Pacific Media Assistance Scheme for the 
adoption of a communication for development strategy (Pacific Media Assistance Program, 2011). 
This particular PhD study can be directly linked to a crucial goal of Australia’s National Research 
Priorities, namely, Safeguarding Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007, p. 35). This goal 
involves: 
 
• Understanding our region and the world: Enhancing Australia’s capacity to interpret and 
engage with its regional and global environment through a greater understanding of 
languages, societies, politics and cultures 
• Protecting Australia from terrorism and crime: Promoting a healthy and diverse research and 
development system that anticipates threats and supports core competencies in modern and 
rapid identification techniques. 
 
The Australian Research Council awarded the University of Sydney AUD500,000 to “strengthen 
the credentials of peace journalism as a research agenda and for media reform advocacy” through 
the formulation of a “Global Standard for Reporting Conflict” (Centre for Peace and Conflict 
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Studies, 2011). This particular study, quite possibly the first to examine conflict reporting in Fiji 
empirically, using the frameworks of peace journalism and political economy of the media, can 
contribute knowledge from a Pacific media perspective to such efforts as those Australia is 
supporting. Internationally, there is substantial available literature on war and media but empirical 
studies from a peace journalism perspective looking into media’s potential for conflict reduction are 
lacking (Hackett, 2007; Lee & Maslog, 2005; Obijiofor & Hanusch, 2011). Thus, a Fiji study based 
on a peace journalism–inspired content analysis framework could make an important empirical 
contribution to the genre internationally.  
 
Theoretical and methodological implications  
The literature suggests that Pacific media lacks consistent and in-depth scholarly investigation. The 
majority of the work is descriptive and does not apply theory (see Latu, 2010). Even fewer studies 
look at conflict reporting in any great depth. In fact, while internal conflicts in the region have been 
on the rise, there have been few corresponding studies into these developments from a media theory 
perspective.  
 
This includes research into media ownership in the Pacific with an emphasis on political economy 
aspects, or conflict reporting from peace journalism and conflict theory frameworks. An audit of the 
media landscape via questionnaire survey to assess journalist capacity and diversity is also rare in 
most Pacific Islands countries. Again, it is hoped that this particular study will inspire and inform 
similar theoretical and methodological approaches in future, especially in regional countries where 
the media set-up is largely under-researched. Moreover, most regional studies in the field of peace 
and conflict have been conducted by political scientists and sociologists (see, for example, Boxhill, 
1997; Hegarty, 2003). Such works do not adequately cover the role of the media. This is a major gap 
given the media’s central position in society and their prominent role in reporting conflicts (Lynch & 
Galtung, 2010). As R. Howard (2003) explains, a peace project that launches without examining the 
media environment is more liable to fail.  
 
Based on the apparent gaps in the literature, this research attempted to address the disconnect 
between content creation and the media landscape to better understand the phenomenon and provide 
possible solutions. In terms of originality, the development of a peace journalism–inspired coding 
category specifically for Fiji is unique, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge. The application 
of this framework to a non-violent conflict such as a national election is also rare. In the Fiji 
context, this approach has given some distinct insights, including the fact that a careful 
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interpretation of the results is warranted since a peace journalism reading is not necessarily a 
positive outcome. Such a reading could mean different things in different settings and contexts.  
 
Practical and training implications 
Specific to Fiji, the findings could be useful for supporting the case for policy reform in media 
legislation. It could also support the development of customised training and conflict reporting 
curriculum in Fiji and the region. Some regional governments accuse media of instigating conflicts 
and claim that draconian legislation is needed to lift professional standards (Robie, 2014). This 
research could help mitigate and counter such claims, having highlighted that the root causes of 
conflict are often constructivist and instrumentalist in nature, and that media censorship may be 
futile in the Internet age, not to mention a possibly counter-productive move. The research has 
argued that training and development may be better pathways for lifting professional standards and 
improving conflict reporting. Based on empirical evidence as it is, the research could be useful for 
advocating increased educational and training opportunities for journalists from the State, private 
sector and international donors.  
 
Contribution to other sectors  
This study also contributes to the work of other sectors. Globally, civil society organisations (CSO) 
are vital forces in the field of peace and conflict (Ekiyor, 2008).  In the Pacific, the Suva-based 
United Nations Development Programme’s Pacific Centre set up a Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
division in 2006. At least four Fiji-based CSOs – Citizens’ Constitutional Forum, Ecumenical 
Centre for Research, Education and Advocacy, Dialogue Fiji and femLINK Pacific – have 
incorporated media-related peace-building initiatives in their programs (Bhagwan-Rolls, 2007). 
Frohardt and Temin (2003) assert that the media should collaborate with conflict resolution 
organisations. For meaningful collaboration to occur, the media sector needs to keep abreast of the 
developments in other sectors and respond accordingly by building its own capacity through 
research activities. This study is a contribution to such efforts. 
 
The next section discusses the limitations of the research. 
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7.8 Limitations of the research 
 
While this research has made some major findings, filled some gaps in the literature and made 
various theoretical, policy and practical contributions, there are various inevitable limitations that 
need to be acknowledged. With regard to the content analysis, only the English language print 
media was studied. Broadcast and online media were not considered – despite the importance of 
radio in rural and remote areas – so the results cannot be said to be wholly representative of the 
national media’s coverage of the 2006 elections, even if print media is quite significant in Fiji. 
Moreover, one of the newspapers analysed, the Fiji Daily Post, closed in 2010. 
 
The focus of the content analysis was on news stories, with features, opinion articles, editorials and 
letters to the editor were left out. Including these items may have provided a more holistic 
impression of the elections coverage. However, they had to be excluded to bring the sample down 
to a manageable size and keep the emphasis on journalists and how they cover news. In addition, it 
is acknowledged that the researcher’s interpretation of content analysis data may be influenced by 
his biases and choices given that some measure of subjectivity is inevitable. Specific to this 
research, the content analysis data could have also been affected by a peculiarity of the 2006 
elections – the relatively high profile of the Fiji Military Forces, which warned election candidates 
to tone down their rhetoric. It is highly unusual for the military to involve itself in democratic 
elections. This ‘unnatural’ occurrence may well have distorted the true picture of how elections are 
normally fought by political parties and reported by the media in Fiji. In other words, without the 
military’s intervention, the outcome could have been different and in the final analysis, the data 
could well have returned a war journalism reading. 
 
For the national journalist survey, the researcher developed the questions from the literature review 
on the basis of his interpretation of what was relevant. In this regard, it is likely that there are 
elements of subjectivity involved. Additionally, the survey questionnaire was somewhat limiting in 
that most questions contained predetermined answers that allowed little room for explanations or 
elaboration. Moreover, the truth or otherwise of the responses in both survey questionnaires and in-
depth interviews are usually hard to verify. This would be more the case with regard to this 
particular study since the fieldwork was conducted in a politically coercive environment, what with 
Fiji under military rule since 2006 and the punitive media law in place since 2010.  
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7.9 Future research 
 
As an important non-state actor, the media’s role in conflict needs to be examined from various 
perspectives to inform further academic studies and policy directions. This study hopes to serve as a 
benchmark for further research and discussion in conflict reporting in Fiji and the region. Future 
risks to stability in the Pacific include transnational threats such as resource scarcity, climate change 
and youth bulges, especially in Melanesia (Centre on International Cooperation, 2010; Ware, 2004). 
It is imperative for the media sector to start strategising proactively in response to these impending 
matters, such as identifying areas in which journalists may require issues-based training. Such 
strategies need to be informed by, and grounded in, research.  
 
Another fertile area is the role of social media in conflict escalation and containment, given as an 
instructive example the part it played during the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. Data presented in 
this study show that Internet use in Fiji is on the rise, which means that increasingly, the news 
media are no longer the only major sources of information. A thriving political blogging culture 
already exists in Fiji, publishing news that the mainstream media will not handle, and also allowing 
the public to comment. These developments include an explosion of anti-government blogs in Fiji, 
fermenting ethnic tensions since the 2006 coup (C. Walsh, 2012). A parallel investigation of the 
‘un-censorable’ political blogging culture in Fiji and its potential impact on conflict would be a 
valuable addition.  
 
Fiji’s neglected vernacular media also need to be studied to verify claims that they are the prime 
target to stir ethnic conflict, especially during coups (Ewins, 1998; Garrett, 1990). Another area of 
interest is the potential of Pacific women in peace-building, given their prominent and crucial 
contributions to the cause of peace in Bougainville and Solomon Islands (Bhagwan-Rolls, 2006). 
This dynamic could be further explored from the perspective of the space and prominence given to 
women in both the newsroom and in the news. In the interest of media freedom and 
professionalism, parallel research is needed in other regional countries to assess journalist capacity 
and diversity, the national legislative environment and the media ownership structure to inform 
future policy directions. This study’s findings and recommendations could be the basis for further 
research into re-building media in post-conflict Pacific Islands societies. This includes Solomon 
Islands, where journalists faced accusations of ethnic bias during the civil conflict (Iroga, 2008).   
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7.10 Chapter summary 
 
This final chapter synthesised the thesis to reach conclusions and recommendations. The content 
analysis returned a peace journalism reading, but this was overshadowed by the lack of critical 
reporting. The survey questionnaire showed a fairly diverse journalist corps with some gains in the 
areas of training and education. However, there were worrying signs of sustained journalist attrition.  
Available documents confirm that the legal environment has become more restrictive since the 2006 
coup while the media ownership regime has become increasingly corporatised and ‘conglomerised’ 
over the 45 years since independence. In essence, the findings are indicative of a media sector mired 
in serious political, cultural, economic and legislative threats and challenges. Media’s alleged lack 
of professionalism are blamed for social tensions. But this research holds that media are not the root 
cause of conflict in Fiji, even if they are allegedly stimulated by it, accused of escalating it, and may 
thrive on it. In Fiji, conflict is more likely rooted in colonialism, racially-based electoral systems, 
ethnicity, competition for scarce resources, lack of leadership, and a myriad other issues (Firth, 
2001). The study indicates that in Fiji, there are deep-rooted problems in the media sector, ranging 
from lack of depth in reporting, largely due to an inexperienced and under-qualified journalist 
corps, and an increasingly politico-corporate media ownership structure putting greater political and 
commercial pressure on the news process.  
 
Punitive media legislation may have actually compromised media’s watchdog role by impeding 
their ability to speak the truth and to be critical of things as they see fit. The major sticking point is 
the incompatibility between the media’s views about what ought to be their ‘proper’ roles and 
functions compared to the views of the State. Finding common ground and mutually-acceptable 
solutions may require compromises on both sides. The bottom line is that media on their own 
accord cannot bring peace to Fiji’s divided society. As former Fiji Deputy Prime Minister Dr 
Tupeni Baba (2005) states, if Fijian society is to enjoy peace, a vision needs to be enunciated. In 
Fiji, there are substantial impediments to overcome: an enduring colonial legacy of divide and rule, 
racial polarisation and lack of political will, to name a few (Baba, 2005; Chand, 2008; Firth, 2001; 
Naidu, 2005). As Chand, writes, change in Fiji cannot “take place in a day or a year”, or over the 
“next two decades even”, simply because the “base is so low to start (2008, p. 202). However, 
change is surely feasible if envisioned as a long-term strategy based on realistic goals, incremental 
gains, and persistent efforts. 
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